INDUCTIVE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS - CHAPTER FIVE and CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FIVE
SYSTEMATIZATION
1. Other people in my shoes would probably produce several treatises on the same subject because the question of the sources, laws and conclusions related to our scheme of inductive logic is a voluminous one. In formal logic things are much simpler than that, due to the fact that the finite number of its laws engulfs the greater part of its systematization. In inductive logic the principle of analogy, which can be applied to everything, demonstrates the success of the numerous conclusions made with the help of the scheme of inductive logic. For this reason speaking of systematization in inductive logic is inappropriate. It has been established that it is an attribute of any reason, and that is why we can safely assume that in systematizing a complete scheme of inductive logic we will, in fact, systematize all such schemes. In view of the fact that we refer to the whole system of logic which constitutes the thread of thought in this treatise, we will offer to systemize it and in this way formulate a theory about inductive logical constructions. In order to do it we will consider the following questions: first, the creation of a system of inductive logic, marking the stages of its development; second, the sources of inductive logic and an analysis of their appropriateness; third, the essence of the conclusions made in relation to the source material. Being a close system, inductive logic is characterized by that that its systematization sources cannot be found anywhere else but within itself. It does not use the ready-made systems of the formal sciences, e.g. physics but identifies them as its own. In other words, it examines their systems by interweaving its own system into the analysis, which is a considerable advantage over the rest. For example, during the analysis of the systems of philosophy, logic and physics we solved a reverse logical problem, namely what is those sciences’ system of inductive logic if they have the present logical configuration. I want to point out that this is a fundamental principle in error analysis, i.e. the synthesis of their scheme of inductive logic. Currently, only psychoanalysis uses a method remotely similar to it. The only question one could pose is why the system of a particular sphere of knowledge would identify itself with a scheme of inductive logic when it could simply identify itself with its own scheme. It is not a question of imposing inductive logic but of analyzing the level of development of the imaginary common intelligence of the respective science in direct relation to its conclusions. If we examine the works of the scientists who have worked in a field as a system of a common imaginary individual, we can construct its probable scheme of logic with ease. Quite naturally, the collective nature of that individual is a prerequisite for the existence of contradictions in terms within its very scheme of logic, i.e. scientists differ in their opinions on a particular issue. Well, identification smooths out the contradictions in the spirit of the finished system of the respective science. In this way, something more developed and unified than the respective sphere of knowledge is created. It is already easy to spot the advantages of the system of inductive logic – it is capable of analyzing the complete and still nonexistent system of science. In other words, it boosts its development as regards the evaluation of its applicability as a logical model and eventually, its usefulness as a product of human endeavor.
At the beginning of this treatise I revealed my philosophical affiliations with dialectical materialism to emphasize the close relation between my work and science. Philosophy resembles a big city which boasts two football teams – you support either the one or the other. You cannot offer a new game if you are not familiar with the game; if you do not support any of the teams, you are not familiar with the game. We have convinced ourselves that materialism remains the only scientific system, whereas dialectics has degenerated into something rather different. However, before we proceed with development of this idea, I must make another point: in order to speak the languages of philosophy, logic and physics, we must be familiar with their achievements. Otherwise, we will either reach false conclusions or discover something the world is already familiar with. That is why the analysis of a science or subject comprises the synthesis of its scheme of inductive logic in its complete and unified form. The lack of any of these two aspects does not signify that only a stage in the development of that science is completed; it can result in distorting the concept of the respective science, for the analogy between working theses is dangerous.
2. What ‘pure’ science considers a logical and natural conclusion of its development within a sphere of knowledge is nothing but the initial stage of the analysis of that science’s system, undertaken by inductive logic. Inductive logic accepts the conclusions made by the science, filling them with its own system of logic. In this way, a legislation of sorts, based on the achievements of the respective science, but possessing the mechanism of the scheme of inductive logic, is created. We shall call such a finished and unified model a pre-system. Its synthetic nature is one of its important characteristics. Although the conclusions made are borrowed from the science, their logical origin is completely synthetic. This resembles the setting of a goal and finding of ways to achieve it; the setting of a logical outcome and finding a reasonable logical model to determine the outcome. It is precisely the model of the scheme of inductive logic that guarantees the optimum way. By the way, we have already come by a lot of points which are characteristic of Control theory, e.g. visibility, manageability, identification and optimization. This is a certain sign that Control theory will take part in the creation of AI. At the time we were examining the mechanism of inductive logic, we arrived at the conclusion that memory is of utmost importance. We did not consider memory as a mechanical set of elements but as a complex and coordinated system of logical correlations comprising all of the elements. While we were examining the historical development of philosophy and its inner contradictions, while we were examining the science of physics with its contradictions and unsolved problems as the opposite of philosophy, we were, in fact, creating the ‘memory’ necessary for the work of inductive logic. The law of unity and the rest of the laws of philosophy we have deduced, as well as the conclusions concerning physics and its appropriate sources are nothing else but a by-product of the unification of the pre-system of the scheme of inductive logic. To put it in plain words, inductive logic can demonstrate its power, whatever the raw material is. Following the same logic, the whole chapter on physics is a by-product of the law of unity of matter. It is something like a recipe for producing gold. The important point in all this is that unification is absolutely necessary in the work of inductive logic. The opposite can channel it to a cascade of false judgments, which can be avoided only by a total unification of the whole scheme of logic.
After the creation of the unified pre-system, a complex special scheme of logic emerges. It has its own laws, causes and effects although it functions as inductive logic does. This is so because this logic does not have laws of its own, in the sense implied when one refers to the laws of formal logic, i.e. the laws of matter, expressed by the cause and effect relations between its elements, are presented in a logical form within the system of inductive logic, and if we assume that matter could ‘change’ its laws, there would be a corresponding change in the inductive logical constructions. Otherwise, the pre-system, despite its completeness and unification, is not the only starting point in our analysis. Another such point is the strict and inevitable/unalterable individualization of the scheme of inductive logic. If the analysis is made only on the basis of the pre-system, or on the pre-systems of different spheres of knowledge, the conclusion reached will be but a correlation between the attitude of the system of science to the particular knowledge. That is why the analyst’s individual scheme of logic comes in. In other words, the pre-system of the analysis is applied to /projected on the analyst’s entire individual scheme of logic. For this reason, the type of logic (or its mechanism) in the pre-system must be compatible with reason’s system of logic. The very comparison is but an inductive logical construction, which we have examined earlier. The consequence of all this is alteration of the pre-system’s logical structure to an extent befitting the individual’s whole scheme of inductive logic. This is how the system of inductive logic in the respective field emerges. An example of this is the system of physics we have constructed in the specialized part of the chapter on physics. It is the result of the analysis of the system of physics after its unification and the comparison with the previous system of logic in the book. It is the uniqueness of our scheme of logic in just this study that has created the positive effect of our work. This hints at the fact that when AI is created, its systematization or attitude to entire branches of knowledge will be a matter of a further stage in its development and complexity.
That is why the question of the relation between the special/particular pre-system and the common system within the inductive logical analysis is of particular interest to us. Is it possible for the pre-system to ‘distort’ the individual logical scheme? The answer is positive. In practice, this happens a lot, e.g. a person acquires the qualification necessary to do a job and as a result of that they start to think in a different way. The conclusion is that their scheme of logic undergoes a change. We answered the question in part I the chapter on education when we expressed the opinion that an individual’s most important characteristic is their refusal to admit that there could be a more authoritative ideology than their own scientific view of the world. It is quite obvious that feeble-minded people perceive the system of science as an absolute authority. This gives us the rest of the answer concerning the criteria which determine the relation between the common individual pre-system and the specific pre-system. We will not consider the system of logic as a binary system, for we will arrive at the conclusion that the pre-system and the system alter each other. Even if the common individual system engulfs the pre-system, it will expand the number of its logical relations, which is an alteration in practice. When we were examining the mechanism of inductive logic we noticed the retroactive effect of the new element on the old one within the scheme of logic. What we are currently interested in is what the conditions in which the common system will be able to impose itself on the pre-system are because in the reversed case there will not be an analysis of a problem but a study of it. This leads to the conclusion that the one who performs the analysis should have an orderly, complete, coordinated and unified logical system. These features of the system will make it less liable (i.e. inert) to changing influences, due to the close connection among its elements. The orderly nature of an individual’s ideology or philosophy reflects the lack of contradictions within the system. Its completeness requires a profound knowledge of numerous spheres of knowledge and the coordination signifies a mutual interdependence of the accumulated pieces of information. Unification is a reflection of the very logical system upon itself. In other words, the individual realizes that they have built a complex logic of their own and is capable of evaluating it in relation to every sphere of human knowledge. This is how the inertness of the logical system becomes a reality. In education, this inertness is weaker despite the conclusions we made while we were considering this issue. However, in the analysis it has to be absolute. Contrary to the wide-spread opinion, it is impossible to make an orderly, detailed and complete analysis of a problem if the common individual system of inductive logic changes during the creation, unification and especially the application of the pre-system to it. In other words, there would not be a starting point other than the object of study. That is why it is necessary for the analyst’s personal scheme of logic to be absolute. Otherwise, that which is nowadays called analysis, is carried out in the following way: first, the analyst acquaints themselves with the system of the analyzed subject, i.e. its divisions, subdivisions and movements; second, they acquaint themselves with the prospects for development the subject has, which, of course, is but a subjective public evaluation. So far, we can see that half of the conclusions have already been forcefully made; third, an arbitrary comparison of different problems belonging to diverse periods of the subject’s development; fourth, the rest of the conclusions are made. Some analysts go even further than that. They analyze the system of logic for inner contradictions and often reach valuable conclusions about the subject, regardless of the fact that they use the methods of formal logic. If someone manages to impose his own ideas, it usually concerns something rather specific and never results in a complete systematic analysis. Although it is fashionable to formulate ‘general theories’, the above words are still valid – the universality of the General theory of relativity compared to the specialized part of the chapter on physics is, to put it in Japanese, is a few centuries behind. But we have already dwelled on the subject at length.
The construction of a complete system concerning a specific set of problems is a logical synthesis, which is called analysis despite all. I see no controversy in that. That which formal logic perceives as disjointed and contrary phenomena, i.e. analysis and synthesis, inductive logic sees as simultaneous events. Alongside the construction of its system, certain logical correlations within the pre-system change. The establishment of the character of those changes is a complete systematic analysis. The fact that the logical conclusions contain sub-elements belonging to the whole system of logic, has determined the use of the term ‘analysis.’ It signifies the whole research from the identification of the problem to its complete exploration. Generally speaking, this is where the greatest difference between formal logic and inductive logic lies. Formal logic considers statement @3 the end of its study, i.e. the arrival at a logical conclusion connecting several elements of formal logic in a particular way with the help of a particular system belonging to the same formal logic, whereas the goal or rather the final stage inductive logic reaches and most importantly continues after it, is the creation of a large-scale unified system of logic. Strictly speaking, unification cannot be considered a characteristic feature in this case because inductive logic is an open system, and unification is characteristic of close systems. In this sense, unification is observed only when the pre-system is created, whereas in the end-system it is only a process, due to the ability of the substance of reason to expand. That is why when we were exploring the system we spoke of unification rather than a process of unification, which does not change the logical structure of the exposition.
As regards the construction of the scheme of inductive logic, we have identified two basic stages, namely identification and unification ending in the creation of the pre-system, and establishing the complete system of the individual, ending in the establishment of the very system concerning the considered problem. The most serious problem in this respect is the pre-system’s attitude to the common scheme of logic (i.e. the inertness of the common scheme of logic). We have already pointed out that lack of erudition, insufficient mental capacity and badly ordered personal ideology cannot be the basis for a systematic analysis. The people suffering from the above deficiencies should turn to religion – to put it in the language of programmers - they only have to enter to run in a loop all of their lives. And again, it is not a question of the system of values behind religions but of the logical structure behind them. Problems such as good and evil, morals, sin, god, god’s will (I still find it difficult to explain to myself what the last one means.), etc. are but a vicious circle within logic, or in religious terms – a sin in the religion of logic. The system of logic is a vast labyrinth in which the entire mental capacity of humanity would not be able to find a way out, should it be locked in it.
3. When a systematic analysis is carried out, the problem of the appropriateness of the complete individual scheme of logic mostly concerns the question of the sources of the above-mentioned scheme and their relevance. The interesting point here is that an inappropriate logical scheme cannot have relevant sources, simply because this is the thing that makes it inappropriate. If reason can find among its activities analogies which reflect the laws of cause and effect, it will construct an adequate model of those analogies. The reverse is compensated by inductive logic’s close connection with experience, even if we assume that what lies inside its system of logic cannot originate from anywhere else but from experience. If inductive logic was a close system, it would be a more deplorable sight than formal logic. That is why, in practice, there is no problem related to the sources of the inductive logical system, whereas there is a problem related to the optimization of the logical process. Its essence is the selection of appropriate analogies in order to increase the speed and universal applicability of the logical conclusion. This is what we will call the question of the sources of inductive logic and their appropriateness.
If we refer to previous paragraphs, we will find out that for sources of our scheme of inductive logic we have used various very unlikely things, such as relations between different spheres of knowledge (e.g. philosophy versus science, idealism versus materialism), supernatural phenomena pertaining to human reason (e.g. rebirth, telepathy, intuition, etc.), special scientific theories (e.g. electromagnetism), etc. When the individual carries out an inductive logical analysis, they choose their sources by themselves and they do not have to explain or even justify their choices, in contrast to formal logical analysis, where this is necessary. One’s sources are strictly individual, and from the point of view of ones scheme of logic - by no means chaotic. On the contrary, they are in harmony with one’s own whole scheme of inductive logic. When the individual analyses a problem, they find out which logical structure within their own scheme is compatible with the cause and effect relationships, characteristic of the problem at hand. If the logical structure of these relationships already exists within their scheme, an element from memory is being identified, if it is not the case, an analogy with an element from memory is being made. The rest of the analysis is carried out in accordance with the same pattern. Therefore the question of the sources and their appropriateness is related to the character of the individual logical scheme. As far as every individual is concerned, the choice of a source is completely arbitrary, due to the fact that every individual’s scheme of logic is different from the rest. However, if we approach this process with a view to the natural development of reason itself as related to the cause and effect relationships of matter, we will find out that with the development of reason, the analogies will gradually start losing their arbitrary character until it becomes mere identification at the moment when reason explains in logical terms matter, itself and the included third factor.
Let us now consider the sources, other than my scheme of inductive logic (i.e. the basic source of this work), we have used and what problems we have solved with their help (we should not forger that we are making a systematization of this treatise).
In the first section of the chapter on philosophy the sources used were the relationships between science and philosophy, idealism and materialism, as well as their historical development and their recognition of themselves as spheres of knowledge. This led us to the historical, dialectical and graphic analysis of their relations. The first example of inductive logic – an analogy based on binary systems – led to conclusions, utterly different from the ones reached by the previous methods, which cast doubt on their appropriateness. During the initial and rather superficial analysis of inductive logic, we discovered that it is directly related to reason (i.e. human reason), whereas formal logic is related to the cause and effect relationships of matter as well as its retroactive attitude to itself. This laid the foundations of the chapter entitled ‘The Transformations of Reason’, whose purpose was to solve the problem of the weaker relation between inductive logic and matter, and to establish whether it is a weakness on the part of inductive logic or not. The sources used were phenomena such as rebirth, not to impress the reader (I made sure that such people would drop the book after the first chapter), but simply because only the above-mentioned sources could lead us to the most valuable source of our whole scheme of inductive logic, namely electromagnetism. It is on its basis that we made the model of man’s brain activity, which later became the model of inductive logic as well. The heavy inductive construction bridging two pairs of different spheres of knowledge as well as the matter-reason axis completely built the system of reason’s relation to matter.
In this way, on the premise that reason copies matter in logical means, we founded the third chapter of the book, namely ‘Physics’. We did not rush to make a model of matter. Instead of that, we made an assessment of physics’ current state of affairs on the basis of a comparison made between the system of physics and the system of inductive logic as it was at the time. We found out that the sources or postulates, i.e. the starting points of the study predetermine the future system of any science and the rest of the processes, whatever they are, are processes of unification within the respective system. For this very reason the specialized part of this chapter did not rely on any sources. Even the contemporary physical concepts of space and time were abandoned and were only artificially revived for the sake of depiction. In this chapter we demonstrated the validity of the law of unity of matter, and that our logical model can be applied not only to man but to any reason, due to the regenerative property of matter, a form of which is reason itself.
In the chapter entitled ‘Earth – Man – Reason’ we made a turn towards the problem of human reason in the question of uniqueness and multiplicity. In this chapter we simply applied the accumulated conclusions to the society of man.
The sources of a study undoubtedly affect the conclusions made – it was the conclusion we arrived at in the general part of ‘Physics’. It is precisely for this reason why there were no sources in the specialized part of the same chapter; the aim was to eliminate the subjective influence on the synthesis of the model of matter. A source could be the common individual scheme of the model’s synthetic character, but on second thought if did not exist there would not be a synthetic model at all. What we are envisaging is the sources as elements of the common scheme of logic and not the scheme as a whole. Since our scheme of logic until ‘Physics’ comprises reason as a form and logical copy of matter, I see no problem in the synthetic character of the model of matter. That is why our main task at the time was to avoid the postulates because they could predetermine the conclusions we would reach in the future. As we have already found out, our conclusions had a very powerful retroactive effect on our logical system at the time, be it through the introduction of new elements or as a proof of its validity. One of those conclusions had a tremendous effect on the whole system of dialectical materialism, largely used in this book.
4. The conclusion which affected the system of philosophy the most is the one concerning the development of dialectics as a philosophical system. Due to its importance, we will consider it in detail.
Let us first assemble and sum up the scattered facts and conclusions related to the above-mentioned philosophical system, but from the point of view of the so called official philosophy. Over its long development dialectics has grown beyond the etymology of the term which stands for it. ‘Dialego’originally denoted a conversation and only later came to mean the ability to argue or support a thesis by questions and answers. Nowadays, it might sound naïve, but isn’t philosophy itself a chain of problems and solutions, i.e. questions and answers? For centuries dialectics tried to find its own true nature, and there were philosophical systems bearing the name, although from a contemporary point of view, they had nothing to do with it. During that time dialectics’ intrinsic dialogue remained unchanged and its system began to take the shape of knowledge of the contradictions in nature, their causes, driving forces and development. The close connection between dialectics and the scientific knowledge of the world is no longer hard to see, although one could find contradictions even in reason. It is this last thing that Kant was after. Most authors consider him the father of contemporary (I would say – the contemporary scientific dialectics) dialectics. In view of the fact that we are being interested in the dualism within this system, we have to point out that despite his oppositions, Kant was careful to stipulate that the oppositions he was envisaging were relationships between two subjects. By expressing the opinion that the above-mentioned oppositions disappear ‘when thought returns among its boundaries’, he indirectly admitted that dialectical opposition is but an illusion of reason. Immediately after Kant came the highest point in the development of dialectics, namely Hegel’s ideas. He realized that everything in nature comes out of something else, develops according certain laws, changes in the same way and is eventually transformed into something else which is a negation of its origin. Thus, Hegel filled the concept of dialectics as we know it. However, he considered motion prior to contradiction, and in my opinion this is the reason why all of his philosophical researches were so successful.
I realize that I might have shocked some fellow colleagues by announcing my adherence to dialectical materialism and at the same time failing to recognize the dialectical Marxist theory as the highest point in the development of dialectics. It is so indeed. Dialectical materialism is a scientific approach to knowledge, which, of course, has its own universally recognized successes and accomplishments. However, our present concern is with systematization - the clear-cut form of a system which will help us select what we need for this chapter from the general system of philosophy. Materialist dialectics is largely a magic spell for scientists, designed to prevent them from seeing the hand of god in the perfection of nature, rather than a subject worth a systematic analysis. It is a big step backwards in the development of this brilliant philosophical system. The question is why. Whereas Kant chose the unique in the static nature of objective relations, and Hegel chose their change and development to find that eventually the contradictions are ‘negations of themselves’, i.e. they are one the same thing, dialectical materialism reduced the multiplicity of being to a contradiction of two sole subjects. It is true that every process flowing in nature can be projected on any set of contradictions, but this projection is not sufficient enough to describe or analyze it. This approach proved to be most applicable to the analysis of social relations (we already know why it is so) with all the consequences ensuing from that. The brittle equilibrium in any society became easily upset and that without much effort. One might be left under the impression that I have swapped the positions of cause and effect – it could be argued that the analysis of social relations and particularly the contradictions created by society have produced the system of materialist dialectics. So what? The emphasis in all this is the limited starting point and the alternative narrow postulates in it rather than on the conclusions reached in this way. However, since we are talking about conclusions, we have to mention that dialectical materialism had and still has an overwhelming influence in the system of ethics. By transferring the contradictions of bourgeois society to its own system, which is more of a historical irony than regularity, dialectical materialism (i.e. Marxism) was trying to vanquish them with their own spirit, behaving like a wolf in a pack, and the moment it could have done it was not that far away in time. What prevented it from doing it was the lack of a precedent in which a wolf devours the entire pack. However, accounts of the opposite phenomenon were not lacking at all. The fruit of that system of values was the famous slogan ‘Whoever is not with me, is against me.’ This unfortunate phrase became the ‘face’ of Marxist ideology. The clear prospect of the transfer of a particular contradiction from a certain relationship to others was described I detail by professor Paulsen, although he was mostly busy criticizing the godlessness of capitalism. This, though, combined with the enormous inertia of Hegel’s dialectics, turned dialectical materialism into a leading scientific system of human knowledge (due to its uniqueness), which makes the above-mentioned professor look like a thief in front of an empty safe. In fact, if the critics of materialism or Marxism knew what exactly to criticize within it, the USA
The founding of our study on dialectical materialism was like setting off from Rome Rome
The opposites dialectics deals with arise from the fact that dialectics is a system of the mind. Since reason defines itself as contrary to matter, rather than a whole with it, the negative logical scheme becomes a part of dialectics’ general system. The main axis of opposites – that of matter-reason, does not just constitute certain conclusions in the analysis, but creates the system of pro-logical disciplines. That is why my personal opinion is that dialectics exists alongside reason, and there is no philosophical system that can be its worthy opponent; if it is possible for one to exist, it could only be matter and nothing else. It is dialectics itself that has created the system of logic in its finished form during its study of the immaterial – the laws of thinking have been separated from those of matter. This has resulted in the establishment of their rationalist character, i.e. that which distinguishes them from the laws of matter itself. Along this line of thoughts, we have to conclude that dialectics is a tool of reason’s second reflection, although at first sight it seems that it would fit the first one better. Awareness as a separate subject is not the beginning of a logical system; it is just a truth, whereas the awareness of one’s reason accentuates intelligence itself, which puts the first axis of contradictions, namely that of matter versus reason within the system of dialectics. In this way dialectics begins to include all possible differences (not necessarily diametrical opposites) in its configuration, until it fills the required ‘memory’ for the formulation of its laws. They become a reality after contradictions and differences are stripped bare of their subjects and only their relations remain as a repetitive and ordered configuration. There have to be differences in order to fill those relations, turned into laws of dialectics, with logical content. Therefore, we can state that the laws of dialectics are laws of differences between differences. This negative or rather alternative formulation of the laws of matter demonstrates that being a manifestation of pure reason, dialectics in its perfect and finished form will be able to describe only hybrid matter, i.e. the common accidental property of reason. Therefore, the discrepancy between the elements of the dialectical system and real matter will be dangerously labeled as the opposite – something non-existent, a lack or a common shadow. It turns out that dialectics is a world of shadows, which lay people find comfortable, theoreticians find bizarre and only the chosen ones find possible to explore. It cannot deduce the unity of matter through identifying its subject with its shadow. Therefore, dialectics is a system which cannot possibly be successfully combined with the materialist approach. Its intrinsic alternativeness overburdens its logical system with relations, non-existent in real matter.
What we have just done is a typical error analysis. In it, we synthetically recreated the system of philosophical dialectics and in this way applied it to our whole scheme of inductive logic. This is how we established the cause of the emergence of the category of ‘opposition’ within its system, i.e. the addition of the alternative configuration of concepts to the lack of alternativeness which is characteristic of matter. This negative quality always emerges in materialist dialectics in contrast to idealist dialectics, where it doesn’t, for the object of study in it is ideas, i.e. alternativeness, and the use of a balancing element within the logical system is not necessary, what is more it is even unwanted. That is why I consider Hegel’s dialectics the highest point in the development of this philosophical system. Hegel and Kant did almost every thing we have done in our study – the analysis of reason, its laws and mechanisms, which are but the very laws of matter. However, as far as matter is concerned, we arrived at the conclusion that it is rather evasive, and we need a new fundamental principle, such as the law of unity of matter. For this reason, dialectics withdrew to the background, and since then we have not abided the principles of any logical system, due to the fact that the principle of logic’s most powerful representative, namely dialectics, failed to produce the expected results. We have to point out that it was no fault on the part of the ones using it, for if there had been the faintest trace of our fundamental principle within dialectics, we would have found it through the matter-reason axis.
It is time we posed the question what should take the place of dialectics within the system of materialist philosophy? Let us make the following parallel:
 |
We see that the Law of unity of matter can successfully substitute ‘X’. After our completion of the system of inductive logic on the principle of analogy, and the consequent creation of a whole model of matter through it, the system of the materialist philosophy we have been trying to find could be filled only by the Law of the unity of matter. Thus the subject of this new type of materialism we have envisaged would be the multiple unitypicality and unified manifestation of matter in all its forms. In this way materialism would abandon its outdated interpretation of matter as a body which has its own volume in favor of a more general understanding. We point out the fact only at the end of the book due to the fact that it is a question of the expansion of a system by means of definition, i.e. after the expansion of our scheme of inductive logic’ concept of matter as a mono-corpuscular phenomenon has taken place. Furthermore, it is of great importance that matter’s motion will not be determined by relationships between contraries, but by relationships between numerous time dimensions and even within them. It is difference rather than opposition that will lie at the crux of the study of this motion.
As regards the name of this type of materialism, I have no ideas whatsoever, despite my absolute right to give it one; besides, in most cases it is other people who give a phenomenon a name. I would simply call it materialism or mono-materialism, but this is irrelevant after all. What matters is the general materialist open system of its logical structure.
Despite the fact that orthodox dialectical materialism is a sufficiently well-structured and consistent monistic theory, for it considers matter the only source of being, the reader cannot fail to notice the enormous advantages of our mono-materialism. In its capacity of a philosophical system, it postulates that the source of the universe is not matter in general, but a particular uniform type of matter, namely the mono-corpuscle. This has rendered senseless the formulation of fuzzy interpretations of the concept of matter, which would inevitably be subjected to criticism or just misdirect the flow of thoughts in the wrong direction. As regards reason, there is no ‘dialectical logic’ which has complicated laws and relations to other logical models, but a simple and lucid logical scheme based on a single principle. The only thing in which matter manifests itself everywhere has found its place in the model of matter, and consequently in the model of reason. Such perfect inner symmetry promises the general philosophical system of the models of matter and reason a successful future. In other words, mono-materialism is intrinsically devoid of complex principles, a law package, alternative notions, i.e. irrelevant complications. For this reason and due to the simplicity of its postulates and depth of sources, we can say that it is a much more elegant philosophical system than dialectical materialism. It is quite natural that mono-materialism comprises principles which have a lot in common with the principles of dialectics; I can even say that by removing the pairs of opposites, we will get a system describing relations between different objects. In other words, we will get the same method we used in our analysis of matters dynamics. What differs in our scheme is the fact that it does not consider dynamics as the result of relations between differences, but as an intrinsic characteristic of the mono-corpuscle. A dangerous mistake would be to confuse the concepts of matter’s dynamics and multiplicity which allowed us to deduce the diversity of matter’s forms in the specialized part in ‘Physics’. Whereas we have found multiple proof of the fact that there could not be multiplicity without dynamics, the reverse thesis, namely the one stating that multiplicity, due to its axiomatic nature, defines dynamics, cannot serve as a source, especially in inductive logic.
CONCLUSION
To bring the models of reason and matter together in a single philosophical work, even to create such successful and applicable models is not a frequent occurrence in the realm of philosophy. The cause of that happy event in our case is the gold mine bearing the name of Law of the unity of matter. If the reader has taken the pulse of the exposition, if they have understood the basic sources, principles and conclusions made, I completely convinced that they will benefit greatly from this treatise. I am far from the thought that this is a theory which completes or closes the study of being because it has a global character. I have always pointed out the reverse as its basic feature. Its universality opens up exciting vistas before scientific knowledge. It will not be long before AI becomes topical with its serious ideology, and as soon as it becomes possible to load it into a physical carrier, it will become a reality. As far as physics is concerned, the prospects are rather different. If we ignore the overcoming of its inertia as well as the emergence of a new unorthodox generation of workers in its field, the transition from the physical model to real and identified types of matter will not be easy at all, despite the fascinating inner symmetry of our theory. To put it in plain words, the task of establishing the number of periods of time dimensions demands a great amount of creative mathematical intuition, but unfortunately it is very unlikely that mathematicians will understand our mono-corpuscular model. In jest, it will be hard to establish what the design behind the specialized part of ‘Physics’ is; well, the answer is lies in the physical concepts as logical elements.
At this point I would like to bring up the question of the moral dimensions of my book within the system of ethics. In order to get ahead of the orthodox presence in this discipline, I want to point out straight away that the book cannot be considered atheistic under any circumstances. Whether it is divine is for history to say; the only thing that worries me is the presence of historians in history. It is true that our scheme of logic changes the very notion of god; it even demonstrates that man cannot become god, for god is, in fact, the unity of reason and matter. If there is a religion ready to change its dogma in the spirit of such a vision, it must be the Orthodox Church, which has, strangely enough, failed to create a close system of its dogma. As regards the rest of ‘logical’ religions capable of borrowing my ideas, I will only point out that I do not necessarily perform Bach’s ‘Toccata and Fugue’ when I play D Minor. As far as Islam and Catholicism are concerned, there could be no question of development at all. If we put aside the concept of god, we will find out that ‘Inductive Logical Constructions’ has a significant influence on ethics. The unity and harmony within matter, between reason and matter, or simply in being is a very old ethical category, but it is so powerful in our study that it purges the entire ethics of any balancing elements or anything other than unity. The abstract principles and explanations of the ethics we are all too well familiar with could hardly show a reasonable man what his purpose in life is, whereas with us the conclusion forces itself: the achievement of harmony through conscious penetration in the laws of the universe does not have to be searched for; it will inevitably take place in accordance with the same laws. Along these lines we can say that man simply has to live his life in harmony with matter or the rest of the living creatures on Earth. It is obvious that such wording contradicts every compulsory action or thought which is enforced by the majority of religions, and for this reason I predict a stormy future for it.
The wave of sociologists, politologists, logicians, historians and others willing to criticize my punctuation will meet with staunch indifference. It was my deep conviction that I should avoid the affected style of some authors as well as the senile peevishness of others, and for that reason I called a spade a spade without marketeering compromises whatsoever. I am also convinced that the functional philosophical style, reinforced at times to the sake of precision, has not obscured the overall simplicity and clarity of the exposition. For this reason it is really fortunate that my philosophy supercedes Hegel’s own philosophy, for were it otherwise, it would have been defined as barbarian – a word applied to Kant’s work as well. Furthermore, it would have been referred to as ‘concerning the elements of reason which never existed’. We can go on in the same humorous tone and make the claim that modern philosophers often debate with philosophers from the past with very little knowledge of the concepts they are dealing with, uncertain whether they are trying to establish one and the same thing or whether the text they are dealing with is the complete original of the work, if it is an original at all. What they are certain about is that no critic will denounce them for that. As regards the above-mentioned consideration, I am safe and sound, for I have no will to argue, and besides I have included the possible antitheses of my opponents in my exposition. “What should we trust, then?” seems to be the only counter- argument, but it is no more than small talk, for even children have become aware of the fact that things are not a matter of believing. If I had to criticize my own theory as if it were somebody else’s, the above-mentioned would still be its only disadvantage.
Otherwise, the varying interpretation of concepts at different times could be a serious problem. The use of universally accepted terms which are not alien to everyday speech considerably weakens but does not completely remove this probability. That is why every one of them should be considered only in relation to the rest. The fact that philosophical thought has always been subjected to militant individualism (which, by itself, could be a valuable feature) will protect me from shallow followers and sham interpreters, and on the other hand the certainty that the people evaluating this book will not be able to voice anything else but their unsatisfactory conclusions and deductions, will help the ones willing to acquaint themselves with my ideas not to get a wrong impression. On the whole, I could think of no reason why I should be afraid of hostile criticism.
The only thing left for me now is to cry bitter tears over the vanished chances that any significant discoveries could still be made on Earth.
Коментари
Публикуване на коментар