INDUCTIVE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS - CHAPTER THREE, Common part 1

CHAPTER THREE

PHYSICS

It is because no one challenges the accomplishments of modern physics – an outcome of its long historical development - that they enjoy the status of unquestionable facts. Nowadays a lot of its branches are systematically complete and possess an inner symmetry, which makes them and the scientists devoting their lives to the unraveling of the mysteries of matter and its development so authoritative and respectable. One of these branches is the Physics of Solid Objects. The laws which govern the behavior of solid objects have seized to be a secret since a long time ago, but besides the already discovered and explained phenomena, there are undiscovered and presently inexplicable ones, and it is they that push physics and other sciences forward. Reason’s innate desire to apprehend being determines as absolute the desire of every human science to unravel the mysterious. The problem is that this zeal often becomes inert – physics often starts dealing with problems without a clear understanding of the tasks it has set for itself, or the principles it will use to solve the particular problems, or the type of conclusions at which it wants to arrive. When one walks in the dark, they move slowly for fear they might stumble and fall. This is precisely what modern (I prefer to call it experimental) physics does not do. One might say ‘Why should it slow down its pace?’ Physics will either discover something new or it won’t, and if it does – the sooner, the better. I am afraid this is all wrong. Under these conditions it is much better not to discover anything, for if it discovers something other than what has been sought, but nevertheless proclaims it to be so, a false theory, which could destroy other valid ones whose advancement has taken years, or even centuries, could be formulated - and this only an insignificant damage. This is where chaos is unleashed in physics. Similar cases are not unknown to history – on reaching land Christopher Columbus believed it was the shore of The West Indies. Logically, the happy end of this story cannot be mirrored in physics. The law of unity postulates that matter is one in all of its manifestations. It is this universality that every science clutches at as if it were a life – buoy. But no one is happy when a newly erected edifice starts falling to pieces. In fact, the possible causes of such fallacies run deeper than this.

The concept of physics has been around since time immemorial. Physics has been defined as a science of the essence of things in nature, the existing relationships among them and their development. In addition to metaphysics – the science of the supernatural and absolutely determined, it comprised an enormous part of ancient philosophy. The superficial knowledge of matter which the thinkers of the ancient world possessed made them seek out its laws with the help of speculations and the power of thought, which often led to astounding conclusions. It is even more bewildering that their theoretical work is more exact than their specific conclusions. Some explain this phenomenon with prior knowledge; others more pragmatically - with the existence of even older highly developed civilizations still unknown to contemporary science. I myself am inclined to explain it with the ability of reason to connect the phenomena, as to the particular mistakes – with reason’s desire to explain the unknown with the help of the already familiar. As a rule thinkers seldom keep in touch with their contemporaries, not to say anything about older civilizations. As regards the possible prior (innate) knowledge, it is most likely related to rebirth of which I would not dear say anything in particular. The conclusion is that ancient physics possesses every characteristic feature of ancient science, i.e. it developed as a branch of philosophy typically characterized by abstractedness and lack of criteria (the criteria by which the truth could de established were still being particularized) as a negative attitude of reason to matter (section 9, part II). But this is only an effect. The cause, as mentioned above, is the impossibility of reaching the crux of the problems through experimentation. By problems I mean the particular questions regarding the structure of matter, its variability, the different relationships it enters and their fundamental principles, while problems in general would suggest physics as such, and this is the goal of science as such. Casting a second look at the essence of ancient physics, we cannot fail to notice the existence of exact practical conclusions, which aren’t and could not be an explanation of the unknown with the help of the familiar, but are rather a logical consequence of that astoundingly precise theoretical work. Therefore, drawing on the wisdom of ancient physics we should reach concrete conclusion about matter only if they are the direct result of theorizing on the unknown.

What is nowadays considered an achievement of modern physics, but is not relevant to our research, is the opportunities for experiments on matter, related to the problems physics is trying to solve, with which modern technologies provide this science. Modern physics like any other contemporary science has separated from philosophy to become a formal science in its own right pretending to possess its own system of analyzing the specific problems with which it deals. If the utmost goal of ancient physics was the acquisition of knowledge about the essence of things, the goal of modern physics is to experimentally obtain results matching the predicted data, and this mainly because of the presumption that a theoretical model cannot be wrong. This, especially the attempt to look for faults in the experiment, not in the theory, does not honor any respectable science. The experiment has an absolute value, so do the results. The crux of the problem is to determine if the obtained result is the one that has been sought out, and if it turns out to be, to correct the theoretical model. Unfortunately, this seldom takes place; it is a lot easier to treat the experiment as a failure. On the whole, the picture is very interesting: either a false result is declared to be the one that has been sought out, as a consequence of which a correct theoretical model is altered, or what has been sought out is found, but it does not match the predictions, and the result is that the theory remains unaltered while the experiment is declared a failure – a pathetic state which can be supported by facts and figures. But as they say – either say good things about the dead or say nothing. Generally speaking, the technologies which enabled the physicists - researchers to experiment with matter dangerously biased their judgment on their own ability to assess data. Because of the abundance of experiments and theoretical works contemporary physicists cannot admit the possibility that their own scientific theories about the structure and interactions of simple matter could be wrong although they do not even have a vague notion of it. To use their own jargon – they cannot imagine that time and space are nothing but fiction characteristic of the ability of the mind to assess information and employ the meter and the second as basic units of measure in the system of dimensions. They cannot even imagine that matter can come out of nowhere, i.e. that there are particles which do not react to anything at all. (I admit that the neutrino is a good guess.) They have connected the concepts of ‘mass’ and ‘energy’ in a dangerous way, for their neutrino with its zero mass possesses the greatest energy while all other particles are energy reductions. At the same time they have dangerously distanced energy from its traditional definition, namely – the ability to do work. We should take this as an ability to alter. This quantitative ability has two sub-elements: kinetic and potential energy (i.e. motion and the possibility of motion).However, the appending of the energy of an object to its mass led to the announcement that the object’s potential energy is proportional to the squared speed of light of mass and equals the full kinetic energy when the object moves at the speed of light. This is ridiculous because we are talking about one and the same thing. One cannot possibly determine the potential energy of a single object!!! Even if we decide to drop the issue of potential and kinetic energy, we have to say that the connection between mass and energy is valid only for highly organized matter such as the atom or molecule, and this is so provided that a slight correction is made, which physicists never do because they seek the source of energy in mass. However, this correction is added to the full energy and it is much smaller in rates, which renders its measuring unnecessary. When we construct a model of matter, we will find out why. As regards elementary particles, this connection is irrelevant, the more I consider it invalid at all.

On the premise of what already has been said we can draw the conclusion that physicists, influenced by the opportunities for experimentation, succumb to the inertia of physics and enter provinces of scientific knowledge foreign to themselves, without even being able to imagine what goes beyond their understanding of physical reality, or making an attempt at correcting the basic theoretical premises in advancing hypotheses about the problem at hand. That is why I advise contemporary physicists to denounce my hypotheses as sheer stupidity, or else modern physics will be compromised.

2. Let us now ask ourselves from the standpoint of the problems with which a practical science such as modern physics deals, what is the cause of its inertia and what is its representation? This question entails two other questions regarding the cause and effect (consequence) in general and the effect in particular respectively.

As far as the initial cause is concerned, we have already defined it as reason’s desire to explain the unknown with help of the familiar. This is a new turn in our study because we have not yet considered the development of reason in relation to a particular problem; we have done it in relation to the great divides in its existence, i.e. reflection. It is apparent that one cannot exceed the limits of their own notion of things when trying to formulate a definition of a particular problem. The proof follows hard upon: reason (with its inductive logic) cannot establish a connection with something that does not exist. It cannot include something indefinite into something already defined. What it could do is create a concept of the unknown, thus providing it with logical content, and only then it could become a part of its logical structure. This is the sequence in which every process of learning should develop. What is sought with the help of logic should not be associated with the familiar changing it dangerously; on the contrary – a logical niche (space) for identifying the unknown should be created and only then it should be associated with the familiar in order to fill it logical content. Due to the fact that the current study is an intellectual attitude to particular problems, I have to say that I have not gone astray from this pattern of research because I believe it is the most evolved of all.

The explanation of the unknown with the help of the familiar is related to a particular stage in the development of the relationship between knowledge and the problems pertaining to it. It is by no means an isolated phenomenon, on the contrary – it is universally applicable. However, the fact that it is related to a particular stage in the development of the above – mentioned relationship makes it particularly static to out dissatisfaction. We will work out its dynamic formula at the end of this research. Let reason deal with a problem comprising a set of phenomena which could include cause and effect relationships identified as unalterable. Within this problem there are solved and unsolved problems. The solved ones have helped create a theoretical system which has been verified numerously and has been found successful. It is precisely in the development of reason in relation to the unknown and the unraveling of its nature that the dynamics of the process we have been seeking out manifests itself. The concept of the unknown could not be made for its own sake. It always has a connection to the logical structure of reason. However, the degree of correlation between the familiar and the unknown sets the parameter which guides the explication of the newly found by the already existing system of reason or science. What happens? Reason, which already has a theoretical explication of the phenomena and processes with which it is familiar, has prepared a theoretical system for them. The moment it finds it difficult to define the unknown, for it cannot be comprised by the system, it increases the number of its concepts in such a way as to include both the familiar and the unknown which could be directly connected to the familiar. These are the initial conditions which unequivocally betray the dynamics of the examined process. From this point onwards it is quite natural that reason desires to transform this close set into a system of identical correlations, identical behavior and consequently formulate a theory about the set. Therefore, our definition of dynamics is: The closure of a theoretical system in relation to its unsolved problems transforms the system into a homogeneous whole. We have mentioned that the closing of the system takes place because it is impossible for theory to apply to every unknown thing. Therefore, the unknown which enters the system is excluded from the theoretical formulae because it has a direct connection to the familiar. Without this circle of knowledge there are other problems some of which could claim a place within the circle (it). Within the circle there is an already completed system which is characterized by the relationship between the theoretical system and its subject, and between the system and problems with which it deals. It is at this point that the processes taking place within a closed binary system described by Hegel begin: there are four possibilities, but because they include the lack of reaction only three of them are considered – the first can engulf the second or the vice versa or they can destroy each other. These variations could be generally described in the following way: each element becomes a part of the final result (i.e. element). The result is, in fact the corollary we referred to at the beginning of this section. These are the two common moments of the inertia of a practical science.

Before we start discoursing on the effect in particular, i.e. on the importance of our arguments for modern physics, I would like to dwell a little longer on the dynamic model. The closing/completion of a theoretical system in relation to its problems is not grounded. Theory could simply give up when natural phenomena do not behave in accordance with it. The closing / completion of the system is a result of the ability to assess information. The evaluation of theory as the greatest logical set defines the theoretical system as a close set and thus limits the problems with which it deals. As regards the relationship between the closing and the reflective unification which follows it, we can say that although from the point of view of the history of physics these events belong to the future (a hundred years from now); from the point of view of reason they are logically simultaneous. The moment a theory acquires the status of a general theory it is already a close/complete system regardless of the problems unrelated to it; the unification which follows is totally unavoidable and logically speaking it has already taken place. The less specific a theory is the longer will take the reflective process of unification. For example, it took Einstein’s General theory of relativity a century. However, the end of this process by no means marks the beginning of the examinations of other problems. Science faces problems all the time, as regards the desire to bring unification to an end, it should be treated as a desire to complete something whose end is already known and is no longer of interest to the logician.

My arguments concerning the inertia of physics, which I would include even if they were not an integral part of the exposition, are an ideal example of a lucid dialectical study. The difference between two objects within a clearly defined sphere of concepts leads to motion within the system which continues until the balancing of all correlations among the elements of the system. First we identified opposites and then we defined them as different. The concrete object, i.e. the scientific theoretical system identifies a specific reason for its inner motion in relation to its own elements and their peculiarities. We adopted a rather general approach to the problem, for we did not address physicists, the history of physics, specific theories or sets of theories, or particular problems. The mutual identification of the different parts of the relationship was of utmost importance for determining their dynamics. This is the complete set of postulates one would find in a good dialectic. Because our study of physics will reflect on inductive logic, I have been trying to avoid mentioning it in order to give an example of it and create a concept of it in the reader’s mind.

Dialectic possesses a single negative quality – it is rather general. It always regards a wider circle of concepts than it is necessary for the research. It is for this reason that Hegel spoke of ‘the thing’ and a lot of philosophers complain that they cannot understand his arguments. Our study of the system of physics determined the desire to achieve unification as basic principle of a system’s dynamics. Such a desire could be observed not only in physics but in the rest of formal sciences. The process commences after a discovery has been made, for it exerts an influence on everything with which it has connections. This principle is applicable both to science (as a process of learning) and reason, but the latter possesses the inclination to deal with self-made sets, and not with limited content of concepts. In other words, there would be nothing left outside reason’s pattern of inductive logic. As regards the unknown, I have metaphorically expressed myself above that reason creates space for the unknown, leaving it outside its pattern, after which the unknown is being identified (see chapter II - 6 b). Later within the process reason links the unknown with the other structures of its pattern of inductive logic. Back to the topic, our principle is applicable even within society. All processes inside it correlate with society’s awareness of its own boundaries which comes to form the public subjective evaluation. The basic law, combined with the economic status of the social system has already logically determined the outcome of the socio-economic processes. That is why all social sciences have their own preventive tasks. I will precipitously say that eventually this principle will turn out to be the basic law of elementary particles’ behavior. It is already obvious (although many physicists doubt it) that an abstract theoretical science such as philosophy has its place within a concrete applied discipline such as physics.

During the XXth c. the latter behaved as a closed theoretical system. The early XXth c. interpretation of all basic physical concepts, namely: space, time, energy, mass, impulse etc. in the General Theory of Relativity allowed physicists to expand these concepts to such an extent that their further generalization would be irrelevant. Not only is the principle of this theory considered more general in comparison to the preceding ones (such as the orthodox principle of relativity or the traditional mechanics of Newton), but it is also regarded as the most general of all. It is physicists’ notion of physics that made it a closed system. This caused reflections on the part of old-school physics, aimed at balancing the system. It is natural that contemporary leading physicists are the same ones whose combinatorial development of other branches of physics was in harmony with Einstein’s theory. This is due to the fact that there is no other theory which gives a different interpretation of the same basic physical concepts. Their works undoubtedly deserve the universal recognition they already have, for they also generate the possibility for theoretical physics to be developed as an open scientific system. As mentioned in the previous chapter, such combinatorial development, when applied to closed systems, always results in limitations and concept tautology typical of formal logic. Bearing in mind the fact that Newton’s mechanics was also a closed system, we face the problem of the why-s and how-s (from the point of view of logical precision) of the inclusion of new phenomena into a unified closed system. The question is how? Let us suppose that a closed unified theoretical system has to include new concepts. In order to do that, it can open, accept them and then close again. If it has to include other concepts it can repeat the same procedure as many times as it takes. If you do the same with your front door, your neighbors will call a doctor. But let us be serious again. We know that we are trying to solve this problem with the help of a logical criterion. From the point of view of logic, closing and unifying are simultaneous processes. If we project the cause in the future, they can even become an identity. Logic excludes time. It deals with causes and effects (i.e. it deals with the correlations between its elements and itself). Therefore, at the last stage of unification (the one we are examining), the new concepts correlate with reason in the same way as at the first stage. There are always problem to solve, but is science aware of that? The conclusion is that the system should not close itself at all. In other words scientists should realize that theoretical science goes a way beyond them. The conclusion would be even smarter if we drew an analogy between reason’s system (i.e. the system of inductive logical constructions) and the system of science. What is different in the latter when compared to the former is liable to correction. We have already explained that reason creates sets of elements within its scheme of inductive logic but it never creates a closed whole. There are no elements which belong to it but remain outside its system, for if there were such elements, they would not belong to it. The only whole it would create is matter, and that would be matter as a closed whole. This could take place if we defined an open system which includes all as a closed one. However, we could offer a better definition: the open system is a product of reason (i.e. a fiction) within which is identified a set with external links, whereas the closed system is a real separate set without external links.

The last definition answers the question ‘How exactly did it happen?’ because it answers the question ‘Why did it happen this way?’ Scientists do not deal with imprecise terms/concepts. Formal logic compels them to seek out concreteness within the boundaries of a set and the elements which comprise it. This is how problems are solved in every sphere of knowledge. The concept of an ‘open system’ excludes the concept of a ‘system’ at all because it erases its boundaries. For this reason I decided to define it as an identified fiction. It is impossible to find a criterion which can help determine (with a degree of probability) whether an element belongs to the system or not, due to the fact that the same criterion has already determined the set as something separate. The tautology is already quite obvious; therefore we should look for the reasons why theory exhibits a tendency to close itself as a system in formal logic, rather than in physics.

Due to the fact that physics has become a science closely related to mathematics, we could draw an analogy between the systems of physics and geometry (or stereometry, which is the same thing from the point of view of logic). Physics and mathematics behave in one and the same way. Both have unalterable basic postulates/concepts; both are unified closed systems. At the beginning of the XXth c. Michaelson proved experimentally that the speed of light remains unchanged after examining it from two different points of view, and thus rendered the principles of existing mechanics obsolete. Now, if we had been Michaelson’s contemporaries who were closely following the development of physics, we would probably have tried to change the concepts related to the motion of matter, involving the existing physical science. In other words we would have tried to expand the theoretical model. Let us now consider the similar structure of stereometry, and thus outline the problem. Stereometry contains a limited number of axioms. This limited number determines the effect of the axioms. I other words it closes the system of geometry as a unified whole. Every problem which is solved with the help of this science has a logically predetermined definite solution. Therefore the very science has a predetermined form. If there is a problem with which stereometry cannot cope, it lies outside the sphere of its system. It is the system that we have to change, in order to solve the problem. Therefore, we have to change the axioms, because it is them that define/determine the system. If we want to change the axioms, and yet retain their validity within the old system, we have to generalize their content. I will illustrate this concept with the help of Lobachevski’s geometry. It stipulates that two lines are considered parallel not when they are always at the same distance from each other (which is essentially the same as converging into infinity), but when they remain at the same distance within the limits of a circumference. The circumference must have been introduced as a result of the desire to construct a concrete theoretical model, or for the sake of symmetry, or as a combination of the two. The essence of the above definition is an expansion of the content of the concepts involved. Einstein did the same in physics – he removed their absolute value from the concepts of time and space, and thus expanded their logical character/essence. The rest is a primary form of unification related to the expansion of the logical content of the original concepts. In this way Einstein achieved the desired expansion of the theoretical system which could already envelop the problems (as well as other possible ones, derived from them) with which science was unable to cope.

It is time we found out (on the basis of the already drawn analogy) whether such an expansion is appropriate or not. As a theoretical model it is unquestionably so. Imagine that we have discovered a formula which is in keeping with contemporary science and explains new phenomena at the same time. Merchants call this ’work on piece-rate basis’. Our task is not to just construct models, but to create an orderly system for the science of physics. In an abstract science such as stereometry the change of axioms would alienate the whole system from our notion of the real positions of geometrical figures in space. A similar phenomenon would be the emergence of a fourth dimension is the Cartesian coordinate system. We can easily picture a point in a zero dimension, a segment in one dimension, a square in two dimensions, or a cube in three dimensions, but a four-dimensional figure would be very hard to picture. I hope this illustration has explicated my ideas regarding the abstract nature of stereometry. However, the subject of physics is sufficiently concrete and unalterable in its structure, and it is hardly interested in what we do with the concepts used to describe it (i.e. matter). Matter is an unalterable fact and if something has to be changed, it is physics that should adjust its theoretical system in accordance with matter, and not the other way round. Therefore, from the point of view of logic, the form of Einstein’s theory is not valid. It resembles a person who buys a larger carpet driven by the desire to live in a bigger room. An object of assessment could be the arguments for the removal of the absolute value from the concepts of ‘time and ‘space’, but it would not explain Michaelson’s experiment, for the explanation is the effect of unification. I am not going to evaluate the above mentioned removal either because the same concepts in my work will acquire a fictitious nature (i.e. as something unreal), and since Kant’s position was essentially the same, I cannot imagine any arguments in favor of the above removal, not to speak of orderly ones.

Although such a theory has no value for logic, due to its expansion by means of definitions, it is of great importance to physics, which (like Kant, who cast a critical look at logic in his study of Man’s ability to reason) after a long but explicable delay, is finally revising some of its basic concepts. We already know that negativism is a necessary natural phase in the accumulation of knowledge. It was Kant who paved the way for Hegel’s ingenious contribution to philosophy, although this is unacknowledged by many philosophers, including Hegel, who, in contrast to Kant, could not find his place in the philosophy of the day and formulated one of his own, starting from simple concepts. This allowed him to advance the science of dialectics in its purest form. Einstein’s general theory heralded a new phase in the development of physics. A lot of physicists are subconsciously aware of that, but in their desire to lead the way they do not adhere to the logic of the theory, but to the form (Here, I will allow myself the liberty to appeal to the Nobel Foundation to cancel the Nobel Prize, for it has transformed science into a grotesque sport). As to the future of physics, it is connected to the world of elementary particles. It is time for a fundamentally new theory to appear; a theory which offers a scientific explanation of the principles behind the organization of matter and concerns the world of elementary particles. In the spirit of the critical analysis of the concepts of physics we can predict the type and essence of this theory.

3. Contemporary physics, which has all the features mentioned above, can no longer benefit from the expansion of the definition of its concepts. What it needs is a dramatically different approach to the formulation of any new theories. Physics does not need simple connections between complicated concepts (as it has been until now), but complex connections between simple constant concepts. Its close relation to mathematics, manifested by formal logic which closes it as a system, has already exhausted the opportunities it provides. Therefore, an open logical system which could provide it with new fundamental principles to base its theories on is being sought out.

3a. Critical analysis of physical concepts invariably seeks to determine their nature, their correlations, as well as whether they are relatively or completely determined. We are not going to make such an analysis because it is painstaking and voluminous, and because we will synthesize the same physical concepts in the specialized sections to follow. I have to admit that making a partial analysis is not correct from the point of view of logic, but because I know what is to follow in the specialized sections, after which the conclusions are presented, instead of making a full analysis of a concept and a partial synthesis leading to the conclusions in which we are interested, I‘d rather make a direct partial analysis. The logical expression of this is as follows:

Physicists claim that their science must be closely related to mathematics because it is thus exact. However, mathematics uses a limited number of established operations. Such a limitation would normally manifest itself as an impossibility to describe some correlations between physical phenomena and force physicists to consider those correlations as concepts’ characteristics. This is how complex concepts wit simple connections are formed. In fact, such impossibility could not exist at all in traditional physics, but this does not render the conclusion invalid, for it is made from the point of view of the physics of elementary particles, where this problem exists. Mathematical operations deal with a concept’s quantitative aspect, i.e. just a part of it. For instance, the force that works on a solid object, multiplied by the distance it has covered equals the work done by the force, or the object. In other words, the quantitative characteristic of the concept of force, mathematically related to the quantitative characteristic of the concept of distance (space), produces a third concept, or a quantitative part of a third concept, namely, ‘work’. Mathematics brings in its limitations. It takes away a great part of the concept, in order to use only the quantitative characteristic of the same concept in its system. The example I offered above is especially relevant to our treatment of physics, for it contains a number of mathematical operations. In fact, if we define two ‘things’ and the operation addition, we already have an almost complete model of mathematics.

The conclusion from this partial critical analysis is that physics deals with complicated generalized concepts. I prefer to call them global concepts, i.e. concepts which have a large number of characteristics. I would like to point out that the term ‘concept’ is not a characteristic part of reason, but a term from the system of physics such as ‘time’ (i.e. the concept of time). Most of the concept’s elements, other than its quantitative characteristic, do not figure in the mental image a physicists forms. Therefore, the conclusion is that matter possesses characteristics which go beyond Man’s notion of it. This, as we already know, determines the development of reason. As regards physics, we can say that it deals with global concepts, but has apprehended the meaning only of a small number of them. This small number of concepts has been sufficient for its development until now, but under the present circumstances it no longer serves its purpose. Elementary matter possesses characteristics which are absent in the concepts physics has been working with.

Since it is a product of formal logic (, i.e. because it is related to mathematics), the generalization of a concept exerts a negative influence predominantly on the basic concepts of physics (precisely what must not be allowed to happen). To be more specific – time and space are global concepts (even if their fictitious nature is disregarded), energy is a global concept as well, and mass is a conglomeration of global concepts, i.e. a disorderly and chaotic whole. Due to all this, physicists are often criticized by philosophers. The first thing philosophy does is to clarify its basic concepts, in contrast to physics, which seems to consider this its last priority. Only then philosophy begins its study of being. The physicists dealing with the problems of elementary matter clearly realize the demand for a new interpretation of the basic concepts, but they (deploying a combinatorial approach) seek it out in The General theory of relativity (which in its essence is an expansion of the definitions of basic concepts). The moment when they will realize the inappropriateness of such expansion is not too far ahead. Some may even have become aware of it already. Due to the fact that global concepts comprise a number of elements, I propose that they are disintegrated into their separate well-defined and stable elements, i.e. that they are divided, and not expanded. This will, as mentioned above, complicate their correlations, and therefore inductive logic (being the functional logical structure of human reason) will replace mathematics as a fundamental principle in physics. Physics will become a science closely related to logic. Mathematics will be used only as a descriptive mechanism.

With all due respect, I will now share something which does not do physicists credit. The method of division has been around since physics became a science and has reached its peak with nuclear physics. The atom has never been considered as a whole, but as a union of constituent parts. If physicists had made a complete analysis of their working concepts (what Kant did in the field of philosophy), they would have simply transferred the methods of studying matter to the study of the ability to reason. This is what is still lacking in the Physics of Elementary Particles. At the same time we cannot fail to notice that physicists have been trying to interpret anew the concepts of mass, energy, time etc. by treating mass as energy and the vice versa, or by treating time as relative – logical treatments which are worth our attention. It is also worth noting physicists’ apt perception of the characteristics of elementary particles which otherwise baffle the mind. In practice this is what research in physics is like. Experiments should always be conducted within the bounds of human ingenuity. Speculation which is immediately related to its system is the next step along the way.

3b.It is time we considered the logical form of a fundamentally new physical theory. The question is where should the study start from? Generally speaking it should start from the basic concepts of science. We have already noticed that it is concepts that deter the further development of physics. Therefore, the criterion which will determine the form and type of the logical basis is what we should start from.

We have reached the conclusion that the division of global physical concepts will result in the appearance of stable and simple concepts with tremendously complicated connections, which in turn will entail the rejection of mathematics as the main instrument of logic in physics. It is so because the system of mathematics does not provide its constituent elements with a sufficient number of links/connections. Due to this, it cannot describe elements’ qualitative relationships (which are a part of the concepts considered) within matter. This explanation determines the criterion which will help us chose the logical form – we should be looking for a system which could comprise the complicated connections between the concepts after the method of division has been applied. Formal logic deals successfully with qualitative correlations. What hinders it is the real possibility to work with all kinds of fuzzy concepts in the course of the research.

Transcendental logic, which seeks out pure concepts by subjecting primary knowledge to reason’s criticism, successfully transfers the fuzzy correlations to its own concepts, which possess an open logical structure. It is a more general type of formal logic which is completely correct in its universality in Hegel’s objective dialectics. Should one see a problem in this, it would concern the relationship between theory and practice –the rationale behind the concepts excludes the concepts of unknown material phenomena which the mind lacks. The study then would be reduced to pure speculation although it would not depend on the ability to reason.

A logical system which accommodates all kids of correlations among its elements, uses fuzzy concepts and is closely related to practice (in other words, which has everything all other systems do not) is the most complex of all because it’s subject matter’s most complex manifestation, and in fact belongs to matter’s antipode, namely, reason. We have arrived at the conclusion that only the scheme of inductive logic inductive logic completely matches the criterion of appropriateness/success. It can accommodate all the complex correlations among the concepts within the ‘division’ treatment. The fact that inductive logic does not impose any restrictions, for the correlations between the concepts are formed on the basis of similarities between the same concepts and there are no middle elements distorting them, is another proof that it is the most evolved system of logic. Further more, inductive logic is the greatest manifestation of human reason, which means that it is the utmost understanding of matter reason can have. Its revealing nature makes it an exceptionally handy tool to use in the analysis of the processes flowing in the world of elementary particles. This is, in fact, its most precious quality – the one that lifts it above transcendental logic, whose primary aim is to discover the fundamental laws of nature through the separation of logical concepts from accumulated experience. Generally speaking, every science, physics included, even our own thoughts ‘behave’ just like transcendental logic. They ‘improve’ their concepts and the existing correlations between them from the standpoint of reason. Applying this kind of logic to the problems contemporary physics deals with, will have a positive effect, not much different from the conclusions we are about to make. That is why I am convinced that its application in determining the qualitative internal connections of the global concepts, in order to divide them into basic ones, is completely logical. However, I will skip this phase in physics’ development because I add the experience, we will have to acquire to the basic concepts, in order to apply the ‘division’ treatment of matter. My intention is not to analyze the concepts the way we analyzed the progress of physics, but to make such an analysis unnecessary. I will achieve it through a synthesis of the basic concepts with the help of apodictic argumentation. This will reduce the analysis to a possibility which provides a study of elementary matter such as this one with symmetry.

Besides, inductive logic is not among language’s functions. Therefore we are immune to insignificant language errors related to logic (not to the exposition), such as narrowing a concept’s content or a concept’s correlation with another.

3c. As regards basic concepts, it is irrelevant whether we will synthesize them, or deduce them analytically from the global ones. The former is typical of inductive logic, while the latter is typical of transcendental logic (or objective dialectics, if we decide to expand the field). I will now proceed to explicate this process. Because it belongs to the future, we will use the system of inductive logic to demonstrate its capacity to make forecasts. We should note that the future ceases to be what it is once it is revealed, and our forecast will have this particular effect, which will be further enhanced by the specialized sections to follow. However the present demonstration is valuable in itself, especially because it contains conclusions we need.

We have mentioned the fact that Einstein is as important to physics as Kant is to philosophy. Both made the criticism of concepts the basis for their conclusions. They considered concepts as a system. Kant considered the concepts of logic within the system of reason. Einstein considered the concepts of physics within the system of science. The concepts of transcendental logic have been divided from the acquired experience and reduced to prior knowledge (which is, in fact, a system of transcendental concepts). In the General Theory of Relativity the global physical concepts have been reduced to experimental elements such as the absolute. In contrast to transcendental logic, physics has not yet managed to reduce its concepts to the extent when a further reduction will not be possible – besides, the different branches of physics use concepts that are reduced to different extents. Let us admit that this is explicable, but why do physicists consider philosophy a waste of time if one cannot formulate a new theory on the basis of experiments, no matter how diverse or numerous they are, but on the basis of philosophical reasoning. We could accept this too, for science and philosophy treat their objects of study rather differently. However, it is bewildering that physicists would not even read philosophy when most philosophers have discoursed on the issues of time and space, and that in a form acceptable to physics. For instance, Kant might not have been familiar with the concepts of mass and energy, but his conclusions regarding time and space (drawn on the basis of a slower and riskier analytical interpretation from the point of view of logical precision) are similar to the ones I am to make. Physicists denounce a theory as completely wrong if they but find as much as one wrong premise in it. The only thing in this book I have openly referred to as wrong is Lawrence’s transformations. Since I do not intend to consider them later in the exposition, I will explain my meaning at this point. Lawrence’s transformations are based on the second postulate of the General Theory of Relativity which reads: ‘The speed of light in a vacuum is the same regarded from all inertial frames and does not depend on its direction.’ It is pointless to argue about the term ’vacuum’, for such a thing simply does not exist. To say it parenthetically – the speed of light is the same everywhere for the same reason the speed of a neutrino in an atom’s core is greater than the speed of light (you’d better write this down, dear physicists). This second postulate is the basis of a mathematical correlation premised on the following argument: if we hold a lamp in an empty space, we will always be in the centre of the sphere of light cast by the lamp. The only logical way out of this conundrum is through the relativity of space. If the distance between the person holding the lamp and the front part of the circumference of the light could be represented as a number of segments (X) which increases all the time, the number of segments before the person is the same as the number of the segments behind them. When the person moves forward, the segment before them becomes shorter, while the one behind them becomes longer. The same reasoning is applied to the time interval, but the basic premise this time is that a light impulse will travel the distance before and behind the person, regardless of the person’s speed of motion. The mathematical expression of this argumentation is the basis of the third principle of the General Theory of Relativity (it is commonly referred to as a corollary, but the second postulate itself is a corollary of the first one): nothing can exceed the speed of light. The maximal speed of light was deduced on the premise of the spherical diffusion of light. What would have happened if a similar phenomenon with a different speed had been interpreted in the same way? I am still convinced that the space and time intervals along the direction perpendicular to the direction of the motion change according to the same logic, for we are no longer considering a cubical but a spherical projection. Third, the conclusion is a result of getting a negative number under a radical as regards speed higher than the speed of light; something which appears to be a major stumbling block for physicists, well, that is life, the necessity to use mathematics does not arise from me. Fourth, the conclusion that the dependence of space and time intervals on the speed of light is an uninterrupted and smooth function contradicts the notion of matter which exists within Quantum physics. Fifth, the line of thoughts presented above mixes permanent and relevant properties (or concepts/terms), and therefore is not logically sound. However, the last consideration should be the subject of an extensive treatise and for this reason I will refrain from elaborating on it.

We have seen that the mathematical foundation of physics does not provide it with an orderly method of research. Although it might not be officially recognized, this science will inevitably split into two major branches, namely logical and theoretical-applicable physics. Mathematics will be assigned the descriptive function of theorizing on the basis of experimental results. This used to be a separate branch of physics, although mathematics usually preceded or succeeded experimentation (i.e. from the point of view of the considered unification it was its logical equivalent). Logical physic will be the branch of physics which deals with the interpretation of the concepts and draws numerous practical conclusions at the same time. The lack of connection between this branch and experimentation will naturally result in some wrong conclusions, but their consequent correction will lead to even more correct ones. This avalanche of conclusions will, in fact, help logical physics establish itself as a successful science. It would have emerged a long time ago if there had not been made so many mistakes in the past. Let us draw a comparison between a physicist and a composer of music. At home the musician plays pieces which can hardly be called music or performs compositions which can help them become a new Debussy; onstage they indulge the audience’s wishes. In the same way a physicist can have brilliant ideas in the field of theoretical logical physics and still theorize on issues of topical interest for the wide audience of physicists, which is being entertained to all kinds of opuses by all kinds of ‘musicians’ at present. Such surrealists compromise the reputation of both theoretical physics and serious philosophy.

This means that we, referring back to the beginning of the current subsection and taking into consideration the historical development of philosophy, could try to predict the basic principles on which logical physics would be built. We have seen, that Kant’s understanding of philosophical concepts could be compared to Einstein’s understanding of physical concepts, and that Hegel’s finished dialectics is a logical continuation of Kant’s philosophy. Therefore I could advise everyone willing to take up logical physics to do as Hegel has done before them, but with a difference, for Hegel is hard to understand and the fact that he failed to notice the first reflection of matter suggests that there are concepts prior to his own. So, on the premise of everything mentioned above we can say that the basic principle of logical physics should read: ‘The synthesis of a concept excludes its fuzziness.’ I am not going to divide the concepts and consequently have doubts whether the result is further divisible, but form a concept, building on other basic concepts. I will not make Hegel’s glaring omission, for I am dealing with matter. By the way I have recently come upon the analogy between physics and philosophy  , and when it happened I found the resemblance between Hegel’s approach and my own rather disturbing. I realized that my study of philosophical physics actually lays the foundations of an entirely new branch of the science of physics. The alienation of experimentation from the senses inevitably entails the need for an abstract science providing the new sense physics could use to perceive its experiments.

3d. Let us now sum up the results of our forecast.

The pro-mathematical and formally logical nature of physics transforms it into a closed system of global concepts and problems. Such a nature is characterized by all the drawbacks of its logical basis. Mathematics as a formal-logical analogue has created global concepts, imposed a limited interpretation of the same and defined theoretical physics as a science which has inappropriately distanced itself from its own object of study. There is more. Physics’ distancing from its object of study has made it the criterion by which to judge the correctness of the conclusion. This is, of course, utterly ridiculous. Global concepts could de subjected to division and analysis in which mathematics can play a suitable part. The problem is that I cannot take this for granted – I must be convinced. Unfortunately this has not happened yet, due to the course of our arguments. The analysis made with the help of formal logic cannot yield a criterion by which to judge its completeness. In other words, we cannot be certain that we have arrived at basic concepts whose further division is impossible. Furthermore, formal logic cannot comprise anything fuzzy or lacking a logical form. The character of theoretical physics is such that it excludes a connection with matter in the first phases of the research.

In order to overcome these problems, we have predicted the emergence of a new fundamental branch of theoretical physics, namely, logical physics which will serve the function of filling the void in theoretical physics. It will also depose mathematics from the throne of theory and confine it to experimental physics as a means of constructing models. Since logical physics will deal with matter in general, it will need the most powerful logical model – inductive logical constructions. Their open system completely excludes the possibility that something may remain beyond the compass of inductive logic. In treats unknown phenomena in logical space as simple interrelated unknown quantities whose logical form can be determined in due time. Inductive logic can reduce global physical concepts to basic ones, but it cannot prove that it has achieved it. Its nature, therefore, its strength is in synthesizing new concepts, proving their primacy and eliminating all uncertainty about them. That is why we will create matter anew. Inductive logic is not correlated with the capacity for expression.

4. It has already become clear what logical physics’ object of study will be. Logic is an absolute priority of philosophy. Therefore, such a science will deal with being. The term physics excludes reason from the matter-reason axis which constitutes the concept of being, therefore logical physics will deal with matter. However, we are about to see that reason will not be discarded altogether, but will be incorporated within one particular form of mater, which we will arrive at later. The logical form is a guarantee that philosophy will not take over physics in order to restore the past, because it defines the object of physics as a distinct form of being and thus guarantees that physics will remain outside the system of philosophy. In other words, physics will use philosophy’s most abstract branch, i.e. logic with its characteristic universality.

In this way we have made a conclusion of utmost importance to logical physics. This means that we cannot enter the realm of physics without clarifying the above mentioned conclusion. We associate physics’ most abstract object of study, namely, elementary particles (or cosmology, which is the same from the point of view of logic) with philosophy’s most abstract sphere. This is due to the fact that the most abstract sphere of model-construction, i.e. mathematics has a dubious position as regards quantitative characteristics. The reader might have already noticed that I am not referring to the four-element scheme of inductive logic. It is so for the sake of brevity. On the one hand, there is the physics of elementary particles (which is not entirely devoid of experimentation, for such is indeed conducted, although it is hardly correct to draw conclusions about something on the basis of its indirect manifestation, which in special physics does not necessarily follow its cause) in which the main problem is that the object of study goes away from the common notion of it, which presents an obstacle in the way of identifying precise concepts by reason’s inductive logical scheme. On the other hand there is the abstract system of philosophy, i.e. logic, which is not interrelated with experimentation. From the point of view of logic there is a connection between two abstractions. However, in view of the fact that logic (i.e. inductive logical constructions) copies matter, physics and logic complement each other. The lack of immediate experiments or observations of elementary matter will be complemented by the logical form of that nonexistent experience.

Our conclusion is that physics’ object of study drifts away from the possibility of experimentation, but from the possibility of forming a concept of the object of study. The varieties of matter, which the physics of elementary particles has introduced, cannot be accommodated by the concept of space, physics uses. Global concepts turn out to be irrelevant to the creation of a theory of elementary particles. Consider the following example. I have mentioned the fact that the physics of elementary particles and cosmology are a logical identity. Astrophysicists have arrived at the conclusion that space closing around particular matter, i.e. the emergence of a black hole is accompanied by a lesser decrease of volume with heavy (i.e. massive) objects, compared to lighter ones. The global concept-conglomeration of ‘mass’ does not allow us to answer the question ‘Why?’ The answer is hidden in the definition of ‘mass’ the Physics of Elementary Particles provides. Not only are global concepts irrelevant to the abstract branches of science, but combined with physics’ inertia they present a real and dangerous possibility to form erroneous notions of matter’s interactions. On this ground we can deduce the goals of logical physics as regards the inconstant form the physical concepts in physics different branches. The main goal of logical physics is to provide a relative interpretation of physical concepts. I have not designated the division of physical concepts as a goal, for the extent of division is a function of the level on which matter is being examined. For instance the concept of mass does not exist in the world of elementary particles and only appears in matter of higher order. This relative interpretation has nothing has nothing to do with the theory of relativity. Let this difference be a warning that inductive logic should not be applied at random, or that language should not be used as its source. I could have replaced ‘relative interpretation’ with an interpretation on the different levels, but in this case it might no be clear what the word ‘level’ means, and besides the latter term ‘freezes’ the concept, while the former is an expression of a general principle. Inductive logic deals with reason’s elements only. ‘Relative interpretation’ should be taken to mean a distinction by force of circumstance. When in the street people use conversational terms, in the office a relevant jargon and in high society sophisticated expressions. The same applies to physical concepts but with a difference – it is the other way round. On the highest level of study descriptions are made in the simplest possible way. Astronomers and astrophysicists in particular do not share this opinion, due to the simple reason that they do not with certainty what they have found. Within elementary matter the division of global concepts complicates their connections. That is why we will find it more difficult to leave the subject than to take it up. However, this is what other physicists think about this issue. The thoughts which are already passing through the reader’s mind have to be checked: if physics imposes a theory of its own on its own concepts, there will be nothing more to discover. The imprecision in the interpretation of the last statement will allow the students of physics to enjoy a good night’s sleep, should they care to sleep at all. Another argument in support of the thesis that there will always be something to discover is the fact that physics in its finished form has been around since the creation of the world (if we take it for granted). However, until reason creates the world anew (this refers to dead matter of course), there will always be something to discover. Well, using this topsy-turvy logic, I will answer the question ‘Is the end of physics at hand?’ with the following words: ‘It is its coming into being that is at hand.’

I will now direct your attention to something which is a very good illustration of what should not be done when physics imposes its theory upon its concepts. As a matter of fact this is something we are not going to do, but to the point. I am envisaging the concept’s inertness. From the point of view of brain activity is an identified set, i.e. a fiction such as the open system as a concept. We have already said a lot about the inertia of the energy status of the nerve cell, but taking into consideration the fact that the concept is but fiction, we have to admit that seeking out the inertness of fiction is fiction too. Therefore what we envisage here is the inertia of a physical concept. The drifting of the concept away from what it signifies (as a result of which we have deduced the problem of the relative interpretation of physical concepts) imposes a need for a change on the concept. I have to admit that until this moment I have purposefully created the illusion that such arguments are of utmost importance to the exposition. The truth is that they are not important at all; the question is purely psychological in nature. I will explain what I mean by using as an example the General Theory of Relativity and its author. At the time the above mentioned theory acquired publicity, it was a heresy. It was similar to Copernicus’ overturn of the existing notion of the world. The removal of the absolute quality from the concepts of time and space caused a dramatic change in the physical science of the day simply because these concepts are dealt with in all branches of physics. Einstein made an elegant counter-move by declaring physics as it was an isolated case. The Special Theory of Relativity has accelerated the development of various branches of physics such as nuclear physics. It has also explained a number of weird characteristics of light. The theory has seriously influenced physicists’ circles too. A new generation of physicists (who perceive space and time as relative with the same ease the old generation perceived them as absolute) has emerged. It has taken a century to construct the mathematical models of the consequences (which are of importance to all branches of physics – ranging from the physics of elementary particles to the theory of the black holes) of this new interpretation within the General Theory of relativity. We have also been presented with numerous retroactive conclusions concerning the General theory, which seem to rediscover it, attaching new importance to it in relation to the other branches of physics. On the whole we are witnessing a dramatic change in all branches of science.

As regards logic, this century of revolutionary changes is nothing but an expansion of concepts by means of definitions, i.e. a minimal change in one of its elements.

It is in this that the psychological nature of the relationship between Einstein’s theory and physics comes to the surface. The lack of assessment of concepts (in other words, the same stubborn attitude to philosophy) defines the new theory as a revolutionary change in physics, but, in fact, it is a different assessment of physical thought. It is to counter such centuries of unification that I propose to advance logical physics. We have already said that inductive logic can create epoch-making sciences and leap across centuries in doing so. Seen from this angle it seems that logical physics will develop at the speed of thought, and if it becomes a victim of inertia, it will be only in the formation of concepts which are foreign to its system, i.e. are the result of wrong logic. The reader has already gathered that the problem physics has to solve does not involve the creation of a general theoretical model of matter by means of mathematical description. In other words, physics does not have to create a universal theory, but a universal interpretation of physical concepts – a reasonable notion which will match matter in all its manifestations.

5. In the way of apology for completely changing the language in this treatise for another time, I will present the reader with an opportunity to acclimatize themselves to what is to follow in the specialized sections. We have arrived at the conclusion that it is not the form of the exposition, but its logic that matters, for the acquisition of an erroneous notion is fatal for the same logic. Not everyone can think as a physicist (frankly speaking this includes even some physicists who entirely rely on mathematics). That is why, in order to prepare for the difficult run lying ahead of us, I suggest we construct anew the model of the atom, using the little we know and only with the help of reason. The first thing we have to do is forget everything we know about it.

While we are defining more accurately the initial conditions, or while we are seeking out a starting point for the construction of such a model, we should try to find out what makes the creation of such a thing necessary. Let us interpret this problem on a more general basis. We should be facing a theoretical problem within physics whose only relevant solution is the construction of a nuclear model. If we draw an analogy with chemistry, we will see that every chemical reaction can be easily explained with the help of the periodic table. The problem within theoretical physics is not that something is being sought, but that there are still undiscovered things. Within experimental physics the majority of problems (which are still unsolved although there are mathematical models of them) are connected with electricity, or as physicist call it – electromagnetism. This is how with the help of a simple analogy we have found the starting point we need for the construction of the model.

Since we have very little to start from, we have to think in general terms. This also means that whenever we use facts, no matter how scanty they are, they must be beyond a shadow of a doubt. That is why if we consider the nature of electricity, we will see that it is nothing but matter manifested in the form of energy. According to the orthodox definition of energy, it is a particular state of a substance which makes it possible to work with it. Along these lines we will fall under the influence of the laws of preservation of energy which stipulate that nothing comes out of nothing nor disappears into nothing, but only changes its state. In other words, in order to produce electricity, we must have energy. The amount of work we put in to produce electricity equals the amount of work of the electricity we have produced. In addition to this we have to mention the fact that electricity has two aspects which destroy each other in the process of their merging. Those two aspect have been called ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ on the basis of the analogy with positive and negative numbers, and their qualitative characteristics have added the concept of charge. That is why we speak of positive and negative charges. The existence of those two aspects of electricity is easily proved with the help of a tool (unworthy of the proud name of electroscope) everyone can make at home. From everything mentioned above it becomes clear that from the point of view of electromagnetism the energy model of the atom comprises two components. However, if the real model comprises other components, they will not bear a charge, for we know of two types of charges only. Such components could be successfully described as uncharged or bearing a zero charge, i.e. they are not related to the production of electricity. Since electricity is matter manifested in the form of energy, the atom must have a charge – be it a positive or a negative one. In other words it must be in a rather unstable state. Therefore, as regards electricity, the model of the atom should be neutral.

But what is the atom? To answer this question we need not think as academicians but as little children (I do not mean to offend the young ones). There are two equally big but different charges. The question is - what do we do with them? Let us imagine the model in the form of two differently charged spheres which are situated next to each other. The word ’sphere’ seems to be a gift from heaven or childhood, for we are now like little children playing the ball. In fact it is a product of our sense of symmetry. If we had none, we would simply consider only one of the charges. In doing so we would want to know what form the carrier of the charge should have, in order to maintain the same charge in all directions, or in other words – to keep the charge’s effect unchanged at all points lying at the same distance from the carrier. That is why the sphere is particularly appropriate for our model – every point on its surface lies at the same distance from the centre as the rest; but to the atom. It has become obvious that this model does not match the requirement for equi-potentiality. The conclusion is that the atom is a sphere as well. The only way we can transform the two spheres into one is to hide the one in the other. At this point every child would ask us how the inner sphere has gone where it is, and every professor of physics would start using tranquilizers. However, this is a very interesting question. It suggests that the outer covering of the spheres is penetrable and probably rather unstable. This instability could lead to a decrease of the substance, the charge, and consequently to a transfer of energy from a suitable atom. Now it seems we have explained electricity. If the reader has not forgotten it yet, we are preparing ourselves for the specialized sections, but the main part of our arguments is yet to come. For the sake of convenience I will introduce the terms ‘atomic shell’ and ‘proton nucleus’ because it will not influence the exposition and will facilitate our acquaintance with the functional style of physics.

So far we have not considered the mass of the two charges. The following arguments will help us arrive at it. We can freely presume that electrons and protons’ mass is the same since their charges are the same (in this we come by the same sense of symmetry). Imagine we conduct the following experiment: If we transfer such an amount of energy to an atom, the zero charge will become the same as the charge of the proton’s core. In other words if we remove the electron cover, we will make the flow of electricity possible, and the energy which is derived from it will equal the energy which has been transferred. On the premise that electrons and protons have the same mass we can infer that after the electron cover is removed from the atom, i.e. after half of its mass is removed in accordance with the Law of the Preservation of the Impulse, the proton core’s counter-reaction will be charged differently than the atomic shell. This, by the way, means, that the transferred energy will be transformed into electricity and mass, or (if one is inclined to go even further than his) that it is the energy of inertia, but if the last is true, it renders the binary model of the atom senseless. This though, does not prove the assumption wrong. Consider the following simple logic: if such an impact on the atom’s electrons makes the core unstable (and considering the fact that electrons and protons’ mass is the same), then the electric current makes the substance it flows through unstable as well. Unfortunately this is not what we see in reality; in fact we observe the contrary phenomenon. This makes it clear that the only way out of this situation is to assume that the mass of the atomic shell is smaller than the mass of the proton core by far. If it is so, the transferred energy will be transformed into electricity, for the atom remains a stable whole even when electricity flows through it. I can reach the same conclusion by means of contrary logic: If the atom remains stable during interactions, this means that most of the energy of the interaction is absorbed by the layer of electrons. That is why electricity has been known since long time ago.

However, a single atom cannot suffice to explain the diversity of matter. The adherers to Marxist philosophy should revise the law of passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes in relation to a real single-component set because the quantitative changes in something do not result in any qualitative changes. The variety of matter surrounding us makes us believe that there exist many kinds of atoms. Such an assumption is entirely reasonable because it is in harmony with the periodic table. On the other hand, the apodictic argumentation of the atomic model excludes the possibility that the differences between atoms is caused by the model itself. On the contrary – their differences should not be related to the atom’s structure. A solution to this problem would be the change of the atom’s charge we mentioned above, and that change should be taken as potential for a change because the atom is neutral as regards electricity. Taking into consideration the fact that the atom’s core is the stable part of the atom, we reach the following conclusion: The charge of the atom’s core determines the type and the properties of the atom. It would be reasonable to inquire whether the charge could vary indiscriminately or within certain limits. The periodic table supports the second alternative that the charge of the atom’s core is strictly determined. We have reached the time when we have to assume that such values are characteristic of some stable particles. Physics calls them protons. The same logic determines the particles in the electron layer as electrons. A study of the mass of hydrogen isotopes would result in the discovery of neutrons. This is how with the help of logic we have constructed the complete model of the atom.

I will now offer to you an analysis of our logic in the current section. It is characterized by a strict adherence to our conclusions and a complete lack of any ‘embellishing’ them. If I had considered an atom made up of a single proton and a single electron and consequently drawn an analogy with the planetary model, I would have concluded that the electron orbit the nucleus in the same way the Moon orbits the Earth. The reader should also note that I have presented the atomic shell as a sphere and left it as it is. Later on we will see why. It should be also noted that I have not arrived at the conclusion that the atom’s nucleus is made up of a set of identical protons, nor have I said anything of the kind about electrons. All this should tell us that, should we seek out a particular property of matter, it would be best to do it studying the same matter and not mathematics or some higher matter or anything else from our knowledge. It seems that the correct conclusion could present itself when it is least expected: the erroneous assumption about the equal mass of the atomic core (at the time – a positive one) and the atomic shell’s mutually excluding properties have helped us completely construct the model of the atom.


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