INDUCTIVE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS - CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER TWO
THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF REASON
1. At the beginning of the most important chapter of this book I would like to worn the readers to abandon the philosophical system with the help of which they see the world. There are numerous reasons why I am making this appeal: first, because if they do, they will be tempted to compare their views with mine, and thus will lose the thread of logic; second, because they will not be able to understand the concept and will only see glaring contradictions everywhere; third, because they will misinterpret my words, which is otherwise hard to do, and so on and so forth, rendering the reading of this book and the invested time senseless.
The chapter is provocative for the simple reason that in spite of my adherence to dialectical materialism, I will arrive at the concept of 'god', without even preliminary setting such a goal to myself, and although I claim that my work has a scientific character, science has little to do with the conclusion I will make. These two reasons taken in, I can make so many opponents, even enemies that Alexander the Great himself would have boasted their number.
The style of this chapter is rather different from that in the previous one, due to the fact that my exposition has a rather narrative nature. The exposition might suffer but clarity will only benefit.
2. To begin whatever research on reason we must first specify what our notion of reason is. I am not going to do so by means of a definition because a definition, although clarifying, is by all means limiting and besides the everyday notion of reason as used by all is sufficient enough for our purposes. It is universally believed that 'reason' is the faculty of rational argument. It is a faculty of every individual and man as such. Thinking, in the same way, is an element of the concept of 'reason', which materializes the faculty of rational argument, or in Hegel's words 'the becoming of reason'.
If we are going to consider 'reason', we should ask ourselves whether this research is of any value. We should do so because we reason about reason through reason, we evaluate the adequacy of the faculty of rational argument through the same faculty of rational argument whose adequacy has not been determined yet. What if it appears to be perfectly adequate at first and then we arrive at the conclusion that it is not…It is even more baffling when it is inadequate at first and is concluded to be so, for it means that it has to be inadequate. This logical problem is nothing new. And although great minds have worked on it I consider it to be utterly ridiculous. It reminds me of the mathematical game with a sheet of paper on whose front side it is written that the writing on the back side is wrong, while back side reads that the writing on the front is right. The only thing it could offer us is the ability to deal with logical connections of a greater rank. That is why in our research we will pose another question, the answer to which renders such logic senseless. We will find it through the following reasoning: The problem is whether the faculty of rational argument is adequate, i.e. whether there is such a faculty, and in this way the property of adequacy is transferred to the faculty itself. The situation is therefore the following: reason thinks about reason. However, this is an equation with three variables. If we find the cause of this process in the future, i.e. if we use a method, preferred by professors of ethics such as F. Paulsen, we will decide that there is something in the future which makes reason think about itself. The conclusion it will make, makes it do it. The variables have suddenly become four. If we had looked for the cause in the past they would be five already. It is apparent that the cause and effect have a very strong 'genetic' relationship. I would go one step further saying that they are an identity separated by time. If time did not exist, this would be a glaring fact. If we use conventional means, this could be proved in the following way: the world is identical with itself. Therefore the world existing at a particular moment in time is identical with the world existing at another particular moment in time, although at first sight these two appear to be two different things. From this point of view to find the cause or the effect is to find out about both. Answering the question what reason will see in itself enables us to understand what makes reason look into itself. In this case a counter argument would be to claim that different causes means different effects and that the assumption that reason is motioned by differrent forces leads to different discoveries, therefore the truth cannot be established. Such logic honors the opponent indeed, but there are not several kinds of reason motioned by different forces. In nature the concept of variation does not exist. In nature there are firmly established laws, driving forces and effects. For this reason, if we are lucky to come across one such thing, that will be it and nothing more. The impossibility of learning (knowledge) in this case is not grounded in anything at all.
Transforming the question 'What would reason find in itself?' into 'Why does reason turn to itself?' we will find the forth variable, using the above analogy and giving the three other variables values derived from the formula ' reason can reason (argue, think)', which will later be proved to be true, for it cannot be otherwise. I would like to mention that it has not occurred to anyone to deny the connection between reason and matter in a scientific system, although it might be considered perspective for a lifetime. From the point of view of dialectics the above-mentioned are a pair of opposites in the correlation called 'being'. According to Hegel's Law of the Unity of Opposites and Lenin's Law of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites they are in a relationship of a dialectical unity, which means that they are a dynamic unity of opposites. This state of things remains valid until the moment when reason reflects on itself, or becomes. I am using typical philosophical schemes which mean' until reason becomes aware of itself'. But the important thing is - reason has always been aware of itself, otherwise it would not be reason, therefore the above situation has never been valid. In other words reason has always been aware of itself. It would be more precise to say '…has become a priori' but what is important here is that matter becomes reason the moment it becomes aware of itself, therefore reason is always aware of itself. These contentions are somehow undemonstrated and seem to be pending, as a result of which a logical deception that the question has rendered itself senseless has occurred. This is not true. We have not refuted the statement that reason thinks about reason because reason does not become aware of reason through 'reason is aware of reason', due to the simple reason that we face an entirely different configuration. It is absolutely true that reason is aware of reason, but it is equally true that reason is unaware of reason. This logical absurd can be explained with the formula ' reason is not aware that it is aware of itself'. From Hegel's point of view the becoming (which equates reflection) of the thing cannot be 'reason is aware of itself' but 'reason is aware that it is unaware it is aware of itself', for Hegel did not arrive at the conclusion that in order to be, a thing must reflect on itself. However, such a complicated formula does not exist in nature; it is only a part of our twisted conception. In history, it is Confuciys who voiced such a scheme for the first time. He said 'I know that I don't know I know that I don't know…' ( the quote is logical). Kant was the first thinker to relate such a scheme to reason, and ironically it was fully developed by Freud in his thesis on the subconscious. Hegel failed to grasp this, due to the simple fact that he was an idealist. He gave the idea a primary status, deducing the second becoming straight away but failing to deduce the first one. Deducing the Law of Unity of Opposites with such precision does honour to him. Of course, The Law of Matter contributed (the amazing recurrence of all things) to this. Lenin did not understand that the key word in that law is ‘unity’ and focused on ‘opposites’ instead. Why he did that is clear to everyone. I would remove the word ‘opposites’ from that law formulating a law of unity: “Matter is one in all its manifestations but the reason perceives its motion as a relationship between different things. This means that the opposites are in fact one and the same thing. There is only one thing in this world that exists as a substance. Reason distorts unity as a conflict, therefore from reason’s own perspective it is the opposite of matter. This law does not negate the former one. It is very convenient as regards whether we want to see being as a unity or as opposites, whether we want to assume an objective standpoint or a partially subjective one.
Going back to the matter of reason we will see that the conclusion imposes itself on us. Due to the fact that I have only brought up the question without wasting a pile of paper to prove it (answer it) but have backed it with arguments, I will now reject the convenience it offers me and will use the already familiar to the reader inductive logic to make the same conclusion. We will begin by superficially examining the development of organisms from single-celled organisms to man with regard to their rationality.
On the face of it, any capability for reasoning of single-celled organisms is out of the question. However, what is the capability for reasoning as a whole? Is it not a capability for reacting to an interior stimulus or an exterior one? That is to say I suggest we transform the concept of ‘reasoning’ into a capability for reacting. Here, we come by the following logic: If every cause has an effect, is it not an absolute capability for reacting? It must be. But look, with man, as it is with every other thing in the material world, this capability has an absolute value while the reaction is absolutely determined. I would even say that man has no freedom of thought, for thinking is a continuous and predetermined process of causes and effects. The way out of this deadlock is in no longer considering reason as a ‘capability’, for we know where it will lead us, but as a capability for reasoning, and because we cannot ‘endow’ single-celled organisms with reasoning we must look for a reaction which would be identical to the one if our reason decided for the organism. Here I run the risk of considering the thesis of the preservation of the species, which, although correct as regards lower organisms, is rather elementary as regards the higher ones. There are animals which are ready to sacrifice their lives for each other or for their master - man. For this reason we will focus our attention on the capability for a relevant reaction. Unicellular organisms thrive in ever-favorable conditions. Otherwise, they cannot survive. Thus their environment excludes the possibility of reaction, and even if there is such a possibility, it can be easily explained with chemical or physical reactions. The same possibility, the things to react to or to adapt to, increases for higher organisms. This explains the growth of neural cells and allows us to speak of intelligence. Here we are facing man and his reason. This is not a new theory. It was formulated by Charles Darwin. But what do all these facts demonstrate? They demonstrate that reason is nothing else but highly organized matter or that matter has become aware of itself (has reflected on itself) through reason. Then we should ask ourselves why reason would reflect on itself. Here it becomes apparent how analogy comes handy in the most natural way: Matter reflects on itself through reason and discovers matter. Reason reflects on itself, this time through higher reason, and discovers reason. But what is the part of higher reason in this? We will answer this question by examining in detail this inductive logical construction, for it is the most interesting one in this work, due to the simple reason that it concerns the two fundaments of being.
Matter – through reason – matter
Reason – through higher reason – reason
This is how it looks from the standpoint of reason. From the standpoint of matter, as mentioned above, reason is organized matter and the above scheme looks like that:
Matter – through reason – matter
Matter – through reason – matter
The two are identical and therefore what we are left with is only:
Matter – through reason – matter
The second dash stands for ‘reflects in’. But if reason is organized matter then what we have is:
Matter – through matter – matter
Or:
Matter
What have we done? We have arrived at the same conclusion we formulated previously as the law of matter. Thus, if we start from matter, the world is one in all its manifestations as matter. If we start from reason, the world is made up of opposites, that is to say reason makes the world full of opposites simply because it sees itself as the opposite of matter.
I do not know if this law will put an end to all contradictions and set the beginning of a world of harmony because it regards reason’s sense of self – preservation. But even without my inductive logical constructions it could set the beginning of a new way of analyzing the world and its laws. As far as I am concerned I feel it will.
Let us see how this law reflects on our research, for the corollaries to it have already been made. Let us first consider the relationship between science and philosophy. Both are products of reason and are not divided by it but by the scientific and philosophical thought become aware of themselves and of these two concepts. Big deal! The law is not applied with regard to reason but with regard to the reflection of the thing upon itself, that is to say with regard to its becoming aware of itself. This means that scientific and philosophical thought take the place of reason in this case. As regards the relationship between idealism and materialism, it has already become apparent that they are one and the same thing. The point of departure here is awareness as philosophy. As regards dialectics I no longer consider metaphysics its antipode. Dialectic is reason itself and that is why the experience of finding about it is so great. However, being a tool of reason dialectics can have its antipode only in the laws of matter and due to this it is such a successful philosophical method. For this reason only the law can be the unity in such contradiction. That is why and for no other reason that I consider myself a man of dialectics.
And finally, to round things up we can say that reason is not just a product of matter, but a higher level of organization of matter through which matter becomes aware of itself. For this reason the possibility of gaining knowledge (if we assume that truth can serve as a criterion for such possibility and choose to identify truth with being, that is to say with matter) exists in the utmost degree, due to the fact that reason cannot become aware of anything else but matter. However, that which elevates reason over matter is its capability for learning aided by its ability to create, which allows it to influence matter within matter’s own laws. It is precisely this connection that we are going to examine in the following items (sections).
3. Human reason is designed to face conundrums and solve them rationally to a lesser or greater extent. One such conundrum is the so called parapsychology. Although it claims that it has scientific character, it fails to consider the important fact that science is yet unable to quantify or qualify its subject. Science does not yet possess a functioning model of matter which could be applied to paranormal phenomena. For the time being there aren’t any quantitative or qualitative results from conducted experiments either. Using an ammeter to determine the presence of ghosts could be a serious method but only in animation pictures. An ammeter can help those ‘scientists’ determine the proximity and the power of the transmitters in their vicinity but under no circumstances the presence of ghosts. Let alone the fact that sometimes parapsychologists themselves become an object of study of conventional psychiatrists. All this demonstrates that parapsychology should vacillate for a moment to its antipode – vulgar materialism and finally assume a neutral position which would hold out bright prospects for it. But this is not our problem. We are going to deal with such issues first to demonstrate that the paranormal can be explained in rational terms rather than in fanciful words, and second, to draw a conclusion which will open the doors of physics for us.
Phenomena such as telepathy, metempsychosis (transmigration, rebirth) and telekinesis , pertaining to the biofield and challenging the human mind now, which does not realize it is just the beginning, are nothing new but present day science cannot boast with successfully determining their nature and is often forced to turn a blind eye to them. Using the phrase ’the human mind’ I cannot possibly fail to admit that man is quite partial to all this. People think of themselves as believers or non-believers. The latter are those who prefer to turn a blind eye. However, we should admit that such people are right to a certain extent because they are presented with dubious facts followed by no less dubious explanations, and if the ordinary person perceives fog as steam, they cannot understand why a stable physical condition is called a ‘fog’, and to complete the simile, prefer to cool their whiskey with such facts and explanations. Believers, on the contrary, are a very colorful sight. Part of them uses the above mentioned phenomena in support of the thesis that God exists. Such people’s logic deserves a profound analysis which would not last five minutes and would only make the analyst go around in circles. How an erroneous logical scheme can lead to a correct conclusion will become clear when we examine intuition. The people using the ammeters look for the cause of all things in their primitive understanding of the world, but if they were certain they were on the right way, they would have already reached conclusions worth our attention. Those who recognize the existence of such phenomena and do nothing I find hardest to understand. I have to admit I cannot tell if they strike a scientific pose or simply cannot do anything. In the end, it is exhilarating that these ‘believers’ help, even if they are unaware of it, the science of parapsychology develop, although upon reflection it seems a better idea to acquaint oneself with the wisdom of Tibet sages.
At this point I want to say that I believe every prophesy made by Vanga - the seer almost without reserve and I will give a few examples of paranormal phenomena, simply to give you a taste of the matter. I might be criticized that I am limiting the research in this way, but it is better off to have a point of departure which offers a narrow but clear understanding of things. On the other hand, I do not know anyone who has had been more closely connected to the problems we are regarding. Otherwise, we will not reach beyond the abstract assumptions. What did she say? According to her metempsychosis exists. Figuratively speaking (again in her words) one is born to complete their basic education, and then they are reborn to complete their primary education, then their secondary and higher education. One’s destiny could be predetermined from the womb. She quotes the case of a certain doctor in support of this. As far as telepathy is concerned Vanga’s abilities are really amazing. She was able to read one’s thoughts not only in the subject’s present but also from the subject’s past and future. This phenomenon was accompanied by a clear visual image. Not only was she able to talk to the dead but she was also able to see them. This demonstrates the tremendous importance of visual images for human thinking. She claimed that man is composed of ethereal, physical and spiritual entities and one’s personality is preserved even after one’s death, which is seen only as an end of the physical being. There are unions superior to the human mind, which is seen as reason in its childhood years. One’s destiny is strictly predetermined and no one enjoys absolute freedom. I see a contradiction in this. How could one be brought to book for a course of action which is predetermined for them? Or perhaps the book is already written? You see now why the issue of freedom will always be topical much to the delight of mediocre philosophers. Vanga was able to see extraterrestrial beings too. Perhaps she spoke of beings from parallel universes who neither live with us nor live like us, but are able to control us and our world to a lesser or greater extent. Struggling with the thought that we are someone’s puppets, we comfort ourselves with the thought that in the kind of society we live in that is exactly what we are. The seer also said that every discovery is made exactly when the right time comes. Nothing out of joint can do man good. As far as telekinesis (the ability to move objects with the power of one’s thought) is concerned there is nothing in ‘Vanga’ by Krasimira Stoyanova, but judging from other sources it seems to exist if we can take it in good faith.
As you see these problems are neither voluminous nor new – Tibet
4. The electrochemical nature of the processes in a neural cell is no longer a mystery to science. The number of neural cells though, makes processes such as thinking and especially remembering, which run in every cell, a mystery. Scientific knowledge at present is at the stage immediately following the creation of the model of the mechanism of conditional reflectory reaction and partly of the memory necessary for forming it. Regretfully, science cannot solve the problems of ‘thinking in general ‘and ‘thinking’, and ‘remembering in general’ and ‘remembering’. The cause of this impotence is the fact that science, although it places the material character of the human brain at the heart of the research, does not imagine, let alone take into consideration the possibility that reason and the process of thinking in particular can sever their connection with the brain because this is considered unscientific. On the contrary – this is what science should start from. Going back to inductive logic and even turning a blind eye to the chemical character of the processes running in the human brain, I would like to make the following analogy whose peculiarity lies in the fact that we will apply an entire scientific model with all the causal relationships pertaining to it, its laws and characteristics to a particular problem.
Let us see what we have. There is a substance we have named reason which enables us to react to the environment - An ability called thinking which can turn to itself through abstract thinking and with the help of memory. The mind is directly connected to the human brain but according to some it can also break that connection. The soul does not die with one’s physical death. Once it leaves the brain it reason can return to it (not of course to the dead organ) but to its material carrier, be it via telepathy or rebirth. To conclude, we are dealing with some motion in matter which can independently leave it or return to it, causing a similar motion. I will only mention that we can already take into consideration the laws of preservation in physics, for if we examine a telepathic connection we will se that the energy which is released by the donor must be transferred unchanged to the recipient. We cannot receive a radio transmission which has never been aired. We can only receive that which is emitted by the transmitter. The analogy we are about to use is no longer a secret – electrical current flowing through a conductor. In practice, we are rediscovering the electric character of brain activity. However, we are not going into a detailed study of Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics because it could overburden the reader and is not necessary for the conclusions we are going to reach. We will only dwell on the processes which could be observed when an electric current runs through a conductor, and on the electromagnetic field which is formed in the meantime. First, when an electrical current runs through a conductor, an electromagnetic field is formed around it. Second, the already existing field no longer depends on its source. When the current is switched off, the field does not disappear. It is no longer generated. The field does not remain around the conductor. It spreads at the speed of light. Third, such a field can generate an electrical current in a conductor (a part of an electrical circuit) if one is placed in it. Thus the cause and effect swap their places as it is with everything else in dialectical philosophy. The reader can already see the strong resemblance between what we have been looking for and what we have found. In most cases it means that the thing has been found. Hence, this model pertains to the problem of human reason in the following way: the dynamics of the processed running in the human brain creates (generates) a biofielf of an almost certainly electromagnetic nature. It is unique and extremely difficult to describe in terms of logic. Once it is generated it can exist independently of its source. This biofield can influence the material object in turn in the form of telepathy or something else.
Here we have to be more precise not to fall into a fallacy. The fact that the brain generates a biofield does not mean that it loses its mind or its logical constructs. Remember the example of the transmitter, for it is extraordinarily pertinent. By saying that it can influence the material object in turn, I mean the notion of matter as something one can touch; as regards the field I do not consider it an immaterial object, although in physics it is accepted to be only a particular manifestation of matter. It is the other way round – waves in the form of light, radio waves or X-ray emissions, which are different manifestations of one and the same phenomenon, as well as reason which science does not consider to be matter or to have material character are the clue to the riddle of matter and this clue cannot be anywhere else but in matter. Therefore it is high time for materialism to revise the definition of mater Lenin provided in his works regarding philosophical thought. Matter can no longer be considered in that way, and in fact since the appearance of the quantum theory no one shares this narrow vision of it. I touch on this not to voice household words but to observe the continuity in scientific and philosophic thought; the acknowledgement of the broadened (expanded) definition of matter is a mere but necessary formality because without it the exposition could easily become vague and ambiguous. Another fallacy would be to assume that one’s brain could affect (influence) itself through its own biofield. The way we see the biofield, it is something which leaves the brain in the form of a very complex wave and never comes back to it. The brain cannot affect itself through such a field (Here I will press the matter a little) for it is indifferent to itself, and because there are no differences to resolve. We will dwell on this fundamental principle of matter in the chapter dedicated to physics because without it the creation of a model of matter would be inconceivable. In electrical engineering released energy in the form of an electromagnetic field is considered a loss of the field in all cases. Therefore, we cannot speak of it either.
5. Analyzing the importance of this analogy for the study of reason we cannot fail to ask: ‘Is it just an analogy or an identity?’, and consequently ‘Could death and rebirth be examined in a mode of thinking other than this one (the model already suggested) or are they alongside telepathy closely related to the laws of electromagnetism and electrodynamics?’
5a. To answer the first question, we have to refer to the scientific achievements in the research on brain activity, no matter how small they are. Biologists are completely convinced that the processes flowing in the neural cell have an electrochemical character. Therefore, the processes flowing in the brain have an electrochemical character as a whole. It is by all means well-advised to take into consideration the experiments which have led to this conclusion, but it should also be considered that the conclusion is the result of registering the weak electromagnetic fields generated by live brain tissue. The Encephalograph works according to the same principle. Here we run the risk of neglecting an important possibility - what if there is another carrier or transporter of energy which misleads scientists that they deal with electrochemical processes. Physicists would swear that such a thing does not exist. However, what really matters is not their confidence but to what extent they are familiar with the origin of electricity and the nature of the atom as a whole. However, the model of the atom as well as electricity was made a long time ago and since then there has been enough time to conduct all kinds of tests, and for this reason we are compelled to reject the logical construction suggested above. Seen from a different angle, even if brain processes do not possess a chemical nature, we can use the same model until the time it stops mirroring reality, and when this moment comes, it will not be difficult to spot. In other words, even if we do not deal with an identity, but with an analogy, the corrections in case of assuming a false direction will be minimal. I make this analysis, due to the simple reason that it lies at the core of our argument, and it predetermines the way we will see reason and matter through it. Don’t worry – recognizing the chemical character of brain processes is a good choice.
5b. If we ask ourselves the question how electrodynamics sees the death of a human being, we must specify that the most appropriate course of action is to determine what happens to the human mind, for the rest is buried in the grave.
For the time being I will set electricity aside and make a survey of the existing theories (positions) related to the issues at hand not to bore anyone but to explain why a grain of sand blocked the progress of science on the way to explaining the nature of death. Classic materialism, which I will be forced to further presently, regards thinking as a capacity to perceive, and reason as a set of sensations, and following these lines it reaches the ocean of death, claiming that this set of sensations or reason dies with death, that is to say with the transformation of the brain into dead organic matter. Materialism rejects any possibility for life after death because it has a rather narrow understanding of ‘matter’. Subjective idealism is much more interesting. It regards matter as a product of human mental activity, therefore the discovery of the material man should be granted to it. All joking aside, idealism and its unavoidable companion religion admit that death is only the end of the physical not the spiritual entity of man - an obvious borrowing from the Bible. The closest to the materialist understanding of this matter, and in the light of which I would like to see it, is Hegel’s dialectical idealism, which in its own peculiar way rose above classic materialism as a system. The reason why it happened is that it simply never delved into the practical aspects of its theories, for the result from an experiment has an absolute value, but is further subjected to false interpretations. That is why you should not be surprised if you notice that my conclusions contain rationalist elements. I am completely convinced that truth is only what the mind sees as such and I will presently demonstrate the validity of this statement.
If we now set out to contemplate the significance of death as if we have not considered it until the present moment, the first question we are going to ask ourselves will be: Where does the soul go after death? If the answer is ‘To heaven.’ or ‘The Elysian fields.’ we will realize that the correct question should be: What happens to the soul after death? If one asks themselves this question they are materialists by nature because they feel that something cannot be and then vanish as if it has never existed; it would simply contradict the well-known law of preservation in nature. Thus they, in every case, begin their reasoning in an amazingly correct way and, again in almost every case, end them making a lot of mistakes. It is correct to begin considering the moments of life and death. Here’s the rub – what happens in these moments, in the thin line between the two worlds. It is on this line that the layperson places the separation of the body from the soul, for the soul cannot just disappear somewhere, it has to continue to be even after this moment. Those who have some grounding and they are the majority, send the soul to Heaven or very much like classic materialists send it nowhere at all but leave it burning low in the body like a dying fire. Although in these last instances there is probably a grain of truth, they do not lead to a logical conclusion. The question is - how can we trust such people? Neither are the former a tourist company nor are the latter a fire brigade whose expertise we can rely on. And so we are compelled to continue our reasoning unconstrained and reach the question ‘What happens inside the human brain?’, or in other words ‘What are the mechanism of thinking (reasoning) and the nature of reason so that it continues to be after death?’ Provided I have ended my exposition at this point, the reader would have already grabbed their pen to insert the electrochemical or simply the electrical character of human thinking (and why not impose it on other living creatures indeed) in our argument, which to my delight shows that the reader already know what they are dealing with. To conclude: the conclusion has forced itself on us. This character makes reason independent from the brain.
In this train of thought the human mind is nothing but a rearrangement of electrical potentials in the brain, which cannot be anything else but a dynamic substance. It is exactly this rearrangement that generates the biofield. It is an exact copy of the process of thinking in the form of a field. The field itself changes too, which in accordance with all laws of thermodynamics enables its induction into another brain in the form of telepathy. If the brain stops functioning (i.e. if death comes) this emission is terminated and the soul goes somewhere unknown. Here we should perhaps make a distinction between the field generated by a functioning brain and the substance, again and the form of a field, which is emitted with death. As far as the possible destination of the soul is concerned, I have a lot of ideas. If we assume that it does not disperse but retains its configuration, it could orbit the planet and even break its relationship with the planet’s matter and set off into space; it could also divide itself among all functioning brains until the time for its rebirth comes - all of these –developments impossible to believe. I will now end my walk outside the edifice of science with the following argument: if we assume that the soul (I will no longer place it within inverted commas) is a biofield, organized to such an extent that apart from being able to become aware of itself it could also affect matter with its energy, then people should seriously think about what they have inside their heads and consider the possibility that what they develop all their lives is not their reason but something superior to our understanding of it, something they cannot master entirely, due to the imperfection of the material body carrying it. This poses another question. If we draw an analogy between the brain and a microcomputer, is the brain equivalent to a chip which is responsible for making decisions about everything happening in the computer, or the decision is made somewhere else, inside this superior mind, and our brain is only a peripheral device whose part it is to display the result. If it is so, this book has already been composed and I am only writing it down on paper. At this point we are not simply touching on the problem of predetermination but are trying to find out to what extent we can consider human intelligence is an independent entity. We can explicate this independence quite easily. Let us assume that the human brain is only a peripheral device which is controlled from without. Then this external operator endowed with reason superior to our own would know that assigning every person a superintendent reason is less rational than using one superior reason to control all peripheral devices, that is to say brains. All joking aside, I want to point out that such a superior form of reason will possess the desire for unification, which means that a great number of people will come together united by the identity of their physical nature. If so we should ask why the logical schemes of every person are so unique if there is one superior and unified mind. Or perhaps every brain is different from the rest? You have probably sensed the danger of entering a vicious circle of causes and effects which could only be left if we could determine the precedence of birth over rebirth or vice versa, and find out if reason is a product of organic matter or a gift from above. In order to pacify the psychics I would like to point out that I am not addressing the human reason but reason as such.
Before anything else I have to touch on a couple of things about death in connection with the brain. When the flow of blood in the brain is interrupted (i.e. when the influx of energy is cut off), the electrical potentials inside it equalize at the speed of the process of thinking and in practice this corresponds to a power breakdown in a coil and the consequent release of the energy generated by it in the form of an electromagnetic field. In other words, the electric energy of the brain matter is no longer the same as the electric energy of reason and this difference turns into an imbalance manifesting itself through the release of energy. If thought has the form of a field inside the brain, the thing that keeps it in is the brain itself, which we can liken to a magnetic core. For this reason when death comes, the potentials are rearranged approximately at the speed of thought and the body is separated from the soul at the same speed, for the brain tries to maintain an electric equi-potential under the same conditions. If there is a slim possibility of holding this desire through letting an influx of blood, lesser than the one necessary for the normal functioning of the brain, in this energy will be held in and that is what we call a ‘brain death’ or ’coma’.
It would be extremely beneficial for biology if the speed of thinking or rearranging brain electrical potentials could be determined. This would help learn more about the state of coma. I cannot see any other way of doing this but some innovative approach of analyzing electroencephalograms, looking for recurrence of the weakest signals or a time (frequency) constant for the strongest. The point is, the risk which a graphic method contains has to be accepted because the problem cannot be approached analytically. The imbalance between the configurations of potentials and the field would lead to a malfunction of some zones.
5c. By analogy, should we consider the origin of reason, inorganic matter is irrelevant, dead organic matter too, live organic matter acquires specialized neural cells (i.e. with multicellular organisms), and thus doing nothing but arranging these subjects along a long line of evolution, we reach man. Darwin
As far as the borrowing of the theoretical model is concerned, it could be argued that the evolution of reason is a part of the evolution of the species. It is a fact. But in Darwin Darwin
I do not see any other sign of consciousness than the existence of neural cells because it signals the existence of specialized logical centers. These centers are the result of the evolution of organisms’ nervous systems. The important question here is what caused the formation of such cells. It has already been mentioned that reason in lower organisms could be reduced to the capability to react or adapt, which demands the formation of such structures in living organisms. It is also important that a relevant reaction demands a precedent, i.e. in order to react in an appropriate way we must have gathered experience in a similar situation. Experience cannot be stored without the help of memory, which in turn means that the storing of information in the memory is the cause of forming neural cells in the process of evolution. This is their primary function. The necessity to access the stored information follows it up. It is apparent that such a divine providence in something as accidental as evolution cannot exist. Simply, in the world of lower multicellular organisms the failure to adapt almost inevitably leads to extinction (death); of course, we cannot speak of neural cells in single-celled organisms. Therefore, if we examine a group of inexperienced multicellular organisms in which the desire to react and adapt to environmental changes has already caused the appearance of neural cells, subjecting them to an external stimulus, which could be responded to in two different ways leading to their survival or death, we will observe that some of the organisms will choose the former alternative and survive, while the rest will choose the latter alternative and die. This means that if they are subjected to the same ’change’ in the future, the surviving organisms will have a better chance of remaining alive due to the experience they have gained from the experiment. This is how evolution, not our considerations, develops reason in organisms through natural selection in order to make them adaptable to changes. But let us not forget that the remembering is the primary function of the neural cell. It could be argued that the neural cells which serve the unconditional reflex do not remember. Their function is to send messages from different receptors to the central nervous system (the body), and although they do not possess the faculty of memory, if they happen to ‘remember’ a fixed reaction, we cannot consider them as intelligent. The concept of intelligence (reason) begins with Pavlov’s conditional reflex, but is applied to lower animals (organisms). The demand for changeability of the ‘padding’ of the neural cell is much stronger in higher organisms and man in particular, because they possess the faculty of abstract thinking, in which the stimulus or to be more precise the cause of the inclusion of a particular neural cell in a logical circuit does not originate inside or outside the organism; it originates in the brain – in an already existing logical connection. Abstract thinking is the primary cause of our research and its ultimate goal. It is caused by it because the model of inductive logical constructs is borrowed from it. It is its goal because with its help not with some synthetic logic that we will unravel the mysteries of matter and being. And in the mean time, as you have already noticed, we are rediscovering and revising already familiar laws and principles, a sure sign that we are on the right way.
6. In this section we will consider the mechanism of abstract thinking from the standpoint of physics which will allow us to set out its logical scheme.
6a. Even if we are not biologists, even if do not know that the brain is made up of neural cells, we can still express an opinion concerning the function of the human brain, provided we know about the electric character of its activity. Thus we will make a conclusion which excludes all other possibilities. Not only does the refusal to use scientific achievements demonstrate the power of philosophical thought, but it also places the conclusion in a more favorable ‘sterile’ environment. Most thinkers and scientist do not favor the last stance, due to their desire to work with more information, which contains the risk of examining facts in the framework of causal relationships, i.e. in different stages of the development of the problem, and thus placing them on the same plane. Personally, I think that formulating erroneous initial arguments, whose task is to determine the facts in the subject of study, is the surest way to a logical trap. For this reason I will now subject to consideration the ‘sterile brain’, in order to avoid any explanations of facts which cannot influence our conclusions.
Many would think that the problem I am going to consider is a counterpoint of the concept of the electric character of brain activity. It is contained in an argument like the following: if brain structures have an electric potential which can change very fast, thus carrying out the process of thinking; if brain tissue like any other live tissue can conduct electricity; even if the brain receives some energy from without, the electric potentials should balance out. In other words the brain cannot perform the part of a capacitor because it will short-circuit and discharge. I can only be grateful to myself in my capacity of my own opponent for bringing up this question. If the research were being made by a biologist though, it would turn into a serious hindrance. He would take the above statement in good faith and live in ignorance the rest of his life. I am saying this not to offend anyone but to point out the necessity for scientists to be more erudite, and to plead against the complete differentiation of the formal sciences. As a matter of fact, the existence of sciences such as biophysics and bionics is indicative enough of the necessity of extensive theoretical knowledge. In our case the theory of electrical circuits provides us with a neat solution to our problem. The capacitor discharges, but through a resistor. Those familiar with electrical engineering must have already guessed the model we are going to use, but for the sake of every reader I will offer a more detailed explanation. First, I categorically admit the fact that the conductivity of brain tissue could hinder the activity of the brain. It is an indisputable fact. However, taking into consideration the fact that according to Einstein ‘God does not play dice’ and does not create anything which is doomed to failure, I will remind you that I have already discoursed on the electrochemical character of brain activity and its high, but by no means lightning speed. Only on the condition that the speed is infinitely high, the potentials in the brain can be balanced out. But chemical processes are rather inert. It is the time that they take that explains everything. The very essence of the principle a neural cell functions on allows it to retain the information it possesses. In practice, this electrochemical process should be very slow. We will presently see why. We can visualize the separate cell and the brain as a sand-glass in which the tiny passage in the middle prevents the grains, attracted by the force of gravity, from falling down into the lower cuplike and of the glass vessel; the tiny passage representing inertness, the force of gravity – the tissue’s conductivity. Just like gravity makes the work of the clock possible, conductivity makes the work of the brain possible. The energy which the brain receives from the blood could be likened to lifting particles from the bottom cuplike and of the glass vessel and putting them back into the top end. If we take the capacitor as a model, the resistor connecting its terminals to form a circuit restricts the flow of electric current, in order to prevent the capacitor from an immediate discharge.
At this point the reader could be slightly confused by the seeming contradiction between our previous conclusions that death comes momentarily, due to the great speed of brain activity, and our current statement that the speed of brain activity is rather slow. The truth is we cannot claim anything lacking data so the correct interpretation of the above should be ‘not so great’. But as things now stand, one feels there is a difference between the speed of the brain cell, i.e. the neural cell and the brain itself, and the prevailing impression is that the cell is much slower. Here comes the core idea of this book. Could the slower element of the system serve the faster one? Control theory and common sense reject this possibility. The speed of the structural elements of a system determines the speed of the whole system. Even if we assumed that such a structure existed, it would be in a model form, a fruit of our mind, not a model taken from nature. I assume you have already guessed that the problem is not the speed but the model the brain uses for its work (activity). This means we are trying to discover the physical nature of the process of thinking. The first issue we are going to consider concerns the possibility of transmitting information via electricity. Imagine an electric circuit, as complex as it can get, pretending to be a model of brain activity. Place, as agreed, capacitors storing electricity, and resistors preventing the electric current form flowing unimpeded. Let us see what would happen if the brain ‘decided’ to transfer energy between the two remotest capacitors. This would involve the passing of electricity through each section of the circuit, discharging and recharging of every capacitor; in other words complete chaos. The transfer of a unit of logic from one location to another displaces every other unit, and as far as brain activity is concerned, in practice it suggests the lack of it. This is so because this model cannot define that primary thing we call memory. We have to conclude that information cannot be transmitted in this way. Thus, through elimination we have reached the conclusion that information is transmitted via the other manifestation of electricity – the electric field. If we connected the two terminals of each capacitor to the terminals of a coil in the circuit we envisaged above, the energy would be transmitted via the oscillating circuit which is formed in this way and is the core of the radio. Stored in the capacitor it could pass to the coil as an electric current, and emitted as a field it could pass on to any other unit of logic, be received by the next coil and stored in the next capacitor. This is a more elegant model, all the more that the energy stored in a capacitor could circulate between it and the coil for much longer than it is necessary for its charging, i.e. the rearrangement of the units of logic could be achieved almost momentarily and the information they contain could be stored for a very long time, which demonstrates the existence of memory. I would not agree if the model were defined as primitive, because it comprises every facet mentioned above: first, we have seen that the electric character of brain activity provides us with an effectual model; second, we have reached the conclusion that there is a field expression of the process of thinking; third, we have expressed a serious supposition about the mechanism of thinking; fourth, on these grounds we have explicated the most important faculty of the mind - memory; fifth, even if we failed to grasp something it would still fit without difficulty within such a pragmatic logical scheme. Now that I have, hopefully, convinced you that the model cannot be considered primitive I will allow myself the liberty to call it primitive from a different perspective. It is because it lacks structural components despite its good functionality. If we set ourselves the task to make an electronic model of a brain cell, it will not contain capacitors, resistors and coils. For this reason we should put aside the model we envisaged and only consider it as a mere function. Our immediate task will be to examine not the work (function, activity) of the model but of the subject - the human brain.
The motion of electric charges within the neural cells toward equi–potentiality is a perpetuum mobile for thinking. This desire will naturally manifest itself in the balancing electric currents trying to pass through the tissue of the brain. Electric currents, as we already know, generate electromagnetic fields which transmit units of logic and make logical connection within the brain. It is precisely the energy induced by the field that lies at the core of the logical model of brain activity. That is why I named this model Inductive Logical Constructions. The term ‘induction’ here has the same meaning as the one in physics, not in formal logic. That is why the brain can be likened to a huge humming hive, which works without a pause even during sleep. The process of thinking continuously goes on in it even though we are not aware of it and only occasionally take advantage of it. It is an immensely complex system of elements and connections, which we can neither describe nor create a replica of. We can only explicate the principle on which it works – the principle of electric induction. It turns out that the brain itself shows us that logical constructions could be made even if there is no direct connection between the subjects of study and some other objects, all the more nature has made this principle compulsory for brain activity. What ‘a direct connection’ means we will see later on. At this point I would like to explicate my statement that the biofield leaves the brain and never returns to it. In other words, I expressed the idea that the brain cannot exert an influence on itself through its own biofield. It is still my conviction. The illusion of contradiction is created by the fact that the biofield becomes invariant in relation to the units of logic in the brain when it rearranges them. In other words, as mentioned above, the biofield, which can be considered a sum of local fields, is not related to the brain because it is a logical identity in relation to it. In still other words the field leaving the brain rearranges the units of logic and never returns.
And Now I will demonstratively mention the fact that the conclusions we reached when we outlined the physical model of brain activity are the same conclusions we had reached through inductive logic when we suggested the analogy with an electric current passing through a conductor, in accordance to the conclusion that brain activity possesses electro inductive character. I preferred to make this ‘ordinary’ conclusion not because inductive logic could not support its conclusions without external help, but because a lot of people might not understand how it is possible. In fact, I want to say emphatically and demonstrate that a carefully selected analogous connection can save a lot of labor. All this reasoning and rejecting of hypotheses and new proof become absolutely unnecessary and only encumber the research. This is one of the characteristic features of this method which makes it rather different from that of formal logic. Formal logic is a man- made system of quantitative and qualitative situations in which the interrelation of subjects: concepts, arguments and conclusions are strictly predetermined. In such a definition there are two basic concepts:
First, it is a synthetic system and despite its ‘absolute’ theoretical reliability (a statement which has a different coloring with every other philosopher), which has established it as the only mode of scientific thinking until now, it is a product of the human mind and one which has drifted far from its source despite its sluggishness. The unbiased thinker who might not be familiar with the laws of formal logic, in contrast to the well - versed logician, could rather easily hypothesize about a problem and decide through simple verification which is the most probable solution, whereas the logician would reach the same conclusions via the methods he is familiar with, but in more time. The difference is that the latter would claim that only his approach has a scientific character, and is therefore valuable.
Second, such logic could only be predetermined. The interrelations of its subjects: whole, subordinate, identity and section could not be any different from what they are. When one concludes that the wolf is an animal on the premises that vertebrates are animals and the wolf is a vertebrate, we can only marvel at the ‘perfection’ of the conclusion simply because it is predetermined by the knowledge that wolves are vertebrates and vertebrates are animals. The average person might not be aware of the fact that this is a syllogism which has a middle term, but they must be fools to assume that the wolf could crawl out of the term ‘animal’. Or if we consider, for example, the following syllogism:
Gold is a metal.
Silence is gold.
Therefore, silence is a metal.
All this is Heavy Metal! Logicians will hasten to explain that ‘gold’ in the minor premise (the second categorical proposition) means a valuable quality or property and so on and so forth, i.e. it is us who are being made fools of this time. Formal logic, in essence, is a massive tautology in disguise, pretending to have scientific character. What do I mean? Let us ask ourselves where the terms it uses to make propositions and reach conclusions come from. The obvious answer is ‘From experience.’ It is experience that allows it to form relations between different subjects in such a way that the geometric interpretation of such order becomes as clear as day, for example, showing which species belong to which genera and so on and so forth; thus all its theory does is indicate this order in words. This resembles decorating the Christmas tree and then ‘proving’ where each colored ball was hung. In other words in order to reach a lucid conclusion, formal logic must know the positions of the terms in the propositions and the conclusion is nothing else but a mere repetition because A means A. What is this if not a tautology? Knowing the truth through experience makes us believe that we are discovering the truth...
But let us like good centrists abandon the naked truth and support the opposition of the stance taken above. Let us still consider formal logic an incontestable absolute. Then we will find out that it cannot surpass itself (We are good centrists indeed.) Seriously speaking, one cannot do much more with the terms formal logic relies on than to define their interrelations, subordinations, sections and identities and, to frame the picture, to inductively put them together in their sets (Here ‘induction’ is used in the same way as in formal logic.) In visual terms this means to draw the terms on sheet of paper, to indicate their relationships by means of lines and so on and so forth until there is no more free space and the diagram is incomprehensible, but alas nothing could be done to remedy the situation. That is the reason why such logic is bounded by its terms, i.e. its structural elements. It cannot be scientific method of invention. At the beginning of the century when science was able to conduct plenty of experiments it might have been of some use, in fact it was, because we see an expansion of its volume, but under the present circumstances, when a single experiment amounts to the gross national product of a small state, this is impossible. Science will be dealing with entirely new, or as it prefers to call them ‘abstract’ problems, and under these conditions I do not see room for formal logic. Its theory mentions the possibility of formulating a hypothesis based on analogy but this method is foreign to it and is only there complete the methodology, not to analyze analogy in detail.
For these reasons I believe that the system or the mechanism of formal logic is foreign to the brain. Man’s mental faculty surpasses formal logic’s capacity by far, for man has a faculty for invention, i.e. for introducing new elements to the configuration of logical objects. That is why I am trying to find the mysterious force which motions the progress of humanity, namely the mechanism of thinking as it is. There is always the possibility that things are not what they seem to be though, for example, brain activity could have other than electrochemical character which is registered as an electric field around the brain tissue and electric potentials in it. Electricity could be only a particular manifestation of thinking, not its driving force. If such a possibility manifests itself in the future, it will only further the physical aspect of our research. Its logical aspect will remain the same due to the simple reason that the effect follows the cause, i.e. electric phenomena would only replicate the configuration of that hypothetical driving force, should one exist outside our knowledge.
As a conclusion we can say that brain activity, comprising perception, or the brain’s attitude to the outside world and abstract thinking, or the brain’s attitude to its own structures, is an inductive rearrangement of brain structures. The word ‘inductive’ might irritate some readers, but I cannot replace it with ‘analogous’ due to the chaotic character of the latter word. Analogies could be made between any two phenomena and this is certainly very dangerous for thinking. The term ‘inductive’ will always remind us where we started and what we gained. We set off from a physical model of brain activity and adopted it to create a logical system. On the other hand an inductive logical construction has a lot in common features with a classic logical induction. The most important of them all is the new conclusion. In formal logic it can lead to forming and naming a particular set of objects while in inductive logic it is a discovery. Be it because I am unwilling to use the system of terms (terminology) of formal logic, be it because inductive logic contains elements of deduction and induction as regards the classification of formal logic, I will put the last fact aside and by ‘induction’ we will understand only the connection with the physical term. Otherwise the conclusion we have made demonstrates that there could be a connection between any two units of logic, and that there is a rearrangement involved. However, this poses the following problems: Does this rearrangement take place on a cell level or on energy level or both? If you remember, we followed our examination of the origin of reason from conditional reflexes with a single demand: a possibility for a change of the logical ‘padding’ of the neural cell, but we did not specify on what level. These speculations reflect on something else as well. When I created the coil model of brain activity I partly explained why the activity of brain tissue is slow while that of the mind is fast, and considering the passing of electricity all over the brain a major disadvantage of the preceding model, I advanced the thesis about the electric field which impacts everything via all channels.
To answer the first question I will use the research of a group of scientists on the simplest perceptions in intelligent organisms, in this particular case rabbits’ sense of smell. An article on this issue has appeared in Scientific American and in the Russian "Scientific American" under the title of "Physiology of Perception" by Walter J. Freeman. The article describes in detail the scientific results from the research and presents well-grounded conclusions, but most importantly it confirms the electric character of brain activity, and as if to answer our question it informs us that a cell could be included in or isolated from an assembly of cells related to a particular perception via the so called Hebb’s synapses. This does not happen by forming and breaking the connection but by regulation of the amplifier constant during the transmission of information. The same scientists have discovered the modulating frequency of the messages coming from the brain, something I have already familiarized the reader with during my analysis of the speed of brain activity. The information which comes to us via scientific research indicates that the changes occurring in the brain during its activity take place on both levels. It would not be fair on science to reach a conclusion about such a specific issue by speculation. That is why we can use scientific results, the more they do not contradict but rather affirm our arguments.
As far as the second question is concerned, i.e. electric current or field, I believe that the problem is not in the all-embracing impact but in the selectiveness of perception. For this reason it cannot oppose at all the model I have arrived at. The mechanism of selectiveness in the electricity model must work with the help of additional loops which like ring roads lead the electricity away from the centre of logic; an activity which must be triggered by a decision made in even more complicated mode – complexity unfitting nature. Much more elegant models could be made with the help of the ‘field’ approach. Without assuming a stance, for it is the concern of scientific research, I will give several examples in order to show that there are solutions to the problem, and if they are consequently taken into consideration, I will be happy to have been of service. No one disputes that the field has a more general impact than the electric current. As regards its transmission there could be two possibilities: It either spreads in all directions or it is channeled by the potentials of the rest of the cells, i.e. by something resembling a magnetic field. The latter could be further subdivided: a cell which does not transmit either receives the signal or furthers it. For a nerve cell the signal could be either a source of information, i.e. the cell functions as a receiver, or a source of energy for saving its information. We could also assume that the dimensions of a nerve cell and the configuration of the axon, the neurons and other neighbor cells influence its working frequency. What we will have then is a radio model – the cell receives only the signal on its working frequency. There is another possibility: the frequency could vary constantly within certain limits, and an assembly of cells which have the same frequency at the same time, i.e. vary their frequency in the same way, could form a speech centre or a sight centre etc. It is accepted that in all these models there is a possibility for selection which can be made for many different reasons, of which we will try to construct a logical model in the following subsection. Hence not only does ‘Inductive Logical Constructions’ give an answer to the question ‘What is there inside the brain?’ but it is also ‘the model of selection’, i.e. the reason why there is a connection between two independent logical centers, and which substantiates inductive logic as a scientific model.
6b. Quite naturally the logical model of brain activity repeats to some extent the physical one, but it also faces the task to make a connection between the level of the latter and the level of reason, i.e. between the primary character of matter and the secondary character of reason. The physical nature of the processes, flowing in nerve cells demonstrates that the direct connection between two logical objects is not only unwelcome but also excluded by matter. The indirect connection we are going to make cannot be between two objects either, for to transfer the characteristics of one thing to another there must be some dynamics in the first party. Dynamics, i.e. motion cannot be achieved if there is only one thing in the world. There has to be at least one more thing to set the first one in motion. If the second thing occupies the farther end of the inductive connection, the connection is no longer an indirect but a direct one. Hence we need at least three things: two in the cause, determining the motion in their direct connection, and one more in the effect, receiving the motion. But the pattern of motion within the effect cannot be other than the one within the cause, therefore the dynamics will pass to the effect in the same way through another connection with a fourth party. These are the minimum requirements for the existence of inductive logic which will be interpreted as a connection whose effect is the conclusion, i.e. the fourth party.
How is this achieved as a logical scheme? We have already mentioned the fact that memory is at the core of any brain activity involving thinking. All the units of logic the brain works with are stored in the memory. I will call the process of storing and extracting information, i.e. the essence of brain work, identification. Mere memory is absurd – erecting a warehouse to lock things in and never use them again is sheer nonsense. Identification determines what and when is to be used. Its task is to locate a thing or an assembly of things by certain characteristics they bear. This scheme has a lot in common with inductive logic. In the first place, there is something in memory we can call an ‘element.’ This element has the following characteristics: A, B, C, D, E and F. If Identification is searching for something which has the same characteristics the element will be discovered, i.e. the first configuration will connect to second one.
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The funny thing about memory’s identification is that the object needed must have all the characteristics which are being looked for or at least the ones which are really important for the object’s identification. It is so because we can identify a Ferrari or a ripe tomato by the red color. I guess you can make the difference yourselves. The same scheme could serve as a model of thinking if we assume that the second thing which dynamics has to give and is needed for the conclusion is contained in the characteristics of the element. But because I am not inclined to generalize about the term ‘characteristics’ in order to make it fit within the terminology of psychology, I will consider the second as another element of memory. Thus we can examine the process of thinking in the following way: If there is a connection, should it be of a causal or logical nature, which from the perspective of reason is indeed of a causal nature, between element A which has the characteristics A1, A2, etc. and element B which has the characteristics B1, B2, etc (always a limited number), and reason makes a connection between element A and element A’ which does not have to possess the same characteristics, or could lack some or even have others, then element A’ will lead to element B’ whose characteristics will bear the same relation to element B as the characteristics of element A’ to element A.
The simple logical scheme will look like that:
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In the simple words of inductive logic if A leads to B, A’ will lead to B’. The complete scheme will look rather differently and it could feature element A’ as the cause of B’ depending on what we know. It is clear that if our aim is to find A, the relation between A and B could not be the driving force and will go to the corollary.
We will examine the explanation of the above scheme only in the case of deducing the corollary – we will be looking only for B’ (or element 4). We start from the proposition that the cause – effect relationship between element A and element B and their characteristic features is already revealed. The question mark on the left does not exist in the brain because the analogy, i.e. the induction is made automatically, but in a logical system analogy must be substantiated. For this reason element A is extracted from memory through the elemental connection, i.e. the connection between the elements’ features, between element A and element A’ and is substituted for the question mark on the left through an identifying connection. The analogy is substantiated by means of the elements’ features. This substantiation should not be considered as a validation of the analogy, but as a selection of an appropriate analogy. Afterwards, from the cause-effect relationship between element A and element B a deduction about a connection between elements A’ and B’ is made. The deduction of this connection involves the characteristics of element B in an analogy leading to a transitional state in which there are characteristics but there is no element or something with such characteristics. Thus through the elemental connection an element matching the characteristics is sought in memory. When it is located it is identified as the object sought; if it is not found it is given a name (in most cases) and is stored in the memory. For this reason I call the connection between the question mark on the right and B’ MIC – Memory Identification Connection. In this way the connections between the question marks and between A’ and B’ form an identity –A’ takes the place of the question mark on the left while B’ takes the place of the question mark on the right and the scheme is reduced to the simple logical scheme featuring four elements.
If element’s A characteristic A4 does not correspond to an equivalent characteristic A’4 of element A’, although it has its equivalent in B, it follows that characteristic B4 does not exist. This is caused by the peculiarity of the two parts of the analogous connection (AC), and could usually be found in the remaining characteristics. We will be deal with the same phenomenon if we discover a new characteristic of a certain element, for example A’ – A’7. Then we will have to seek out its equivalence in B’. This molding of the conclusion is so natural that I do not deem it necessary to set it out. In the process of creating artificial intelligence though, this molding must grow into a system because it is in itself that the essence of inductive logic’s discovery is contained.
It is time I noted something very important. We explained that the above scheme does not contain six but four elements when it is applied to the brain, but, in practice, the brain does not differentiate the elements on the basis of their characteristics. No elements exist for it; there are only characteristics and connections between them. Thus because only things exist for the brain, element B is just another ‘thing’; the element is not a sum of features, the features themselves are the elements and the induction is made between groups of elements (units of logic, as we have called them), a process which might lead to the creation of a new element. That is why from the brain’s perspective logic and memory is the same thing. Such a conclusion - let us be pragmatic for a while - supports our observation that there are people who think logically but have a bad memory, and others who cannot solve a simple mathematical problem but have an amazing memory. In order to give, we simply have to take. I myself am an interesting example of this phenomenon: In my early childhood I used to have a phenomenal memory. I knew the lyrics of many songs and was able to memorize whole books from which I remember little now. At the age of ten I realized that my peers were able to solve the problems given in the maths lessons and I couldn’t, and this somehow changed my mode of thinking. For all this there is, of course, a practical explanation – children contemplate the world, whereas adults analyze it and this is so because logic requires memory. However, the model of inductive logic cannot be the same as the one of memory because we cannot allow such anarchy to lurk into the logical schemes of artificial intelligence. On the whole reason is moderate in its conclusions, which is a consequence of its experience with matter. Until computers develop such a connection, they will have to operate within somewhat artificial limitations.
Despite everything reason does make mistakes. It draws erroneous analogies although it has a connection to matter and can evaluate its own activity. There could be a variety of reasons for this. It is not time yet for us to analyze them, the more it might become the subject of a different volume. At present, we are only interested whether a wrong unit of logic in memory is stored as it is or is replaced with the correct one. From the point of view of reason every logical sequence it has passed through is history, i.e. is something already recorded as a past event, and therefore the conclusion which has been reached is also remembered. This creates the illusion that there is a chaotic mixture of wrong and correct conclusions inside the brain. This is completely wrong. In the first place the mind could or could not be aware that a particular unit of logic is wrong. Second, even if the conclusion is wrong, one could still be convinced that it is correct because science is at a stage of its development when an erroneous proposition could easily be mistaken for correct. An example of this could be the medieval fallacy that the world was flat. This illustrates that reason accepts as true everything it has deduced itself, although it could be partly or utterly false from the standpoint of matter. If we assume that errors are forgotten, the development of another argument on the same topic hides the danger of making another error. However, some might point out that we have already given an example of correct logic and it is indeed so, but truth has been reached via indirect ways and this serves as a premise to find the conclusion invalid and consider replacing it with a more reliable one. These are two entirely different logical schemes. If we do not make an error analysis, we will be left with the impression that A follows from B, when it has to follow from C in a correct (valid) logical construction. Reason would never put up with the intrusion of foreign conclusions into its own activity. It will never believe that the Earth is round if this proposition is not substantiated with arguments about the shadow cast by an object or photographs of Earth taken from spacecraft. That is why as a conclusion we will say that an error is stored as an error, for it is an element of reason – one of its units of logic which can be followed by another one indicating that the argument is false.
There are no errors in formal logic if we are to trust its disciples. However, it was created as a system at the time of Aristotle and there are people inclined to think that it had appeared even earlier somewhere in China
Formal logic is also statistical logic. The languages spoken on Earth are the reason for the existence of both sciences - formal logic and linguistics. The statistical probability that a statement exists unchanged in all languages should be equal to the probability that the same contention is identical to peoples’ experience, i.e. with truth. This verifiable supposition, if it turns out to be as true as I think it is, will reveal the present - day civilization in a bad light because we will find the same forms in primitive tribes, which in turn discredits the system of formal logic.
One of my objectives is to overcome the language barrier in my attempt to create a system of human thinking, for reason is much closer to matter than language, which lies at the core of the pedestalized until now formal logic. Inductive logic provides thinking with a lot more freedom. It could be successfully compared to navigating by the position of the stars. The stars would stand for elements of our memory and the celestial map in the mind of the traveler would be an assembly of other elements, and only when the two, the stars and the map, are juxtaposed we will find the right direction in which we must go. However, we should be aware that reason still finds its way by the stars; it has not invented the compass yet, and even if it has it dos not know that the compass won’t point to magnetic north for it. Whatever we find, we will have to pay a very high price. Discoveries will take a lot of effort and time and for this reason no matter what the destiny of this book is, it is nothing more than a drop in the sea of human knowledge.
7. Now the concept of inductive logic already has a definite shape in the reader’s mind, but the reader should never forget that although inductive logical constructions are the basis for this research, they are not its basic goal. It is to demonstrate the might of reasoning and its incredible capacity for unraveling the secrets of matter and even for reshaping it, for going beyond human limitations and penetrate deep into the mysteries of nature and its laws. It is a demonstration of the usefulness of abstract thinking, intended to restore scientists’ trust in it and make them not only set out the manifestations of matter through experiments but also try to figure out its objective laws through speculations. Some might wrongly interpret the Law of Unity as a failed attempt to reshape Hegel and Engels’s (I personally think it is Lenin’s) Law of the Unity of Opposites due to the fact that unity is one of its elements. My firm stance is that it is not a simple revision but a great step forward in our understanding of the world. It is not just a law, it is a fundamental principle of my philosophy; I will go even further – it is the fundamental principle of all manifestations of matter. The transformations of reason are transformations of matter as well. Reason is a higher form of matter – to be more precise – of self-organizing matter. This is the main thread of this book - the power of the mind (speculation). The model of reason is speculative as well; the creation of artificial intelligence will require a lot more work if it is based on it. It will have to be adjusted to fit in a material carrier of information. The model of matter will be speculative too – much to the military’s regret, it will not contain the plans for a new bomb. We must pass through a speculative stage in order to succeed in practice. It is logical theories and not mathematical ones that will be the future of science for a long time. I can only wonder at the physicists who haste to complete the system of theoretical physics and their antipodes who construct a model of every phenomenon they deal with, when it would be much simpler to change the multiplication table; but why put ideas in their heads? Really, what could be better than being in a transport of joy in this derailed state of affairs? Physics could simulate advancement; it could even mislead physicians, but it would be enough to compare the state of physical science at the beginning of the century to the current one, ignoring the General Relativity Theory, to know the truth. Nevertheless physicists are so incredibly stubborn that they won’t turn for help to more abstract sciences such as philosophy. I will only mention the fact that there have been numerous instances in the history of science in which logically deduced ideas were neglected only to be rediscovered through experiments a couple of centuries later. But isn’t it one of history’s primary functions to help us learn from the mistakes of our predecessors?
In this light we will take an interest not only in the development of physics or all other sciences but in the development of reason as a whole, for reason is the initial force that sets the wheels of all sciences, including philosophy, in motion. The question which would pop up first is “What does ‘the development of reason’ suggest?” The first thing we would like to do is find out whether ‘the development of reason’ implies the motion of information within it, or even without it, or its historical development over the centuries, or motion as a process of recognizing reason in its relation to being. As far as this book’s goal is concerned, we have already exhausted the first possibility, and I do not aim to overburden the reader’s mind with additional arguments. The second possibility is the concern of sciences studying the history of physics, chemistry, biology, medicine and even philosophy. The third possibility – the development of reason as related to being, is what we are going to consider because our chief interest is to find out what the future of reason is. In other words, we will try to find out what conclusions reason arrives at in its analysis of being. But according to all existing laws of philosophy, if something wants to find out about itself, it has to leave itself, i.e. it has to see itself from an external point of view as well as from its own. If we approach the problem via the dualism of matter and reason, we will see that to understand itself reason has to leave itself and go to reason. This premise is true, but only up to appoint. First, it is true that matter needs reason to become aware of itself, but what would reason do in dead mater if it wanted to become aware of itself? The conclusion is that the mechanism of the above premise does not work. Second, to become aware of itself reason has to rely only on itself, but becoming aware it must logically do it through matter; for this reason the above premise is true only in its logic. In the second section of this chapter I introduced the term ‘higher reason’ while we were trying to answer the question ‘Why would reason reflect on itself?’ It is time we saw why I did that. From everything I have said it is clear that mater is the origin of reason and its object of study. However, in their criticism of the materialist approach in reason’s study of matter some idealists claim that the opinion of materialism on this issue is rather chaotic, and there is no sign of a plan for this activity. I cannot understand what the implication of the term’ plan’ is, perhaps it denotes some divine design, and I categorically renounce this doctrine. Man is not simple beast taking a walk in the woods and only accidentally showing traces of reason. On the contrary - reason and matter are (so) closely connected in man due to the simple reason that in its current stage of development reason can experiment with its material vehicle and thus gain first –hand knowledge of matter. However, the lack of complete chaos is not a sign of order. For thousands of years man has been deducing the laws of nature and furthering science; barbarian tribes have devastated scientific facilities in towns, plunging science into its past – this is the history in which we are currently interested. It appears that reason, speeding up in some epochs and slowing down in others, and perhaps following a ‘plan’, has been trying to understand matter and its laws, to grasp its essence, and find its place in it.
We have already acquainted ourselves with a hypothesis concerning the origin of reason, in its manifestation as specialized cells, from unreasonable live matter. If we use this hypothesis to determine the direction of the development of reason, we will only reach the conclusion that reason is trying to understand matter through its ability to sense and deduce. Thus we will neglect the following important questions: ‘Have animals been simply slowed down in their evolution?’, and ‘Will reason simply cease to develop when it finally understands matter?’ I have chosen to ask these two questions, the first one simple enough while second one is complicated enough, to point out that we should never rely on the achievements of formal science if we want to be genuine scientists. If we try, or more precisely, if we prefer to go the easy way and rely on every discovery made until now to answer the first question, we can say that some species must have come out of the water later than the rest, and therefore their evolution must have started much later, and this can explain their current position in the evolution of all species. This could be true but do people ever ask themselves why man considers himself to be much more evolved than the rest of the species? Could it be due to man’s egocentricity? If so, how can we possibly explain man’s achievements in science and technology? It becomes apparent that man does not consider himself a higher being on the grounds of such logic. Man is indeed the most evolved creature in the world as we know it. What we are dealing with here is something entirely different, and it lies in man’s ability to reason. No one would place the fox higher than the wolf on the evolutionary ladder only because the fox is the more cunning of the two. I on my own part could decide that the ability to survive is the factor determining a species position on the evolutionary ladder, and position the wolf higher than the fox because the wolf is the stronger and the more ferocious of the two. As regards the idea that the position of a species on the evolutionary ladder could be determined by a criterion other than reason, and the idea that evolutionary levels could be divided into sublevels, I find them unfounded. Matter reflects on itself through reason, and reason being more elevated than nature could serve as a criterion by which to judge development. Therefore man will not simply stand on a higher level; he will represent a qualitative leap in the development of reason. Here we reach a point when we realize the necessity of a criterion by which to unquestionably determine the levels of development. It could be deduced either by using the tools of evolution, or by the tools of logic and philosophy. Evolutionary analysis would prove that man, in contrast to animals, realizes its ability to analyze matter. In other words man envisages reason as a highly organized matter which is most likely absent in animals. If we consider abstract thinking, i.e. if we accept the rearrangement of brain structures unprovoked by an outside stimulus as a criterion, we will inevitably sink into the bog of ‘the problem of the existence of abstract thinking in animals’ because we will certainly find out that it exists. An analysis based on logic and philosophy is by all means better, and for this reason I will adopt it in my research.
We will start by defining the key terms. Until this moment ‘reason’ implied the human mind. From now on we will speak of ‘reason’ and ‘higher reason’ when we refer to what precedes man and to what follows him respectively. We have advanced the proposition that from the standpoint of matter reason and matter are the self - same thing, while from the standpoint of reason they are antipodes (in contradiction). In order to differentiate the stages in the development of the relationship between reason and matter we will start from the premise of the latter dualistic standpoint. Here, we will come across ‘apparent’ contradictions to what we have said before, but let us never forget that we were examining the relationship from a diametrically different angle at that time.
The first step in every analysis is the identification of the problem. In our case we are asking ourselves what the future of reason is because we have discovered that reason has gathered experience of life, which we can lawfully call ‘motion’. This means that matter and reason are the two components of one correlation. Matter exists objectively and does not depend on anything external to it, or depends only on itself, which is practically the same. Reason has originated from matter, and is now trying to construct a logical model of it in order to understand it, and consequently enable matter to ‘become’ through it. That is why we prefer to consider reason in contradistinction to matter. This might seem unfounded and unfit, but we will assume that reason progresses from utter ignorance to profound knowledge (the absolute truth) because there cannot be reason without knowledge. In other words ignorance is not reason. We have already seen that memory is a prerequisite for the existence of reason. And because memory is knowledge, there is no reason without it, therefore there is no reason without knowledge. This in turn means that reason does not begin its progress toward knowledge from the very beginning, but from some further stage which is a prerequisite for its development. As regards the relationship between matter and reason, we also observe that matter is permeated by reason, i.e. reason approaches matter in its own way – unraveling its mysteries. We have already said that man is closer to understanding matter than animals are, and compared to them is at an altogether different stage in his attitude towards the world. This allows us to conclude that the development of reason passes through altogether different stages. But for the time being this is only a hypothesis. Our task is to evaluate the appropriateness of this proposition. In order to do that, we will examine the correlation between two objects in a close system. The following arguments, by the way, will be of tremendous importance for the construction of the model of matter. To examine a closed system which consists of the parts (objects) means to imagine that there are only two things in the world (the formula ‘closed system’ excludes the possibility of an outside intervention) which are involved in a dynamic relationship; the fact that there is motion within the system speaks of its dynamic nature. Hegel also attempted to analyze a closed binary system, but I presume he envisaged the political processes in a society, and concluded that there are three possible combinations: the first object can engulf the second one or vice versa, or the two objects can destroy each other. I am drawing your attention to this only to point out that the analysis I am making approaches the problem from a completely different and sufficiently general standpoint. If we distinguish between two objects within a whole, it should be done on the basis of their differences. It is the differences that cause the motion. The simplest example of this is the upward or downward motion of a balance, caused by the different weights in the two dishes. Indifference, on the contrary, indicates lack of motion and piece without. Therefore a difference causes a reaction, and conversely, the effect of a difference is a reaction; the elements of the system strive to become indifferent to each other, i.e. they strive to become a whole. This is the most general and the simplest case – reason understands matter and permeates it, to put it in general terms. In particular the situation is a lot more different. Let us illustrate it by analogy with a reversible chemical reaction: when two elements (substances) react with each other to form two new elements (substances) the chemical change is paralleled by another change back to the original substances, i.e. there is a balance between the formation of the new substances and their decomposition to the original ones. The balance could be achieved only if the speed of the two processes is the same. If, for example, in the formation of new elements heat is given off (i.e. the reaction is exothermic), the temperature of the medium rises, and the reverse reaction is accelerated because it is always an endothermic reaction (i.e. heat is absorbed). This illustrates the fact that there is only an ostensible balance. The motion within the system never stops; the balance between the two substances could only be affected from without. This shows that reason, even if it understands matter (i.e. identifies itself with it), will remain foreign to it, which determines the absolute nature of its dynamic relationship with matter. We will achieve a better understanding of this in due time. However, the model we have been constructing does not represent successfully the relationship between reason and matter because it has a mechanical character – it stipulates that the reaction is absolutely determined and unique. Since matter is absolute in all possible meanings of the word, I will accept it as a point of departure because from now on I will claim that reason has the property of alternativeness, which is why it does not completely fit it in the previous model intended only for objects devoid of the same property. What does this mean? Imagine that reason faces a problem or a task ‘posed’ by matter. Reason arrives at three different solutions to the problem. It experiments and determines that only the first one is valid. Despite this the second and third solutions, although wrong, are stored as alternatives to the first one, (for errors are never forgotten). This is what I mean by the property of alternativeness. Although it is strictly determined, this reaction is not the only one. That is why the mechanical model cannot fulfill the task. The selectiveness of reason is another reason why the system maintains its dynamics. The second and third solutions, which are discarded as invalid, help the closed system expand, and create new correlations within it. The idea that new things can come out of nothing is in contradiction with a mechanical theory; it breaks the laws of the preservation of energy, weight, etc. As regards matter everything is in its right place, but remember – we are now considering things as regards reason. But are those alternative wrong solutions, expanding the matter – reason system, the causes of new stages in the development of reason? The answer is in the negative simply because reason cannot enter an altogether different stage of development at the same speed it solves the problems it faces. Every solution is another step to the next stage of evolution. The reader should not be afraid that we have been misled in our choice of criterion – we are on the right way.
However, let us consider matter and reason as two separate realities, and ask ourselves what could happen to matter that would allow us to state that mater has entered an entirely new stage in its existence. I have chosen matter to illustrate the concept because the answer to the question as regards matter is clear - cut compared to the province of reason in which there are ‘a lot of pubs on the way home.’ The decomposition of water into hydrogen and oxygen, or the bonding together of the latter to form water, or the formation of complex hydrogen compounds, which we call organic, or the breakdown of an element’s nucleus accompanied by a release of a tremendous amount of energy, or the likes, are simple transformations of matter and do not represent a quantum leap in its development. These are simple changes, not leaps. Therefore, the only thing we can claim to be a qualitative change is the emergence of reason. Philosophically speaking – the reflection of matter upon itself, its becoming, the passing from ‘the thing in itself’ to ‘the thing for itself’ through reason. In simple words – matter’s becoming aware of itself though reason. This is the criterion and we will see that as regards matter there cannot be another, and since reason is matter – again seen from the standpoint of matter – this criterion applies to reason, i.e. revisiting our previous arguments we are convinced one more time that the reflection of the thing upon itself is the only divide between the objects of study. Matter reflects upon itself and reason comes into being. The transformation of one thing into two others, i.e. the transformation of an element into a seriously unbalanced binary compound could seem rather paradoxical at first sight. In this some might wrongly see divine intervention because it seems a thing cannot unbalance itself. This error is a result of the mistaken belief that the material world is considered to be a single element system, when it consists of unlimited number of elements, and only bears this name for convenience – just another example of the linguistic nature of the formalizing of thinking. Matter has released some of its energy I order to reflect upon itself, and this only after long years of evolutionary development. If we consider mater a whole, we must abandon the different laws of preservation, and become accustomed to emanations like the one above for we will come across them in the province of reason as well. After its separation from matter as an independent entity (Haven’t we come across a similar phenomenon already?), reason has to reflect upon itself, which, if understood as ‘to understand itself’ should mean that reason has to see itself as a highly organized mater. This is exactly where man’s reason is. The next stage is man’s realization of himself as a conscious highly organized matter, etc. thus creating higher and higher ranks of reason. Here anyone could ask the question why isn’t there a reflection performed by matter and another performed by reason; everything would be so systematic and orderly – matter would become aware (conscious) of itself through reason, and reason in turn would become aware of itself as (through) matter. This is logical, isn’t it? Unfortunately it is wrong in this particular case. As far as matter is concerned, things are like that indeed, but there are two sides to every story, and a division always leads to another. (This is especially valid in politics.) If we separate matter from its reasonable segment, we will find the difference between the two and the characteristics of reasonable matter. It is these characteristics that create new relations. By making their own assessment, they will further divide reason into less or more reasonable creatures, etc. This is how a division leads to another. The same arguments can be made about the reflections of matter (i.e. of reason as well). One becoming leads to another. Let us now, when we have already selected the reflections of the thing upon itself as a criterion for the different stages in the development of reason, ask ourselves if all this is a chain of becoming, i.e. if it is an infinite sequence: reason knows about matter, reason knows that it knows about matter, reason knows that it knows that it knows about matter, etc., etc? Is there an infinite number of reflections of reason upon itself? As regards the eternal aspiration of reason to truth, this is a very convenient model because it reveals that there is always something undiscovered, something that matter keeps concealed from reason. You have probably noticed hat the very words I used in the previous sentence are the words of men who consider reason an absolute reality which is separate from matter. It is precisely for this reason that matter has become a separate concept which has even been ascribed the property of reason which is not intrinsic to it. That is why I am completely convinced, and I believe you share my opinion, that the sequence outlined above is not, in fact, infinite. The second reason for my conviction is the fact that matter is unalterable as a logical model made by reason for it. Since this model is a goal, it is logical that once it is made there will not be anything else to discover. At first this seems to be in glaring contradiction with my ideas regarding the alternative version of a binary system, but, in fact, it is not. The model which reason will construct for matter at this final stage will include matter, reason and even a third element, should one emerge s an alternative (to the former).
I will now give three examples which will probably make some laugh at me, and others thank me for the explanations, but no matter what my conscience will be clear because I will thus remove any doubts from the reader’s mind. All three examples are based on the premise that a reasonable object observes the following:
A. Numbers are periodically displayed on a screen: first 1 then 2. Reason would logically assume that the next number would be 3; in fact the number displayed is not 3 but 4. At this point reason assumes that the next number will be 8, and indeed it is.
B. A segment is divided into two equally long parts. The part on the right is in turn divided into two equally long parts, etc., etc. Reason notices that each time a division occurs the result is two equally long segments, and that it is always the segment on the right that undergoes a division. This observation is sufficient enough for reason to conclude that at a certain point in the future the process of division will reach the right end of the original segment. This means that reason will solve the problem, should it take it as one, at the time the fourth division takes place, and not at an indefinite time in the future.
C. This reasonable object is being told: ’You know that you know that you know that you know...’ The sequence is already replaced by ‘you know’, and reason already expects the thing it knows; and this thing is matter. This is how our reason progresses in relation to matter and itself. On level 1 it understands mater. On level 2 it realizes that it understands matter. On level 3 it reflects upon itself as conscious highly organized matter. Presumably, at this point it deduces the underlying principle of the progression and terminates the endless chain of reflections, i.e. it solves the infinite problem; so to say reflection reflects upon itself. The alternative which unbalances the matter-reason system and which we presented as infinite progressions in the examples above, finds its balancing element in this double reflection. This happens because reason, which creates the alternative unbalancing element as a third part of an identity, can eliminate it by creating its counterbalance (antipode). The most complex example of this is the thing’s reflection upon itself. It eliminates the unbalancing action of the ‘thing’. If the thing is a candle, its reflection is the definition of a ‘candle’. ‘A thread coated in wax which burns for a long time when lit.’ eliminates the lack of knowledge as to what a candle means. The prediction which reason makes that an unbalancing element will emerge, in fact creates the very thing which will balance the system, but this takes place only after reason understands matter and its place in it. This is when it progresses to its highest form.
8. What people call a higher force, supreme reason, or a divine plan could be simply referred to as ‘God’. We have arrived at the notion of God through our exploration of the transformations of reason. I believe that our conclusions have a great value even from a theological point of view. But what do I mean? Matter is the beginning of all. From it emerges an energy which acquires the ability to store the energy states of the rest in a point in time, i.e. in memory. It is through this memory that the newly emerged entity acquires the opportunity to create new such states, which , if we accept it as valid, go beyond time, for everything stored in memory belongs to the past, and everything which is not belongs to the future; the divide between the two (the moment of storing information) is the present. If the above propositions are valid, they are an alternative to mater. Due to this last property this type of reason perceives itself as different from matter. In a binary system different means ‘contrary to’. This realization leads t other similar ones, in the process of which, as it has been pointed out before, the essence of matter, reason and everything that might emerge from their relationship is integrated in this energy model. Since reason is matter, its progress (motion) in relation to matter could be characterized as separation and divergence following the curve of a circle and leading back to matter, constructing an energy model of it including itself. In all cases reason remains separate from matter. Once it leaves it, by accident or not, it no longer depends on it. The moment it completes its last becoming everything will become history to it, i.e. in contrast to matter which recognizes only present realities, reason does not belong to time; it is the other way round – time belongs to it.
In other words – God did not give birth to matter; it is matter that gave birth to Him. Life on Earth, for example, might have started with the help of some supreme force; a supreme force because on the way to the last becoming (reflection) there could be several others of the kind. This is not simply a question of man; it is a question of reason as such. Man is just a figure. Let us assume that we were created by a higher force. If so, where did it come from? To me ‘God’ – this is matter. When reason flows back into it, assimilating all of its laws, it becomes indifferent to it, i.e. it becomes one with it. However, matter already has two aspects: a dead one and a reasonable one, if you allow me to phrase it this way to make my meaning clearer. I would even say that dead matter lives in the present, while reasonable matter lives in the past and the future. Reasonable matter can exists in the present only through dead matter. I will tell those who want to know what God is matter in its perfection.
God is matter, reason and their merging together at the same time. If we substitute ‘father’ for ‘mater’, ‘son’ for ‘reason’, and’ the holy ghost’ for their unity, we will arrive at the Christian interpretation of the divine trinity.
It may be a conviction shared by none, and it may as well be wrong, but I feel that it is the point where numerous philosophical schools meet. Such an interpretation ‘pacifies’ materialism with idealism by identifying matter with god, thus stealing the bone of contention from them. I see here rationalism as well, because it accepts as true only what the mind sees – if reason ’copies’ matter, it follows that rationalists do not reason through ‘reason’, but through matter, which is essentially the stance of rationalists’ opponents, namely – empiricists. Physics and metaphysics meet in matter, etc., etc. Contradictions which are, in fact, one and the same thing divided by its subject, very much like cause and effect, are one divided by time. Of course, I would not insist that this will complete philosophical thought. Let us not forget that we are in reason’s childhood – we are little children toying with the world’s most powerful computer (i.e. reason). I hope that philosophy will rise from its ashes like a phoenix, for the more it learns about matter, the closer it gets to perfection, and there isn’t a deadline for reason’s progress to a higher level. Everything reason knows about it (i.e. this higher level) is in the past. Even the future, with which we are already familiar, is no longer a future, but a past which is to happen. The experiments which we cannot conduct with our hands will be made in our minds – such is the role of contemporary philosophical thought; reason can penetrate where the eye cannot do so and see things the eye is blind to.
9. Partly revisiting some arguments from the previous chapter and fulfilling a promise given in it, I will consider the relationship between the pairs of antipodes – philosophy and science, and idealism realism respectively, because the appending of the matter-reason axis to the analogy of the above mentioned pairs of opposites cannot be done without a good knowledge of the concept of reason. Some philosophers would freely substitute ‘appropriate interpretation’ for ‘good knowledge’ in the above phrase, but their notion of philosophy as a polemical science would not allow them to gain advantage of it. However, why do I bring up this question? The system I have been trying to create is based on similarities between the phenomena. I see similarities among these three seemingly dissimilar pairs of opposites. A polemic, on the contrary, always looks for discord between systems, as well as within them. For this reason, I think a polemic has a destructive character. Sadly enough, anyone could produce a polemic. On the other hand, a constructive polemic is as difficult to make as it is difficult to make an interstellar flight – very few people could offer something of value to replace what a polemical dispute has rejected. However, to offer something new means either to invent it, if there is no prior scientific knowledge of the object of study, or to adapt an established theory. The former demands creativity, the latter critical analysis. Both demand a more general knowledge of the problems than the theoretical formula would betray. The correlation between the different opposites is a good example of that. In my analysis of them I am guided by the preliminary knowledge that their relationship follows the curve of a circle. They depart from a point on the curve and the wider the gap between them, the closer they get; and the centre of the circle is occupied, if we want to complete the comparison, by the bone of contention. However, let us consider the already mentioned relationships in their respective order.
As far as the question of philosophy versus science is concerned, we have already reached the conclusion that philosophy is abstract, indiscriminate and alternative, etc.
‘Abstract’ usually suggests a lose connection with material reality. And indeed, philosophy deals with problems little pertaining to the visible world and gravitating towards the spiritual in man, looking for something similar in nature. Worldly problems are almost always seen through the prism of man’s peace of mind, and in a lot of cases are even identified with it. On the other hand, the lack of criteria should be understood as a desire on the part of philosophy to question the absolute nature of reality and the belief that experience is the criterion by which a proposition could be evaluated. The cause of such a desire is the imperfection of man’s perception, while the effect is, as we have already seen, the rejection of the possibility of gaining knowledge. The property of alternativeness is a derivative of the first two ones. Knowledge gained through experience is replaced by logical combinations of phenomena which (like abstractedness above) transform reality into pseudo-reality. Our inclination for such reasoning leads to a single positive outcome – it increases our chances of solving IQ tests successfully. Science, on the contrary, is concrete, objective and straightforward. Needless to say, none of these properties is an absolute prerogative of science nor is it completely absent in philosophy. Science is concrete because it deals with concrete objects. It does not study phenomena such as the spirit, conscience, will, etc., simply because they cannot be isolated in a form convenient for scientific research. However, here we cannot neglect the fact that the above mentioned is in direct relationship with the ability of the human brain to form concepts, i.e. we see again that elements of science and philosophy mingle together. Objectivity, it has become clear, is ascribing experience an absolute value in the construction of a model of a particular phenomenon. I would even say that in science experience is a goal, and not a means – the aim is to prove the theoretical in an experimental way. Straightforwardness or the lack of alternatives is seen as a complete rejection of the possibility that one and the same phenomenon can be the subject of two different models. A phenomenon can be explained in only one way. An exception to this rule is the case in which a theory contains another theory in itself.
The opposition of materialism versus idealism is no less interesting than the one above. I have always been inclined to identify idealism with philosophy and materialism with science, and I have always found them different – a sufficient reason not to do it. Abstractedness is the most characteristic feature of idealism. However, with idealism it broadens its meaning. Besides, distancing from material reality this concept entails the idealistic premise that reason is the beginning of being. This postulate is based on the concept of reason as much as it means the opposite of matter – something reason indeed considers itself to be. Thus idealism contends man’s common notion that mater is at the heart of all.
This differentiation already has a polemical value because it can question the system of idealistic philosophy from its own standpoint. If reason is not an antipode to matter, then what is that immaterial entity on which being is founded? In other words, we doubt if you have grounds to doubt. Reason’s awareness as an opposite of matter is of importance to us because it indicates that idealism has not evolved as a philosophical system, but as an anti-philosophical one within the cause and effect relationship of things. It has evolved as a doubt about an apparent truth. For this reason its contribution to the history of philosophy is not the system it has built, but the critical analysis it has employed to explain the world. We are approaching the moment when we will see that Einstein’s contribution to the physical science is of the same kind but with him everything inexplicably twists and turns: looking in the wrong direction he somehow managed to see things in their true light. From a contemporary perspective this does not make a big difference that he wrote the beginning of a story after he had read the end, or that he achieved something which he later claimed to have planned beforehand. As far as the properties of indiscriminateness and alternativeness are concerned we could hardly attribute them to idealism due to the simple reason that we cannot attribute their antipodes to materialism. The latter is always in the process of looking for a criterion which explains the variability of its evaluation of phenomena; it is not a that primitive ideology which reflects man’s first impression of the world, but a rather complicated philosophical system, especially as regards its treatment of reason and idealism. As regards its concreteness, it is scientifically abstract, and should be considered so, even when compared to that of idealism in the sense that its subject is (at least at first sight) something concrete, i.e. matter. The rest of the specific properties of idealism and materialism are not really relevant to the parallel with the relationship between matter and reason that we are going to make.
As far as the above mentioned relationship is concerned, I believe I have said enough. That is why I will only emphasize what can serve as a parallel to the properties of the other pairs of opposites. On the one hand, we can identify reason with both idealism and philosophy; on the other hand we juxtapose matter with materialism and science. At a first glance though, such an analogy could be criticized for the following seeming weaknesses: first, that reason has determined and differentiated all other objects; that matter is the basis for all and that the relationship between reason and matter is a constituent of the relationship between idealism and materialism, and is the basis for their differentiation. First, I believe, I have set forth the enigma of ‘reason thinking about reason’. Second, we assume that matter is the basis of all, we will arrive at the law of unity and that will be it. Third, I do not see a problem in saying that one of the objects is contained by the other because we have already come across a similar case in our exploration of the first two relationships. Philosophy comprises both materialism and idealism. For the above reasons I believe that the analogy is completely appropriate. Reason is not just an element of the concepts of idealism and philosophy; it is not basic for them as an initial cause in idealism and a means in philosophy respectively; reason is also similar to them in other respects – for example in its historical development. In the first place it has separated from matter as a form no longer dependent on it. Similar observations can be made as regards the two other objects of study. In other words philosophy, idealism and reason represent an initial becoming, i.e. an initial reflection in relation to their opposites. Second, philosophy, if we assume that it means ‘love of wisdom’, or simply ‘wisdom’, has separated from ignorance, lack of reason, or matter as its antipode through reason’s realization as such. The same goes for idealism. Third, all three objects because of their history face the challenges of ignorance. As regards philosophy and reason, it is apparent; as regards idealism, we only have to remember at what time it was the foundation of philosophy to reach the obvious conclusion. When science is in decline, science, materialism and matter are ‘on the other side of the barrier’. The opposite properties of the philosophy – idealism – reason axis are valid for them too. They are also characterized by pragmatism, or a close connection to the material world, i.e. their subject is being (or matter). Now we can already represent our argument in the following diagram.
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All three axes depart from material reality and become what they are only after the differentiation of philosophy, idealism and reason. The axes represent a gradation. The bottom axis is the axis of the initial cause which could be either reason or matter. On this foundation is built the second axis – that of the principle. If reason is taken to be the initial cause, the principle of idealism will be reached; if matter is the initial cause, the principle of materialism will be reached. The top axis is that of the system, i.e. the systems of philosophy and science respectively. It is at this point that the two lines connecting the axes stand out the most. The system of philosophy accepts as an initial cause reason’s critical assessment of being. Therefore, the objects along this line are founded on doubt. Doubt is the cause of variability, which is the antipode of the lack of variability of material reality. This variability separates the three objects from it and thus, because they are already different from it, their first becoming, which is mostly a becoming of matter, is achieved. The reflection of the initial cause (i.e. mater) gives birth to reason; the reflection of the fundamental principle gives birth to idealism and the reflection of being (it being a complex system) gives birth to philosophy. And the other way round – the positive line is the positive line of the axes topped by the system of science (at least the science I am envisaging). As we already know, the superimposing of reflections along the separate axes could expand them to the right. For example, we have seen that idealism and materialism have changed their forward positions in the system of philosophy. (Here, I have allowed myself the liberty to take materialism out of philosophy for the sake of convenience,)It follows that after ‘materialism’ we have to write ‘idealism’ again, but this is a minor detail because the purpose of the diagram is to represent the point of departure and the axis of the particular opposition. It is time I asked the reader’s forgiveness for throwing in such an amount of scientific detail in support of my argument. My only excuse is that I did it to prevent the reader from thinking that they are reading the script for a western and declare philosophy, idealism and reason ‘the bad guys’, the objects along the other line ‘the good guys’ and finally arrive at the conclusion that philosophy has to be read, but not trusted. This after all, is philosophy too! I am joking, of course. I do not want to offend the reader; this is just a peculiar comedy technique of building an exposition I have learned from my tutors at the technical university. On the whole, such a treatment of the problem provides us with a handy tool which can allows us to determine if a thesis in progress has a scientific or philosophic nature. However, we should not consider its rejection or acceptance of something a criterion for such a classification. It is only a feature. The rejection of a scientific theory for example, could help stimulate the development of other theories and in the long run turn out to have played a positive role. The benefit from the above diagram is that we can already clearly differentiate science from philosophy.
10. Until this moment we have contemplated on rather general concepts such as ‘reason’, ‘matter’, ‘philosophy’, etc. which are involved in relationships closely connected to problems with which we have been dealing., i.e. via the methods of inductive logic we included these general terms in the development of the exposition due to the fact that we have been thinking about general issues. In contrast to the conclusions presented so far, which I claim to be true on my honor, I have to admit that what is to follow could undergo certain corrections in parts. I a mentioning this not to share my working ideas with the reader, but to give them something to think about, and to allow them to catch their breath before we storm the province of physics in the next chapter. The topics we are going to discuss cannot be considered particularizations of the ones with which we have been concerned; they stand aside, bearing no relation to what has already been said or what will be said, apart from the fact that they derive from our previous topics.
We have already observed that troubles come in battalions when inductive logic assaults the above mentioned heavy concepts: it has mixed the enormous variety of problems, disputes and solutions – a product of the relationship between science and philosophy and a source of much joy for scientists and philosophers who make dough, point a finger at it and announce it is matter. As regards reason, at first it was sent to matter and then called back to where it belongs. It has also tricked the biggest philosophical schools namely materialism and idealism, by proclaiming itself a materialist method, and then it has admitted and even deduced the existence of God.
Even if some tiny loophole for mounting a counter attack on the part of scientists and philosophers were left uncovered, they would not be able to take advantage of it because their possible antithesis has been considered in the exposition. It seems that such people can only hope that their learning is good enough for (let’s get serious) inductive logic reaches a valuable conclusion sooner or later; something I wish every scientist or philosopher could do. Now we will try to find out why everyone, be them scientists or thinkers, cannot find the truth about the matters they deal with. This will be the topic in the following section – the individual.
We have already touched on the issue of errors and I believe it is sufficient enough for it is a vast sea. We have also touched on the current stage in the development of reason. It is time we focused our attention on the following: we have arrived at the conclusion that inductive logical constructions are the model of man’s brain activity, i.e. its logical equivalent. We have also concluded that in the process of its activity the brain apprehends matter because there is no other alternative for it – it cannot apprehend anything else but matter and itself, which is basically the self- same thing as regards matter (the law of unity). From all this it follows that the individual should be able to apprehend matter with ease through his reason (or inductive logic), but cannot do that as we have noted in our formula of the ‘alternativeness of reason’. But what is the relationship between the individual and his individuality, i.e. what are the differences between people as regards their awareness of their individuality (How do they see the world? What is their notion of it? What is their notion of themselves? And finally what is the relationship between the two?) It’s worth drawing certain analogies with arguments made in the previous chapters. For example, awareness, the mode of perception and notion resemble the initial cause, the method and the system from section nine. The development of the individual could be compared to the development of reason. The erroneous nature of a particular notion could be associated with alternativeness even if it is not exactly ‘erroneous’ but simply an imaginary reality.
It would be wrong to assume that we are trying to revise the postulates of psychology because we are not crossing its borders at all. Here is another important argument: although we predominantly use inductive logical constructions, it would be very dangerous not to recognize the fact that the problems we are about to deal with are not new to science and they have already been treated in an appropriate manner. The forceful use of inductive logic in a province where most mysteries have already been solved seems inappropriate, and therefore it should be avoided. However, this does not mean that its use is banned, and our use of it is justified by the benefits we will reap from it. Our intent is not to discover something new, but to treat the concept of the ‘individual’ in view of the correlation between it and reason, in order to append a special case to the already considered problems. It is common knowledge that man passes through numerous different stages in his mental development: from childhood naivety – when the child mostly contemplates its surroundings, through the time when it becomes conscious of itself as an individual and becomes aware that it is a reasonable being, to the moment it forms its own view of life (i.e. the world it lives in).
I have chosen my words carefully, in order to help the reader estimate the value of the analogy between the development of reason and man (as regards his ability to reason). NB The reader should differentiate between reason as such and man’s reason. The above relationship could be deduced on purely scientific grounds: biology stipulates that the human embryo exactly mirrors the evolutionary development of the species. This appended to the fact that the psychological development of the individual is a consequence of its physical development allows us to fashion the following argument
Psychological development is a consequence of physical development (all mental disorders excluded).
Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.
Therefore, psychological development follows evolutionary development.
This, of course, is sheer formal logic: a syllogism with a middle term. We haven’t fallen into a trap yet, but this is what we can expect. First, what does psychological development follow: is it the development of reason, or that of the brain of the species? Second, evolution goes as far as man; what then? Or perhaps the psychological development of man reaches its peak in man? Believing it would be foolish, wouldn’t it?
I gave this example to show that by using the tools of formal logic to make a discovery, we seem to make a progress, but after we analyze this progress we find out that we have entered the same vicious circle of old-fashioned thinking and that’s it. Fortunately, I am a conscientious logician, in contrast to those who do not bother to analyze their progress, and bravely but irresponsibly proceed to make dubious discoveries. Therefore, if we want to benefit from the above syllogism, we should consider it as a possibility, and not as a proved fact. (To be honest I formulated this conclusion as a speculation. The important thing is that we can change the speculation into regularity through juxtaposing all aspects of the evolution of reason with the evolution of the species, and thus take into consideration the analysis of the progress we have made. The deduction of the criterion for juxtaposition would be an enormous mistake because if it turned out that it was other than the reflection of the ‘thing’ upon itself, we would fall into a ridiculous situation in which we would have to conclude that matter, or, in the better scenario, its development, or even something else was the connection between matter and reason, and that connection would become a criterion for their relationship).
On the other hand, such a speculation allows us to include physics, the psychology of the individual and evolution in an inductive logical scheme. Some might ask if I have borrowed all of my schemes from formal logic. The answer is: almost none of them. There is an easy way out of this situation: if the reader remembers, we have already proved that formal logic derives from inductive logic and its explanatory power is rather limited by verbal tools. Even if we ignore this, it is clear that serious science neither takes into consideration, nor estimates the origin of an idea, but to what extent the conclusion is founded. And because I hope that the reader is as convinced as I am certain that we have founded inductive logical constructions well, we should use in the moment of discovery the tools of inductive logic. As regards the origin of an idea, we will see later that a synthesis of the ways to formulate ideas in the realm of scientific knowledge should be made, for the origin of an idea is an important constructive element of any research, i.e. it should be determined how the individual decides on the setting on which to base his research. Thus a criterion common to all individuals would be found, and this would be only the beginning. Going further would mean to isolate a scientist’s characteristics, in order to establish what all scientists have in common, because this would be the very goal of the research, but it is man’s reason which sets the intricacies of the synthesis of the working thesis (i.e. the main arguments) without which we will certainly reach conclusion similar to those of formal logic. In this particular case I am looking for similarities between the development of the individual and reason on the grounds that ontogeny replicates phylogeny, presuming that it would be possible to relate some of the important stages in the development of reason as such to that of the individual.
What would the simplified four - element scheme look like?
On the one hand there is the physical and psychological development of man. Here the characteristic thing is the verifiable premise that the latter replicates or follows the former. Several questions would be worth answering: “How does it follow it?”, “To what extent does it follow it?”, “To what point does it follow it?” We should note that these are only working questions and they could be reinforced/expanded, altered, or simply deleted.
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For the time being X could signify the ‘evolution of the brain’. As a whole, as it becomes apparent from the diagram, this should be replicated by the psychological development of man, somehow following the evolution of the species. We will now focus on some trickier issues:
If we assume that the development of the embryo’s brain follows the embryo’s development, we will bridge the distance between the left and right sides of the diagram, representing the individual and the group respectively, and thus we will reduce it to individuals only - a mere corollary which does not yield information, the more the above contention has been borrowed from biology and used as a basis for the inductive logical construction. If we subject to analysis what we have been left with (this residual contention), we will see that it serves us from the moment the individual leaves his mother’s womb, because until that time what we have is an identity.
Therefore we, remembering that reason deems the distance in the analogous relationship of the inductive logical argument an absolute necessity, should consider this proposition retaining the same distance in the individual-group corollary. Therefore, we should consider the unknown quantity as the ‘evolution of the brain’. This brain can no longer be that of the individual due to the simple reason that it (the element) is located in the part of the diagram dedicated to the group. Thus, the brain acquires a generic sense which practically means that we are dealing with the evolution of reason.
The next question is ‘Is it reason as such, or man’s reason? We are now walking on a thin ice. It is close to home that the development of the individual follows the evolutionary development of man’s reason. But what evolution of man’s reason are we talking about? – A question which in a polemical game of chess will make us checkmate in several moves. And besides, by excluding all other species don’t we exclude evolution itself?
Let us cast a look at the inductive logical scheme. The individual-group axis is located from left to right, but what about its perpendicular? On the left we see psychological development versus physical development; on the right the evolution of the species as a physical group and something unknown to the left side (look above). We cannot deduce the unknown through the unknown, so let us examine the right side of the diagram. It represents the relationship between the psychological development and the physical development of the individual. What is the nature of this dynamic relationship? We set out from the verifiable premise that the former follows the latter. If we determine that psychological development mirrors physical development, we could draw a conclusion about one’s lifetime starting with one’s birth (We have to exclude the embryo from our considerations, thus narrowing the focus o research, but this won’t exert a negative influence on the validity of our conclusions). If every physical change leads to a psychological change because psychological development mirrors physical development, we will reach the dubious conclusion that my brain activity changes abruptly every time I drink a glass of water, which, of course, is ridiculous. The opposite (i.e. the idea that physical processes do not affect psychological processes) is also equally untrue. Whenever I drink coffee, my thoughts quicken due to the effect of caffeine on my organism.
We have already come across a similar phenomenon, haven’t we? It is the matter-reason axis. Reason does not depend on matter due to its alternativeness, but in this case the problem is to what extent reason is independent from matter and man’s psyche is independent from man’s physique. On the whole, we have defined reason as something which has differentiated itself from matter as an independent entity. However, if we narrow the concept of reason, appending to it the property of individuality, we will deduce the individual cohabiting his body (i.e. his physique). Therefore, there is presumably certain dependence on matter. Thus, finally we can define this perpendicular as the axis of the primary versus the secondary, i.e. matter versus reason.The matter-reason axis provides us with the criterion by which we can precisely determine the unknown. We have stated that the evolution of matter to reason is based on the reflection of the ‘thing’ upon itself, therefore if we consider the evolutionary axis, the reflection of evolution would make sense only as a reflection of reason, i.e. thus the reason-human reason-reflection of reason axis has been founded. The reflection of reason is, as mentioned above, a priority of man only. If we now cast a look at the expanded logical diagram, we will notice a possible parallel between things we have already said and the configuration of elements in the diagram:
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This is how inductive logic discovers things. We have identified reflection as a divide in the individual’s development because it is a divide in the development of reason as such. A counter argument would be the contention that we have already reached a conclusion regarding the current stage in the development of man’s reason. If so, what reflection are we talking about, the more it would signify the existence of a higher reason? That’s right, but we are going to analyze the full development of man form an embryo to a person with a fully developed psyche. At first the same reflection in the diagram does have a connection with the concept of evolution, but consider the following:
Reflection is an event; evolution is a process, the more in our analysis of the individual we also deal with processes. But here we consider evolution as the essence of a fundamental principle behind the development of species, i.e. intelligence. As regards matter, intelligence is a sign of its becoming (i.e. reflection), and therefore of its development. Biologists just prefer to call reflection ‘evolving’. It is becoming clear that ‘evolution’ could signify the event of a species evolution from another. If we consider development on the whole, reflection is an event. It is for this reason that I have placed these two concepts along one and the same line instead of expanding the diagram to the right.
As a process evolution comprises the historical development of the species. What we are concerned with is neither the history of reason as such nor the history of human psyche, but the correlation between history and man’s reason. We have already explained that matter accepts as reality only that which exists at the present moment, i.e. nothing but the present moment exists to it; if it did, that would violate the different laws of preservation. With reason things are not the same at all. Reason accepts as reality what is stored in memory and the processing of the stored information, i.e. thinking. However, memory is stored past events, i.e. the past, or logically predictable future events – a portion of the future. Would then man’s reason perceive history as signifying a succession of events and processes in the development of human reason? This is pertinent question because we have seen that history is of concern to reason.
10b. Along these lines and with the help of the inductive logical constructions we could examine the development of human psyche as regards the relation between the dividing moments in this process and the characteristics we have already deduced.
The ovum is fertilized. The microevolution of the species begins. The embryo’s development replicates every major stage in the development of the animal world. During its development it mirrors the history of evolutionary development, which in accordance with the reasons stated above means that it is not yet reasonable, i.e. it is developing organic matter devoid of reason. The fetus completes this microevolution when it starts resembling a human being. I will now pose a question and leave it unanswered because it is not relevant to our research, but would be of great importance to biology should it use our mode of reasoning: ‘Does this microevolution end there, or does it just come to a halt, i.e. could it continue?’ If it ends there, the conclusion is the man is the most developed reasonable being in an organic form, or that beings surpassing man cannot have a similar organic form. If it just comes to a halt at that point, the existence of a still higher form of human reason becomes possible.
If we do no approach the end of microevolution through the biological development of the embryo until it acquires a human form, but seek the point when the embryo stops following strict history, we will conclude that the reflection of unreasonable matter upon itself forms reasonable matter. Logically, the reflection of the fetus forms the embryo. The departure from the history of the species takes place at the moment when the embryo becomes aware of itself as a separate being. This is, in fact, the moment of its becoming. From this moment onwards it is no longer subject to time in the absolute sense of the word. It does not matter to us if this reflection takes place in the eighth month with the development of the nervous system of the embryo, or earlier – with the acquisition of its human form. Here, I would like to reverse the cause and effect relationship and advance the idea that it might not be the development of the nervous system that makes possible the first reflection (the transformation of the embryo into reasonable matter), but the other way round – it could be the reflection that launches the development of the nervous system. And this is well – grounded. Remember that a division entails another division. Separating itself from the rest of the world the individual reason begins its development, and even in the simplest logical version this building of the self invariably demands more memory, very much like a self – upgrading computer program requires more machine memory. In fact, this could lead to the development of the nervous system in the eighth month.
The cause of the reflection could be internal, i.e. inside the embryo, or an external one (remember the hypothesis for transmutation), but I’d rather say no more for it would be a shot in the dark. But what about the time during which the nervous system develops before the delivery? It is close to home that the more time there is, the better the development of the embryo. That is why it is sometimes said that some children are born with character, but the ones who are not as lucky have enough time to catch up. We should not think that the moment of the first reflection is of particular importance to the individual.
The second reflection cannot take place in the mother’s womb because it is, in fact, a realization on the part of the individual that he is a highly organized matter, which presupposes a contact with other reasonable creatures, or, in a worse scenario, complex connections with dead matter. Here I would pose the question: is society the cause of this second reflection, or is it just a catalyst? What would happen if a human being was raised by animals? Would there come a time when that human being would realize its supremacy of reason over them? I guess these questions have already been answered by psychologists and for this reason I will drop the subject. There is another reason why I am unwilling to continue with the exploration of the above questions: the conclusion that man is genetically endowed to become aware of himself as a higher form of consciousness in comparison with animals, provided that he does that under the above mentioned conditions, is not logically founded due to the fact that the question of transmutation is not taken into consideration, i.e. if a human being under the above mentioned conditions becomes aware of himself as a human being, this could be the result of accumulated intellectual experience from previous reincarnations – that is why I consider the conclusion sterile.
Since the second reflection is of particular interest to psychologists (although they have not yet heard of this term) in the lines to follow I will try to harmonize my terminology with that of their science. We have already expressed the idea that this second reflection denotes the individual’s realization that he is a reasonable being. This unquestionably takes place in early childhood and has nothing to do with the post – pubescent realization of what type of character one is. The latter is imposed by public morale, and largely concerns the relationship between the individual person and society and less the one between a person and himself, but since we do not know what happens inside a child’s head and when it happens (it is unknown to children’s psychologists) the moment of this realization remains a mystery. Not a single child runs into the kitchen to tell his mother that he has realized himself to be a person; we can only spot this moment by some external manifestations of the psyche – a child’s decision to alter its environment according to its wishes, or a child’s decision which cannot be the product of his experience could be a sign of such realization. The same signs could be observed in animals, but this does not mean that animals are as reasonable as we are. This only means that animals have the same physical nature of brain activity as we do, therefore they can discover new modes of behavior which make their survival possible. Man, on the other hand, has a reasonable environment, and such a decision would indicate the fact that he has identified himself with his environment. Could a pet animal then become aware of itself? Even if the animal belonged to the most intelligent species, it would not be able to. If it were able to do it, it would already think in an entirely different way, and if it were consequently restored to its native environment, it would be different from the rest of its kind. Unfortunately, practice shows otherwise such animals behave exactly as all other representatives of its species. This means that animals imitate the behavior and way of life of the people around them. A pet’s master influences the pet (be it through his /her actions or via telepathy) in such a way that the pet adopts a behavior similar to that of its master.
To conclude: the first reflection separates reasonable matter from the rest of live matter; the result of which is the emergence of the individual (other than the rest). Then the individual accomplishes a second reflection and becomes aware of their reason. Man becomes aware of himself as a reasonable being (an individual reasonable being).
10c. As regards the reason of the individual, his thinking begins to adapt to his future experience. His future life exerts a retrospective influence on his perception of the world. We cannot pose a question regarding the mechanism of correction of one’s knowledge and perception because we cannot determine with certainty what has to be corrected. The second reflection is not a conclusion attached to man’s logic; it is an isolation of the system from the environment. Whereas the first reflection causes the individual’s self-awareness as something other than the world, as a result of which he begins to study other things as an extrovert, the second reflection increases the inaction of the individual reason on external influences. This is logically the individual’s reaction on seeing the difference between reality and the way he sees it, and a consequence of the action he takes or the conclusions he makes in order to change reality in accordance with his wishes. Psychologically speaking this could explain extrovertness and introvertness as modes of behavior reflecting a person’s character. If the reaction is successful, i.e. the child arranges his/her toys and is satisfied with the effect, he/she will become an extrovert. If the conclusion is that things cannot be changed - mostly when human relationships are concerned, the result will be an introvert type. This is, of course, a theory – a single experience cannot form one’s character and pure extroverts or introverts do not exist. The conclusion which suggests itself is that the closer such an experience to the second reflection is, the greater its importance for the formation of the individual reason (individual) is.
At this point we are left with the impression that introvertness is a manifestation of discord between reason and reality. In other words if a child reaches the conclusion that something could not be changed, it will a distress factor in its development. But is this correct? If an individual experiences the positive effects of his actions before the second reflection takes place, he/she can retain his/her extrovert nature, otherwise the failure to understand why nothing happens the way he/she wants it comes as a shock. In the first case the individual remains open to the environment; in the second he/she withdraws trying to find a solution to the problem. Ideally, in both cases there is a reflection – the individual becomes aware of himself/herself as a reasonable being, but is the first case the ideal alternative? It is true that the collision between reason and reality poses a problem, leads to a state of shock and causes a withdrawal in ones thoughts, but is it not the same alternativeness which is characteristic of reason? It turns out that the discord is predetermined because reasonable matter differs from dead matter in a way we have already familiarized ourselves with. For this reason I have defined the second reflection as an isolation of the logical system from its relativity.
It takes a child a very long time to become aware of itself as a reasonable being, accompanied by natural introvertness, while at the same time extrovertness is required from it. I am envisaging a child’s education. Very much like discord is straightforwardly (and wrongly) considered evil education is considered good. In order to prevent my philosophy from dealing with such foggy concepts as good and evil, I will state straightaway that education is evil as far as it treats as compulsory extrovertness the intrinsic reticence of human reason. But to explain: even if the second reflection takes place in early childhood, the individual becomes fully aware of himself/herself after a time, even if he/she does not realize it as well as we do. In other words, in the course of time the individual realizes the worth of his/her perception of the nature and order of things. For this reason we will call this realization independence, i.e. independence of will, opinion etc. It turns out that introvertness is a natural effect of the second reflection and possesses the qualitative characteristic of ‘independence’. It is this characteristic that education often fails to take into consideration. It imposes a radically different interpretation of what the individual has already formed an opinion representing complex brain structures of inductive logic based on personal experience(be it physical or otherwise); something which can exert a malevolent influence on the person. It would be much better to let the student change his/her opinion by himself/herself, or carefully help him/her do it if it is necessary. The worst case scenario is when a child’s correct conceptions are changed forcefully – for a student’s worth is in his/her denial of authority when the child’s own scientific conceptions are at stake.
Pedagogy as the study of the methods of teaching should rely on the residual extrovertness which marks the distinction between the absolute extrovertness after the first reflection and the acquired extrovertness after the second reflection. The bigger acquired extrovertness is, the lesser the possibility to educate the individual mind – it no longer wants to be educated; it educates itself on its own.
It is time we focused our attention on something very important which has been neglected (and will be for a long time in the future) by pedagogy, namely what should be studied. The tragedy is that the answer does not depend on the capability to think but on the varying moral values of a particular society. The comedy is that one and the same wrong conclusion has been reached in all these variations of the moral and economic chaos we call ‘society’: Do as others do! As regards an individual’s behavior towards others we distinguish (it is an established fact) two types of societies: of individualists and collectivists. But the above rule is fully valid for both types. What I have to say now will be wrongly supported by individualism and wrongly rejected by collectivism in consequence of their wrong self – esteem.
The question ‘What should be studied?’ might perilously lead to identifying a specific subject when the solution of the problem is in teaching the individual an orderly and acceptable (I have replaced the word ‘ correct’) system of perceiving reality and identifying the laws of its dynamics, i.e. in seeking a tentative approach to nature, or in philosophical terms – to matter. Logically, language deprived from its richness is the main hindrance to creating pedagogy of value. The oversimplifying of terminology creates the false impression in the student that the connections between the subjects are simple too. Early acquaintance with the vast concepts of exact sciences creates an impression that the different sets of objects and numbers are a limited number, which precludes the acquisition of important qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the aforementioned sets with the complication of the material in the higher grades. All this leaves the student with the impression that he/she can discover new things through a combinatorial approach – through complicating the simple, or through simplifying the complicated. The ability to combine data is the only solution to the above problem. We know that mental pictures play an important part in inductive logic – the conclusions one reaches depend on the mental pictures one forms in their minds. However, in the process of learning the student is offered already identified sets of objects or phenomena with clearly defined boundaries and exact number of elements. In practice though, neither the boundaries nor the number of elements is clearly defined. What is left out for various reasons is usually defined as another set with its own boundaries and elements. This is very perilous to logic - if there are several sets and remainders, reasoning steps on hypothetically ideal grounds fraught with hypothetical conclusions. Differences, cross – sections and assemblies of sets which have no value, although they pretend to, are defined because the sets’ boundaries and elements are known. This is the essence of the combinatorial approach. It is it that sets the aforementioned requirements. For this reason it is applicable only in mathematics and other provinces of knowledge related to mathematics, whereas inductive logic can operate with objects not clearly defined including the correlation (which is identifiable) between them and something unknown. That is why the student should be taught how to form appropriate associations, and not appropriate combinations. I do not see what else could pedagogy do, but further develop that which is intrinsic to reason.
Public interest though, which has never been written down nor heard of because it has never been defined properly, self – righteously fosters a certain stereotype of behavior in children. The enforcing of these public interests just because ‘it is right’ damages the independence of the individual because the ability to form associations is highly personal and is interrelated with the connections the individual brain makes. One’s independence should not be limited or destroyed altogether, for it could result in limiting the brain capacity of the child, but on the contrary – stimulated. The popular IQ tests are not even close to evaluating one’s ability to form associations. Even if I failed to notice the fact that these tests evaluate different types of people using the same criterion, I could not possibly fail to notice that the same tests evaluate one’s ability to make combinations. A high score indicates that the subject can be a successful card player, chess player, a programmer, but not a scientist, because he or she would not possess the ability of a person with a valuable inductive logic or just a system of associations to discover new things; if such a person formulates a new scientific theory, it would be only a product of the already existing scientific practices. Regretfully, such theories enjoy an upsurge of popularity in scientific circles, especially among physicists. My original intent was to write only about logic and philosophy but under the present conditions I am compelled to contemplate the question of matter, the more it gives the present research a finishing touch. A theory has value only when it is firmly grounded – a person who rediscovers the wheel will make better cars than the one who founds their manufacture on motion. In other words, I cannot trust other people’s discoveries. A true discoverer believes that their scientific theories are the best authority of all and this allows them to appreciate other scientists’ work.
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