INDUCTIVE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS - Prologue and CHAPTER ONE

You think that the universe is an impenetrable chaos.

You are wrong.

It is so because, on the one hand matter is made up of elementary particles but electrons don’t exist on an atomic level, and on the other hand there is nothing general about Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, therefore it is not surprising that one sees the universe as chaotic. However, this poses the following question: What does contemporary physical science deal with? The answer is - it does not deal with what philosophy deals with, for philosophy is subject to the logic underlying the very fabric of the universe and reason itself.

How it is possible that an empire of logic rises out of a simple and seemingly unscientific principle and a suspiciously general philosophical law, you will find out in this book.

Prologue

The world is made in such a way that no matter what we do it cannot be changed.

It seems science has forgotten that this contention is refutable. The further science has penetrated the unexplored depths of the microcosm – the world of elementary particles; the macrocosm – the universe (which seems to have an infinite supply of surprises in store); and history (which some have emphatically pronounced over and done with), the more science has become like a lost child in the big city. The smallest particles have refused to comply with science’s understanding of their nature, and the leading universities have been compelled to look for researchers who think unconventionally, hoping that they could provide new insight. Astronomers, the daring dreamers, whom serious physicists would gladly listen to after a hard day’s work, have gradually been overcome by despair, for the cosmos wouldn’t behave as expected. This can help us explain the increasing popularity of astrology. Historians with their diligence add the final touches to this rather grotesque parody.

Having forgotten that in most cases historians have not witnessed what they study and their knowledge of things is not firsthand, they marvel at sensational facts, which they have seen differently, and realize that they have to change their theories according to their new perspective. These people fall within two categories: white-haired men who eloquently unfold the legend of the downfall of Troy; and young, energetic but penniless supporters of political parties, who would reshape history for a certain sum of money to everyone’s utter dismay. We can conclude that this state of affairs is a hereditary illness historians share.

This rather ungainly state of contemporary science brings a sad smile to our face. Where is that impetus humanity had on its entry into the 20^th century? One must be blind not to see the accomplishments in the spheres of biology and technology, but it seems that of these two branches of knowledge only the former will retain its rate of development. As far as the latter is concerned, I remain a pessimist.

In the world of technology, the machine that substitutes man’s mental activity – the computer – is undoubtedly the century’s greatest discovery. But what do we see in that? The manufacturers, consumed by the sales of their products (and supported by scientists within the field), present the expanded memory, the increased speed, and even the rearrangement of components aimed at the optimization of the calculation-data exchange process as an extraordinary development. However, the technical problems solved in this way are but smalls stones cleared in the shadow of a high mountain. Whatever the methods behind the process of calculations, whatever the ways of exchanging data, whatever the structural components (be them electronic, optical or of some other nature) no one will ever be able to propose a straightforward method, be it only in concept, at the time when the creation of artificial intelligence will become a demand. Science is not ready for that yet.

That is why now, bearing the complete responsibility for what I am about to reveal, I will propose a method which is the binding thread of this work. However, this method will be in a different version, namely, a logical model of the mental activity of man. And bearing the risk of appearing immodest I dare say it will launch science 150 years into the future, for the method is simple – everyone is aware of it, and therefore also doubtful of its functionality as a way of thinking. There is more. It shouldn’t be applied at random (without an appropriate attitude), for it will lead to nothing intelligible. This method is directed at people conducting a researcher’s, and more specifically, an inventor’s mental activities.

Inductive logic and inductive logical constructs are an extremely powerful system of avoiding scientific deadlocks.

In the world of Physics, in contrast to the world of technology, the situation is truly tragic. Let’s leave aside Einstein’s Theory, which I will revise thoroughly because there is nothing true in Lawrence’s transformations, and see how some elementary particles can force brilliant minds away from physics and science in general; and all this because of pride and reluctance to heed the Greek scientist Nanopoulos, who spoke of a certain analogy between strings and elementary particles. Had he been taken seriously, contemporary science would be more advanced today. We, in contrast, will examine both strings and elementary particles, but one at a time.

For obvious reasons I would never call this a scientific work, at least not until this concept acquires a more scientific connotation. Generally speaking it is high time the methods, which the different branches of science deploy to solve problems, became history. The most widely-applied of them all, due to its’ being frequently verified, is the method of ‘trial and error’, but its’ one-sided use as regards the ‘trial’ has deprived scientific research from extremely valuable information about the ‘error’. If errors’ mechanism is understood it will be very easy to arrive at different methods of synthesizing a true contention. It is exactly this aspect of the problem that I propose to elaborate on to such an extent that it will enable us to make further conclusions. The failure remains in the domain of science and that is why I am inclined to define this work as predominantly philosophical. The fact that the subject of this work, as well as the relevant topics accompanying it, belong to a domain on the margins of different sciences is a rather sensitive issue. Running the risk of sustaining hostile criticism from professionals, I will firmly state that this is only a proof of the universal applicability of the method I am deploying, and instead of ascribing to me the motto ‘Came, erred and continued’ these people should try to understand the matter to their own benefit.

Despite its clarity and the fact that it is intended for a wide range of readers, few will understand it because in order to understand the content, one has to be able to adopt different logical models in general and to tune in and adapt to my own model in particular. In addition, at least some knowledge of philosophy, physics, mathematics, psychology, history and many other branches of science will be necessary. Among the few enlightened ones there will be real benefits for those who can deconstruct with ease and build with patience and skill. They will dispel prejudices and build our well-being.

Chapter One

PHYLOSOPHY

1.               Love for wisdom is not just a day old. It has undergone numerous transformations, twists and turns, which accounts for the fact that the debate about its place in life has never abated, and as far as I am concerned, it never will. Undoubtedly, the aim of philosophy throughout the centuries has been to establish the truth but the roads to it have been diverse and disputable. What remains unquestioned is only the connection between philosophy and science. The development of the former has fostered the development of the latter and vise versa – the development of the latter has often dramatically altered the former. Let us consider, for instance, the significance of Kant’s works. They completely changed the direction of thinking in the scientific circles at the time and helped develop the scientific methods of analyzing the universe. In other words, they set up the beginning of a new epoch in science. Kant’s research did not only influence the so called pure science, but it also influenced philosophy itself, which since Plato and Aristotle, had never been so scientific. The discovery (or rather the hypothesis) that the Earth is round undermined the doctrines of the Church, or when seen from another perspective – those of medieval philosophy. The clash led to the conclusion that human cognition is imperfect and there is always something beyond our power of analysis, something we can only approach indirectly. Instead of posing the demand to analyze the channels philosophical thought was directed to and setting the task to optimize them, this conclusion pushed philosophizing into two different channels: the first one outlined all possible solutions to a problem, following a combinatorial approach, and came up with just one or no solutions at all; the other blindly denied the possibility of knowledge, due to the impossibility to perceive the world clearly through the senses. By fostering the development of materialism and materialist approach in philosophy, Darwin’s theory weakened the thesis that the world was created by a divine being.

2.               If science and philosophy are so closely connected, what is their relationship? As you can see, I am not posing the question of whether philosophy is a science, for it is an ill-advised question and all reflection on it is futile and useless. As the unfolding of Inductive Logical Constructions demands a demonstration of logic, I am bound to give you one, which is also in keeping with my promise to be as lucid as possible.

The question is rather a general one. This always doubly safeguards the inquirer. On the one hand, it saves them from an incorrect question, that is to say, from a concrete incorrect question. On the other hand, if the question is a polemical one, they can always be dissatisfied with the answer, due to the impossibility to understand the question. As regards this particular instance, I answer my own questions, and therefore gain nothing. So let us examine the stages through which the answering of a question passes. The question is: ‘What is the relationship between philosophy and science?’

The first thing to do is answer the supporting questions:’ What is philosophy?’, and ‘What is science?’ The next step is to     find something they have in common, as regards the initial        interpretation of the first part of the main question. It is never           grounded to look for the etymology of a word – for example          claiming that ‘philosophy’ means ‘love for wisdom’, because words are seldom used in such a simple fashion, while the contrary occurs frequently – a new connotation is appended to the meaning of the word in the same way that a coat is appended to a button. After the explanation of the key words, there follows their juxtaposition, guided by the goals we have set for         ourselves; in this case – revealing their relationship.

Finally a statement is made, which is the normal   completion of our treatment of the problem. We shall examine three models of the process of thinking, based on     the standard way of thinking (i.e. through formal logic), and one, which is a          mild           reflection of inductive logic. Since the reader is not aware      of the nature of inductive logic yet, they should (for the time being) substitute the word ’analogy’ for it.

2a. If our predisposition is such that we are inclined to look for the meanings of words and their relationships as terms on a historical plane, we will think in the following way: In Ancient Greece and all the developed neighbor countries all the people of whom we think today as the founders of contemporary science, such as Pittagoras, Tales (the founder of mathematics), Aristotle and Plato before him (the founders of ethics, physics, the social and political sciences et cetera) called themselves philosophers and studied and taught others at schools of philosophy, and their mathematical conclusions and aesthetic views were simply a product of their thinking. What we nowadays define as science was persecuted by the Church and the Inquisition within the Church during the Middle Ages, and the notion of science meant nothing else but philosophy and theology in particular. Since the time of the formation of bourgeois societies science has acquired an autonomous status through the differentiation of a great number of formal sciences such as biology, physics, psychology, aesthetics, etc., and hence the term ‘philosophy’ has come to mean an orthodox system of a scientific ideology in general. Along these lines we can answer the question in the following way: philosophy and science are one and the same thing the notion of which is in a functional dependence on the particular historical moment, so that their common subject is sometimes ascribed either one or the other label, which does not prevent them from retaining their common subject, namely knowledge.

Such would be the thinking of a historian. What is characteristic of this kind of thinking is that, although the historical development of a problem is examined, it is not presented dynamically but rather statically. Such a conclusion stands in danger, for history is never straightforward and in this sense to look for regularity (a leading line) is to lay a trap and walk straight into it. That is why the conclusion I have arrived at was of a rather general nature. However, it is equally untrue that there is no regularity in history, but its mechanism is of an entirely different nature. So what would be the benefit of finding regularity, which has been valid until today? Therefore when approaching the conclusion I applied the principle:’ All things pass, all things change’ as a motto and a dogma.

2b. The one who claims that everything in nature should be examined in its dynamics and mutual contingency will not approach the problem in any other way but dialectically. However, the relationship between philosophy and science or the notions of philosophy and science are rather inert. They are, because it takes colossal energy to change something in them. A handy example is Copernicus’ overturn of the notion of the order of the universe and the separation of science from medieval philosophy. They are inert because it takes decades, even centuries to change something, no matter how insignificant it is. The reason for all this is the close relationship between philosophy and ethics, and it does take time to change morals. That is why to see the dynamics of the relationship between science and philosophy it is necessary to examine the history of the relationship. Would we fall into a state of confusion if we assumed that this case overlaps with the previous one? I do not think so. Here the examination of history is purely accidental and that is why I offered this example. A man of dialectics is not a historian and the vice versa (in this case ‘a man of dialectic’ and ‘historian’ are only temporary concepts), hence the radical difference in their logical constructs: If there is an argument or a debate between philosophy and science whether science is a philosophy or philosophy a science, the debate is not between philosophy and science, but between philosophers and scientists as regards the place which their conceptions of the order of things occupy, and their relationships in the framework of human knowledge as such. When we cast a look at antiquity, we see that science as a term cannot be considered at all. There is only philosophy. When we cast a look at the Middle Ages we see that there was no science at that time either, and philosophy, from a contemporary perspective and with the benefit of hindsight, had become unscientific or rather theological, although it had retained the root morpheme ‘logos’. The consequent development is a mirror image of the current state of affairs. Therefore, we can draw the following conclusion: If we examine the differences between the scientific philosophy of the antiquity and the unscientific philosophy of the Middle Ages, we will be able to define the concept of science. Considering that philosophy in the antiquity could be characterized by its applicability and usefulness and in the Middle Ages by its abstract and spiritual nature, we realize that the concept of science involves the issue of applicability. But is it what the concept of science only consists in? Hardly, for it also includes the elements of logic and argumentation. While logic is an exclusive prerogative of philosophy, argumentation or the science of methodology or in still other words gnoseology (the science of the sources of knowledge) is not only an exclusive prerogative of philosophy but also an intrinsic part of it. It appears that philosophy and science have a great deal of common ground and a lot of marginal territories. In case we reopen the philosophers and scientists’ question, we should ask ourselves if philosophers are scientists. The answer is quite clear – they are not sportsmen, aren’t they? What about scientists? Are they philosophers or not? They had better be if they do not want to remain simply scientific workers. On the one hand, after the development of the formal sciences, following their formation as such, philosophy cannot follow their accomplishments and philosophers are deprived of the opportunity to become specialists in them. On the other hand, every science has limited itself to its own methods, as a consequence of which every science speaks its own language different from the rest. Does this not remind you of the legend of Babylon? Philosophers remonstrate against not being listened to, as a result of which a lot of years are wasted until a discovery is made when with good methodology the time span of making a discovery could be reduced to few years. Scientists also remonstrate against others interfering in their work as researchers. What is this if not a scientific feudalism!

The final conclusion is that philosophy in its progressive accumulation of knowledge about the world has branched out into a multitude of formal sciences with practical purposes. Its relationship with these formal sciences can be found in its tracking of their accomplishments separately and as a whole, and in the methods of research they have inherited from it, methods which may have already become obsolete.

This is the conclusion one will make if they examine the dynamics of the development of philosophy in relation to formal sciences. Although such a conclusion stands out with its orderliness and soundness, it nevertheless has some disadvantages. In the first place, the final product of reasoning is not a certain configuration of concepts, but taxonomy of the development of the relations and processes of the subject of study. Although this conclusion will come closest to a serious scientific result, it does not present the spatial positions of the concepts as such. Hence, such a conclusion examines a system as a dynamic whole of relations and laws which comprise the sub elements of the system, but the very essence of these elements is not explicated and it is where the heart of these interactions is. Of course, every person endowed with reason would register this drawback, but in order to differentiate between the various methods we present an idealized and rather specific case. This type of reasoning possesses the inclination to reject the possibility of knowledge, despite the fact that philosophical thought shows otherwise. According to it, it is dialectic, and no other system that is capable of discovering the laws of matter, although ‘It could be right but it could be wrong.’ is also an example of dialectic. The last has managed to find a way out of the vicious circle because of its very nature, which I believe is only a natural stage in its development, in order to move on, looking for methods and criteria to differentiate between truth and untruth. This is the very key to its success.

2. C. That which many people consider to be a complete system, although it is only a necessary detail in the studying and classifying of a phenomenon, is the creation of graphic models in the process of research. In other words if a person can visualize something, they can understand its nature and (only then) if they have managed to create such a graphic model, the research is complete. If the same people knew they were right, they would not stop at this point. If they were aware of the tremendous importance of visualization for thinking (reasoning), I would not be writing this book. But if we stop at this point, we will see that visual (from now on I will refer to it as graphic) image is nothing else but a photograph. It could be a photograph of an object, a logic configuration, even music. Feelings can also be visualized. But this last visualization does not have a dynamic quality and is imitated through successive alternation of concepts, therefore we have no right to draw conclusions based on it. Graphic concepts are not compatible with thinking for thinking is a process. Such heresy is capable of throwing a lot of people into a black despair for a reason. But there is no room for misunderstandings. This concept is particularly suitable as raw material for logic because it is easily juxtaposed. The last word is the key to solving the problem. Using formal logic as an orderly graphic system, the method juxtaposes configurations from its own concept with configurations from logic. In this way the firm conclusions from the logic system can be applied to the problem which is being solved. If there are not similar schemes in logic, schemes form accumulated experience are used, but they have to lead to certain conclusions. If there are no such schemes, the concept is likened to a logical scheme by combining or excluding.

So, if we ask ourselves about the relationship between philosophy and science we will face several alternatives: They could be absolutely independent, or they could be one and the same thing, or science could be a part of philosophy or vice versa, or they could overlap somewhere. We have to exclude the first option because we saw that they have common grounds. As regards the second option, namely whether they are one and the same thing, it is highly debatable, but then where is the difference between them? In accordance with the stated above it is more likely that science is a part of philosophy than the other way round. If we consider the last option, we will see that they do overlap but the key to the understanding of the matter is not in it but in that which subject goes beyond the cross section. It is so because the former could be a part of the latter and the vice versa. At this point, the study enters a labor – consuming stage in which the answers to the questions whether there are unscientific elements in philosophy and vice versa have to be found. It will most probably turn out that both are valid which in turn means that philosophy and science are overlapping concepts going beyond their cross section.

There is but a step from this method to inductive logic, one we are not going to make yet. The problem is that graphic concepts work within clearly defined borders, but are the concepts of science and philosophy clearly defined? It they were so the answer to the question would be easy to find, but unfortunately, there are no clear definitions of the above concepts and they remain rather vague. There is, of course, the theory of fuzzy sets but in this case, it is even less useful than the lacking definitions. The same is valid for the probability theory despite its success. How can we possibly define ‘unscientific’? Anything, which is scientific today, could be scientific tomorrow. As regards ’philosophical’ defining it baffles me. Hence not only is this method of study clumsy but it is also rather uncertain. It is to put it this way a rather unrewarding labor. And indeed although formal logic as a system has been around for a long time very few people are inclined to use it. The comparison of schemes in such a logic system hides numerous under - water reefs such as an erroneous comparison to a similar scheme. I will now leave the subject for it is my intent to subject formal logic to a more detailed criticism later on.

2. d. In contrast to the methods examined above, analogy is used on a regular basis. The curious thing is that hardly anybody realizes it. With men of history, men of dynamics and men of graphics analogies are predominantly encyclopedic (factual), dynamic or graphic. A man of history is aware that over the centuries the concepts of science and philosophy have changed beyond recognition a number of times, and hence they will change in the future as well. For this reason, men of history, considering the current state of affairs, leave themselves a loophole as big as the triumphal arch in Paris, in order to change their conclusions if there is a necessity for it. Men of dialectic are no lesser supporters of the conception of development and change than men of history, but being disciples of a sufficiently big philosophical school, they are forced to offer a specific conclusion. Therefore, they find such a correlation between the time and the relationships between the subjects that it would appear valid to anyone (if they were able to understand it) no matter what. Men of graphics, on the contrary, are inclined to simplify things. And their way of reasoning, at least in this respect, comes closest to inductive logic (analogy being their strongest tool), although the mechanisms of formal and inductive logic are radically different. Thus, analogy can be found everywhere, whether people realize it or not, and in most cases it is the element of the process of learning which plays a crucial part in making a decision concerning the form of the conclusion.

However, if we ponder, analogy demands a detailed knowledge of the case, because, in accordance with the mentioned above, there is always the risk of making a faulty logical connection if the problem is not identified properly. It is for this reason that I have considered in detail all other forms of analysis of a particular case, for in inductive logic such knowledge is necessary. In it, given that a sufficiently correct system of analogies is made, the element of creative intuition which is part of the former conclusions, will be scientifically explained. However, let us see the overall situation, and in this way enter the theoretical part: let us consider, as far as it is possible at this stage, a superficial example of this kind of thinking. First, from a historical point of view, from a part of philosophy or rather a manifestation of philosophy science has evolved into an entirely different branch of knowledge. Therefore it could be stated with high percentage of probability that it is a regular process and (with a lower percentage of probability) that it is a one way process. Second, from the point of view of the dynamics of the relationship between science and philosophy, it becomes clear that there is a frequent overlap of domains and problems specific for either science or philosophy. Therefore, there is an overlap of problems (or objects of study). Third, here the model is different. Although science and philosophy overlap, they should be two separate subjects if they do not equate. Fourth, we could represent the above said as a glass of water which accommodates small metallic particles. At first the contains are a homogeneous mixture but gradually the metal sinks to the bottom drawn by Earth's gravity. But this process is never completed, and even if it is, there will still be water among the particles, philosophy 's legacy. The problems solved by philosophy and science stir the mixture to the effect that there is always some overlap between the two substances. If there are no problems to solve, the metal will fall to the bottom and the water will evaporate.

Therefore, we can make the following conclusion: Philosophy and science are two parts of one whole - knowledge. They are differentiated by their tasks: the theorizing in philosophy and the usefulness of science. This is the conclusion. It will be foolish to further particularize the 'glass' model and ask if the contains should be these and not others, why a glass and not anything else, if knowledge is limited (by the way it is) and so on and so forth. We do not unfold fables, we strive to aid science. I can already allow myself the liberty to call philosophy a science. What is of interest and importance here is something else. The visualization we have used offers us additional properties of the phenomena such as the following: The force of gravity which pulls the particles downwards offers an analogy with the force which separates science from philosophy, namely applicability or the public benefit. The reason for all this is nowhere else but in that that the object of study has a material nature. Logic and science build a model of the material world. They can never go beyond its boundaries because they are a part of it.

3. Here we are about to deal with problems which I cannot qualify in any other way but as a vast forest festering with fanatics, former members of several gangs, whose coups used to upset even the treasuries of kings. At present the number of the gangs has been reduced to two rather big ones, which are so consumed by the division of the forest that they forget to rob the passing treasuries. For this reason I do not know if I should be afraid of entering the forest or not. I am envisaging the two biggest philosophical schools - Idealist Philosophy and Materialist Philosophy. I will allow myself to offer a brief retrospection on this matter:

Friedrich Engels, the man who was closely studied by capitalists scared by his ideas, in cotrast to comunists who didn’t, for they were convinced that a British spy could not occupy the post of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created an extraordinarily orderly system for classifying the problems of philosophy, their solutions, and therefore the different movements and schools. He arrived at the conclusion that being is the subject of every philosopher. Hence he brought up the questions which every philosopher strives to answer, namely ‘What is primary in the world?’ and ‘Is the world cognizable?’, which he called the two sides of the basic philosophical question (i.e. What is being?). Thus, the schools of philosophy can be divided into materialist and idealist ones. As regards the cognoscibility of the world, if they believe that it is cognoscible,they are men of dialectics, otherwise they are metaphysicals. Here we have to mention that the term ' metaphysics' was for synonymous with 'philosophy' a long time in the antiquity and denoted a science of the order of the world, the absolute and the supernatural. It is best translated as 'superphysics'. That is why, being unable to find a reason to replace it with anything else, I will examine philosophy from this point of view and no other.

We have now reached the conflict between materialism and idealism. Both schools present proof of the fact that the beginning of all is either the matter or the idea with such consistency and constancy that one would think if they succeeded the universe would be bequeathed to them. When subjected to serious consideration, it becomes apparent that this is not a conflict of philosophies but of moral values - materialists reject the very thought of divine will as an agent in the creation of the world, they would not even talk about it, whareas idealists cannot, be it for a moment, admit that the universe is built of small mobile particles and nothing else, and in accordance with this logic man is only human. This debate has been prompted by the development of science and the demands it posed on philosophy as regards the method. I believe all parties are right.

3.a. Giving an answer to 'Why?' I intend to consider the relationships between these two schools on the one hand, and on the other between them and science, and to offer an example of inductive logic.

Should we admit that a conflict exists, it would be logical to assume that one of the two sides gains the upper hand over the other for a time. So let us assume that a man of genius was born some time ago and has recently offered an explanation of some mysteries. It already becomes clear that Materialism has gained an advantage. But the answers bring up new questions, or to put it in other words, the greater the knowledge the greater the ignorance. And while we are waiting for another genius to be born, idealists offer all sorts of supernatural explanations.

In general terms, from this rather synthetic model one could draw the following conclusions: First, materialism is boosted by its own scientific accomplishments while idealism is boosted by the pending problems in science, which can only be solved with a recourse to supernatural forces. Second, science does not evolve gradually but in phases which begin with a scientific discovery and end with its incorporation within the science. Third, all these changes resemble circling round a centre which in turn moves in some direction, and in this way different parts of the wheel come to the front at different times. Because this centre could not be anything else but the knowledge about being, it should be relatively slow, but since we are talking about a 'wheel', the situation acquires a rather different dimension: the natural course of events alternately pushes Materialism and Idealism to the front, for if one of the two retained its prominent position, the wheel would come to a halt. This notion is sufficient enough for us.

3. B. If we ask ourselves the question ‘Which is primary?’, envisaging materialism and idealism rather than mind and matter, we will be compelled to return to the time when philosophy came into being, in order to assess the relationship between the questions man asked himself, the answers of the questions, and then to project all this onto our understanding. If we assume that we are going to examine an answer to a question, we could easily mislead ourselves, in accordance with the previous subsection that Materialism is prior to Idealism. However, the previous subsection was dedicated to the scientific solution to problems and scientific explanations of phenomena. Is it really the same in our case? If we ponder, we will see that the first philosophical question mustn’t have been radically different from the basic philosophical question posed by Engels: ‘What is being?’ Different versions of it would be: ‘Who am I?’, ‘What is the meaning of my life?’, ‘What place do I take among the rest?’ etc. But there is another approach as well. If we define the term ‘philosophy’ as ‘knowledge’ about the question ‘What is being?’, then the moment the question was asked for the first time was the moment philosophy was born. However, this presumes the absolute nature of the above taxonomy. That is why, and in view of the fact that the logical scheme is a tautology, I would not adopt such an approach to deal with a problem, but let us imagine the answer to such a question. Consider the following situation: A primitive man sees a falling star and wanders: ‘Do stars really fall from the sky? Then it seems they die as well. But what is death?’ and so on and so forth. What explanation could a man like him give to himself? He was aware of his insignificance because he was afraid of the elements. He noted that the seasons changed as if to do somebody’s bidding. The conclusion is that at such a moment the primitive man created the deity and explained everything he could not find a rational explanation of with divine intervention. To all theologians’ shame this is the best interpretation of the concept of god for all time. God is the world, nature, life and death. Since then people have been attributing their own faculties to god and curiously enough claiming to know god’s will, forgetting that ‘will’ is another human property.

Therefore, we cannot possibly consider such an answer materialist but idealistic. For this reason, idealism is the first philosophical doctrine. Due to its origins, it cannot define the beginning of all as matter, for thus it will render itself senseless. On the contrary, materialism supercedes idealism, because it is not necessary to explain everything with the concept of god, all the more the possibilities to explain things otherwise become more and more. Hence it seems logical to explain everything with physical matter and its particular transformations. So, in the long run idealism remains a citadel of ignorance, stormed from all directions, and still standing, not because of its strength, but because of the attackers’ weakness. The funny thing is that the more walls fall the harder the storm becomes. Then it seems the attackers need a Trojan horse. Such a Trojan horse would be, I will no longer vex you, the recognition of the existence of god by materialism. Anyhow, the gradual slowing down of science’s advancement has its rather pragmatic explanation: Science becomes more and more abstract; it enters realms devoid of human experience or others where human experience could not exist. Let us take for example the physics of elementary particles. There scientists are forced to evaluate the phenomena with the help of circumstantial indications, which cannot guarantee success at all, because they do not possess the evidence to evaluate phenomena circumstantially. This is exactly one of the tasks this work is assigned to perform: to offer a logical scheme which will not be influenced by the lack of concrete experience, an impossible task at first sight, but one which becomes fully possible as a corollary of a law we will draw later.

3. c. Skipping the graphic analysis, simply because it is a part of the logical construction, I have already promised to you, we will say a few words about inductive logic constructions. They are a unity of inductive logics in which the course of reasoning and reaching of a conclusion within a certain inductive logic are transferred to another. In other words, it is an analogy between analogies. What is peculiar here is the speed of the logical synthesis: at first when the first inductive logic is made, it is smaller by far in comparison with the one in formal logic. Consequently, it goes to such dimensions that - by means of analogies between different sciences - a conclusion about another one could be made. I feel compelled to repeat it – this method is mostly for scientists. The power of these constructs can create a new science with ease, forestalling its creation by decades.

At the beginning of the example I will voice my conviction that the reader has already noticed the striking resemblance between the relationships between science and philosophy and idealism and materialism. Thus he can make certain ambiguous conclusions without aid. However, let us start from the very beginning. If we examine the current stage of development, we will see that both sides pretend to be right or, in other words, pretend to have made the right conclusions - first as regards the opponent, second as regards their relationship with the opponent, and third as regards themselves. On the other hand, both sides in the two kinds of relationships share one and the same subject matter. Similarities could be found both in the historical development of the parties involved and in their relationships. Hence, using the already deployed scheme, we can make the conclusion that the relationship between materialism and idealism are the same as that between philosophy and science. However, in this case this is not sufficient enough, for we have already seen that their relationships are rather similar but the question is: which side in one of the relationships can be juxtaposed with its counterpart in the other one? The answer is easy enough if the problems and their solutions in all the four cases are subjected to careful consideration. If we consider the question of applicability and usefulness, we will notice that both science and materialism see experience as a criterion by which they judge the correctness of every conclusion. All the more, both science and materialism reach the highest peaks in their development in history at the times when the greatest practical discoveries are made. Therefore, philosophy’s counterpart is idealism, and science’s is materialism. It would be particularly wrong to assume that materialism is not a philosophy. What is our error? We transform the analogy into comparison through identity. If so, the distance which the schemes of inductive logic in the inductive logical construct, wrought with the peculiarity of their nature, must maintain is lost - thus the objects juxtaposed become a blur. That is to say, that analogy could mean proximity but not equivalence. The theoretical explanation of all this will be provided in due time.

In fact discovering begins only now, made possible by the inductive logical constructions. It is a feature of a kind of logic which I can define as a 'reflective effect'. In general terms, it can be explained in the following way: when we create an inductive logical construction we do it on the basis of a superficial juxtaposition of one thing with another. Once we make a conclusion, it has to be verified, which can be best done by juxtaposing features and phenomena of the two objects we have not considered yet. If there are analogies between them too, then the conclusion must be correct. Here's the rub! The two objects might share a set of features, but since we are only familiar with those of one of the objects we can only guess the existence of an analogous set in the other. The verification in this case is mostly a prerogative of practice. Therefore we are discovering new unsuspected characteristics and properties. It is precisely this capacity of inductive logical constructions to translate that generates their innate power.

If we subject to consideration the same construction once more, provided that idealism is prior to materialism in the system of their relationship, we dare say that philosophy is prior to science - a statement we claimed to be a historical fact, and which rather resembles a tautology. It is the time I noted that in inductive logic in contrast to formal logic such a concept cannot exist, that is to say the conclusion and premises are not genetically related. The only concept which comes close to it is that of identity, which is always apparent and for this reason can be easily avoided. But let us go back. Before philosophy as such came into being, there was practice which created a prerequisite for its appearance. Philosophy incorporated practice, adding its own system and a set of unverified hypotheses. The mechanism of scientific discovery is approximately the same. Then by analogy, if we remove the system from idealism the only thing that remains is being. Thus we have reached the question 'Which is primary?, without being able, for the time being, to determine whether it is matter or the idea. Practice comes to the rescue from the other part of the construction. It seems that we are looking for something that anticipates materialism the same way practice anticipates the system of philosophy. Since practice has a more concrete and material nature, materialism should be what we are looking for, otherwise we could not place matter anywhere in the system of science. And yet, if we assigned ourselves the task to give the idea a primary status (i.e. to place it before matter) I would ask ' An idea about what?'. Even if we choose to be doubtful about this conclusion our doubt will vanish when we append the reason - matter axis to this construction.

Thus, I have defended before the reader my philosophical views as belonging to the school of materialism and dialectical materialism in particular, although I will be anathematized first by their adherers. I am convinced that there is no other approach which can lead to real scientific results and offer real methods of studying the phenomena and processes in the world. That is why, trying not to be a slave to any system of beliefs and complying with my conscience of a scientist, I stand firmly behind this solid scientific method.

4. In this case we should ask where the philosophy of dialectical materialism stands in the modern world. During the cold war, the children born in the East came to this world shouting they were Marxists, while in the West, although most scientists were materialists by nature, they did not advertise their progress in their study of Marxism, for the ones who financed scientific endeavor seldom required from scientists any views whatsoever but demanded better results, and if possible profitable ones. Nowadays the situation in the East and the West is the same.

Science deserves a better consideration. At the end of the XIX c. and during the whole of the XX c. science made a considerable progress; discoveries whose listing would be insulting the reader’s intelligence were made. Most incredible machines were built, most incredible theories were created, and if we consider the world the way we do now, we can conclude that the scientific dialectical materialism was ‘to the front of the wheel.’ But let us not confuse the philosophical system with the political system, although they share the same destiny by mere coincidence; at least until now. During the last years of the XX c. we have seen a slowing down of the pace. The only thing which is still marked by development is computers and this is so only because it is now possible. We all know that the idea of making computers dates back to the beginning of the century. Then what is the thing that stopped the progress of science? What is that thing that stands in the way and science feels powerless to remove it? It is in this case reason itself, science’s very begetter. This in turn means that the wheel has probably made a turn since the beginning of the century. And indeed problems such as parapsychology, clairvoyance, telepathy etc. which reason poses, have, it seems, turned out to be too complicated for science to solve at this phase of its development, and until they are solved in a reasonable way there will be people who will go as far as to deny the possibility of learning about reason and the world. I do not harbor the illusion that I will be able to explain all of these phenomena; I have a more modest goal – I will be content if the model I am about to present will aid the study of these phenomena through the method I have to offer. This means that the topic will be considered as much as to evaluate how the mental processes comply with the laws and the fundamental principles which rule over matter. If a contradiction is found, it will be a sign that the particular function of the brain is either different or our concept of matter and its laws is wrong. Luckily, our model rules out the last possibility.

Without knowledge of the principles of logic our brain activity is based on, it is virtually impossible to create artificial intelligence; such an attempt would be a leap into the unknown and the odds that it will succeed are so small that not a single person endowed with reason will ever attempt it. I consider those who nevertheless do so snubs who know in advance the results of their experiments. Viewed from a different angle, it seems that science does not possess the reformist potential to create a theory which will explain the mechanism of mental processes. It will either pore on the human brain or in its desire to create artificial intelligence and at last it will lodge in it the principles of formal logic, neglecting the fact that the amount of computer memory renders the attempt senseless. In both cases, there is a dead end ahead. Later we will see why. It is time science overcame its haughty attitude toward philosophy, resembling the treatment children receive from their parents, and asked for help, because the greatest struggle against ignorance is at hand, and as the story goes science will triumph sooner or later. This will not become a reality only if idealism is sought. One cannot explain anything if it is accepted as a postulate in advance. How can we possibly explain reason if we believe it is what the universe begins with? The same is valid for Einstein’s postulates. If he had demonstrated their truth (later we will see that even a child can see it) he would not have lost himself in that erroneous stream of thoughts to die in doubt about the correctness of his theory. It is materialism and its dialectic in particular, closely connected to inductive logic that can work solid scientific wonders, because through it we can consider things we cannot see, and with the help of reason put them in close relationship with matter and its laws, and thus understand both reason and matter. The connection between reason and matter is so tight that the reader, provided he was familiar with it, might ask the question ‘Is the world so perfect?’

Before we open the specialized chapters I have to admit that I will present my research in its chronology, not only because it facilitates apprehension, but also because to build a house you have to start with the very foundations. The examples I have already offered to you serve the dual purpose to introduce you to the logic I will present to you at the end of this study and to help you accept the way I am going to present my thoughts. If I had decided to begin this book with the theoretical part, the reader would not understand but rather wonder that it works, and this is something from which no one can profit. Let no one be worried by the diversity of the considered problems. The fact that they all are within this book demonstrates the astounding unity of matter in its variety.


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